' This appeal is directed against the order dated 21.11.2013 passed by learned Civil Judge, Khanewal, whereby he dismissed the application of the appellant for the grant of temporary injunction moved by him in a suit for specific performance.
2. The facts, in brief, are that the appellant instituted a suit for specific performance, contending therein that Mst. Bashiran Bibi, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents/defendants entered into an agreement to sell with him in respect of land measuring 48 kanals 2 marlas situated at Chak No. 79/10-R (the details whereof have been set out in the plaint) for a consideration of Rs.36,00,000/-. It was further averred in the plaint that out of the total consideration of Rs.36,00,000/- the plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.30,00,000/- as earnest money in the presence of the witnesses while the balance of the sale consideration amounting to Rs.6,00,000/- was to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the sale-deed. It was further maintained by the plaintiff that the agreement to sell was not reduced into writing because of the close relationship between the vendor and the vendee.
3. The defendants entered appearance, filed written statement and vehemently denied all the assertions made by the plaintiff. It was specifically denied by them that their mother ever entered into verbal/oral agreement to sell with the plaintiff. The receipt of the earnest money was denied as well.
4. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff/appellant also moved a miscellaneous application for the grant of temporary injunction. It was specifically prayed by him that the respondents/defendants be restrained from alienating the suit land and from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land.
5. As stated above, the learned trial Court seized _with the suit dismissed the application moved by the appellant for the grant of temporary injunction vide, order dated 21.11.2013, the validity whereof has been assailed through the instant appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant had a strong prima facie case that balance of -convenience also lies in his favour; that if the injunction sought by the appellant is refused, he would suffer irreparable loss; that a huge amount of Rs.30,00,000/- was paid to late Mst. Bashiran Bibi and her legal heirs are bound to transfer the suit land to the appellant; that oral agreement is as good an agreement as the one in writing; that the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land was not denied. In support of his propositions, he has placed reliance on the judgment reported as 'Mrs. Mussarat Shaukat Ali versus Mrs. Safia Khatoon and others' (1994 SCM R 2189).
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the documents annexed to the appeal, in addition to perusing the impugned order dated 21.11.2013.
8. It is hard to understand why the appellant paid a huge amount of Rs.30,00,000/-in cash to late Mst. Bashiran Bibi and if at all he made this payment to the deceased, why did he not get the suit land transferred in his name by means of a sale-deed or through a mutation attested in his favour.
In the absence of any proof of making of payment to the deceased through cheque(s)/pay order(s)/draft(s) etc., one would have to stretch one's credulity to believe in the assertions made by the appellant. The possession of the plaintiff over the suit land appears to be in the capacity of a co-sharer. Therefore, the appellant cannot make capital out of this fact. Even otherwise, mere possession of a person over a piece of land would not entitle him to the grant of temporary injunction as was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Muhammad vs. All Mehnga Khan' (2004 SCM R 1111). Furthermore, given the claim of the appellant that he did not get the oral agreement reduced into writing on account of his close relationship with the deceased lady, it would be an uphill task for him to prove the transaction in question and as to when, where and in whose presence the deal was clinched between the deceased lady and the plaintiff. Again, whether late Mst. Bashiran, Bibi, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants/ respondents had independent advice available to her at the time of the deal alleged to have been made by her with the plaintiff/appellant. All these facts are yet to be established by the appellant.
Therefore, as things stand it cannot be observed, even tentatively, that the appellant has a Prima facie case. In case respondents are restrained from dealing with the suit land as they please and an injunction is granted, respondents would be at a disadvantage. Therefore, neither the balance of convenience lies in favdtir of the appellant nor is he likely to suffer irreparable loss. And in the absence of any of the aforesaid ingredients, which are a prerequisite for the grant of temporary injunction, the Courts of law invariable decline to grant the relief asked for by the plaintiff.
9. The impugned order passed by the learned trial Court does not suffer, from any infirmity.
Apparently, the learned trial Court kept in view all the aspects of the conflicting claims made by the parties to the suit. It appears to have weighed pros and cons of the consequences which were likely to flow. From the grant or refusal 'of an injunction sought for by the appellant. To my mind, the learned trial Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction by dismissing the application of the appellant/plaintiff for the grant of temporary injunction.
10. For what has been stated above, this appeal challenging the order dated 21.11.2013 passed by learned Civil Judge, Khanewal being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed in limine.