' The appellant has assailed the vires of order dated 28-3-2006 passed by the learned Administrative Judge, Accountability Court No.III, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, whereby freezing of his property bearing No.482, Street No.17, Chaklala Housing Scheme-III, Rawalpindi, was confirmed.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that no reference was pending against the appellant before the Accountability Court so the learned Administrative Judge, Accountability Court No.III, Rawalpindi/Islamabad could have not passed an order to freeze the property as under section 12(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, only the trial court is vested with this power; that the appellant had nothing to do with the acts and omissions of Syed Muhammad Makhdoom Gillani; that the appellant is not connected with the commission of any offence as prescribed under section 9 of the Ordinance ibid; that no evidence is available with the NAB to connect the appellant with the commission of the alleged offence; that the impugned order suffers from material illegality/infirmity and that the Chairman, NAB, could have not delegated his powers under section 12 of the Ordinance ibid to the D.G., NAB or any other officer. In support of the contentions raised, reliance is placed on Al-Jehad Trust and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2011 SC 811).
3. On the other hand, learned ADPG for NAB has contended that the freezing order was passed by the D.G., NAB, to whom the powers have been delegated vide SRO No.712(I)/2005 dated 22-9-2004 duly published in the Gazette of Pakistan on 15-7-2005 and that the learned Judge has confirmed freezing order on perusal of the record placed before him through a self-contained and well reasoned order.
4. No doubt the learned trial court has also the powers to pass an order to freeze the property of an accused but under the same provision of law i.e. Section 12 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, the Chairman, NAB, is vested with this power with a condition that his order shall remain in force only for 15 days unless confirmed by the court to which the reference is to be sent as provided under proviso to section 12(c) of the Ordinance ibid. The plain reading of these two provisions would lead to the simple conclusion that the order of the Chairman, NAB, is subject to confirmation of the court before which the A reference lies, while order passed by the trial court does not require any confirmation. The impugned order confirms the order of the D.G., NAB, passed under section 12 of the Ordinance ibid. The contention that the D.G., NAB, had no power is also against the record as all the D.Gs. Of the Regional Offices, NAB, were delegated full powers of section 12 of the Ordinance ibid to freeze the property and the matters incidental thereto under the provisions of section 34-A of the Ordinance No.XVIII of 1999 in view of the SRO referred to above. The contention that the D.G., NAB, under whose orders the powers were delegated may not be in office at that time has no force because the same has not been substantiated by any tangible proof and this contention was not even raised before the learned trial court. Above all the appellant is a proclaimed offender. A proclaimed offender loses some of his normal rights. The contention that he was not connected with the commission of the offence is also without force as per record, he allegedly received a sum of Rupees more than 90 million, which was transferred from the account of Gillani Corporation to his account. An accused as per definition given in section 5(a) of the Ordinance ibid includes a person in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is or has been involved in the commission of any offence triable under the said Ordinance or is subject of an investigation or an inquiry by the NAB. Admittedly, the appellant was facing the inquiry at the relevant time and thereafter willfully absconded.
5. For the reasons supra, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. The instant appeal is without merits and the same is hereby dismissed.