' AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 4- 9-2013 of the learned High Court of Sindh, whereby the Constitutional Petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The facts material for disposal of the instant petition are that on 28-10-1985, the petitioner was appointed as Junior Engineer (Mech) in the Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as (OGDCL). On 7-10-2012, he made an application for correction in his date of birth from 6-6-1953 to 11-6-1956, on the strength of an Order dated 3-11-2011, passed by the E.D.O.
(Education), Jacobabad. Admittedly, his date of birth in all the relevant documents, which he provided at the time of entry into service of OGDCL, was 6-6-1953. The application of the petitioner for correction in his date of birth was rejected through Office Memorandum dated 7-2-2013. On 7- 3-2013, the petitioner, filed a Constitutional Petition before the High Court of Sindh, impugning the Office Memorandum dated 7-2-2013, praying for a direction to the respondents to treat his date of birth as 11-6-1956 instead of 6-6-1953 in the service record. On 5-6-2013, he stood retired from the service of OGDCL as Manager. The learned High Court, vide impugned judgment, dismissed the Constitutional Petition of the petitioner. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
3. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the learned High Court while passing the impugned judgment had fallen in error, dismissing the Petition on the ground that it suffers from unexplained laches. In support of his contention, he submitted that the petitioner has approached the learned High Court on serving of the impugned Office Memorandums dated 27-9- 2012 and 7-2-2013, whereas, the Petition was filed on 7-3-2013, therefore according to the learned Counsel, the Petition did not suffer from laches and the finding of the learned High Court on this issue was contrary to record.
4. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the learned High Court has erroneously held that issues raised in the Petition cannot be decided in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction unless comprehensive enquiry into the controversial and disputed facts is undertaken.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that the learned High Court had failed to take notice of the fact that the petitioner was discriminated against by the respondent in as much as the request of the petitioner for the correction of his date of birth was declined although similar requests made by Karam Ellahi, and Daryafat Khan were entertained by the respondent though the S.R.O.521(I) issued on 31st July, 2000 was in field. He next contended that the learned High Court in Constitutional Petition No,D-522 of 2009 allowed such request of correction of date of birth of one of the employee of OCDCL by its order dated 19-11-2009 and the respondent complied with the order by correcting the date of birth of the said employee.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner next contended that the Office Memorandums issued by the respondent in regard to the restriction in altering the date of Birth of an employee, are non- statutory in nature, therefore, such instruments cannot be sanctified by the learned High Court in a Constitutional Petition under Article 199. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner on 28-10-1985 was appointed as Junior Engineer (Mech.) and his date of birth in the Service Book was recorded as 6-6-1953. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it was an incorrect date of birth, for which the petitioner initiated process of correction of date of birth on 3-5-1982, much prior to his date of joining employment with the respondent. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the process of correction of the date of birth was completed on 3-11-2011 and the petitioner made Representation to the Managing Director of the respondent on 7-10-2012. The learned Counsel submitted that in support of his application for correction of date of birth, the petitioner submitted documentary evidence comprising of the order of E.D.O. (Education) Jacobabad issued on 3-11-2011, School Leaving Certificate Primary/Secondary Section, Publication in the local newspapers, NIC, Birth Certificate and Entry in General Registers of Primary and Secondary Section besides Medical Certificate issued by Civil Surgeon Jacobabad.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the face of aforesaid material coupled with fact that the respondent earlier had allowed correction of the date of births of the employees, the learned High Court without adverting to the aforesaid material had dismissed the Petition by the impugned judgment on the grounds not warranted in law. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the judgments in the cases of Administrative Committee of High Court of Sindh through Registrar, High Court of Sindh, Karachi and another v. Arjun Ram K. Talreja and another (2008 SCM R 255) and Qazi Chand Muhammad v. Province of Sindh and others (2009 SCM R 269).
7. As against this the learned Counsel representing the respondent has contended that the respondent has issued Circular No,AAO103-15 dated 16-10-2001, through which clarified that the date of birth declared at the time of entry into service shall be treated as final and no amendment will be allowed in it at any stage. The said Circular referred to the earlier letter No, AAO103-15 dated 6-3-1989. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner, at the time of joining the respondent had filed a number of documents which mentioned his age as 6-6-1953, and when the petitioner reached the age of retirement, he maneuvered documents with mala fide object to get his date of birth altered in order to continue in service after the date of superannuation. The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that in terms of Office Memorandum dated 31-7-2000, the date of birth declared at the time of joining the service shall be treated as final and no amendment shall be allowed in it at any stage. He contended that the judgments cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable on facts and has supported the impugned judgment.
8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. It is not in dispute that the petitioner at the time of joining the service of the respondent-Organization had submitted the following documents:---
(i) Secondary School Certificate issued by BISE Hyderabad.
(ii) Petitioner's CNIC No,401-53-026018.
(iii) Certificate of Registration with Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC).
(iv) Personal Bio-data signed by the petitioner with the application dated 21-7-1984 for his appointment.
(v) Personal Data Form.
(vi) Verification Roll duly filled-in and signed by the petitioner on 28-10-1985.
9. In the aforesaid documents, the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 6-6-1953. The petitioner stood retired on 5-6-2013, on attaining the age of superannuation on the basis of aforesaid documents. It is also rot in dispute that notification of retirement of the petitioner was issued on 12-12-2012, which mentioned his date of retirement as 5-6-2013 and on 7-3-2013 the petitioner filed the Constitutional Petition before the learned High Court of Sindh, whereas the petitioner on 7-10-2012, made representation to the respondent for correction of his date of birth as 11-6-1956 instead of 6-6-1953. The petitioner's representation was rejected. The petitioner in the Constitutional Petition has pleaded that he acquired the knowledge of incorrect date of birth in the year 1982, and approached the Education Department and the E.D.O. Jacobabad, by his order dated 3-11-2011, corrected his date of birth as 11-6-1956. Admittedly, the petitioner made representation for correction of his date of birth after serving his department for more than 20 years, at a stage when he was nearing retirement. The petitioner has not offered any plausible explanation either in the Constitutional Petition or before us justifying inordinate delay in correcting of the date of birth.
10. It is not conceivable that the petitioner, who joined service of the respondent-Organization in the year 1985, sought correction of his date of birth prior to joining the service in the year 1982 and it took him more than 20 years to get his date of birth corrected in the relevant record. Even at the time of joining the service, the petitioner did not reserve his right to seek amendment in the date of birth nor placed any material reflecting that he has approached any Authority for correction of his date of birth while joining service with the respondent.
11. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner immediately on obtaining the documents which mentioned his correct date of birth i.e, 11-6-1956, approached the respondent-Organization and then the learned High Court and, therefore, his Writ Petition was not hit by laches, has no force, as, admittedly, the petitioner in terms of Circulars No,AAO103-15 dated 6-3-1989, 16-10-2001 and 29-3-2006 was required to declare his correct date of birth at the time of joining the service of OGDCL. Under the said circulars, it was provided that the date of birth declared at the time of entry into service shall be treated as final and no amendment will be allowed in it any at stage. The petitioner, on the basis of subsequent documents, which were obtained by him on the basis of affidavit after more than 20 years of his service with the respondent, could not seek correction of his date of birth to nullify the earlier documents submitted by him, which mentioned his date of birth as 6-6-1953. The learned High Court, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case was justified in holding that the Writ Petition of the petitioner was barred by laches.
12. The other contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the other employees of the respondent-Organization were allowed correction in their dates of birth, the learned Counsel for the respondents has informed us that all of them have retired. The petitioner, even otherwise, has not placed material either before the High Court or before us to establish that his case was at par with those employees, whose dates of births were corrected by the respondent by amending their service record. In any event, the circulars referred to above, clearly show that the date of birth declared by an employee of the Company at the time of joining the service would be final and no amendment can be made in it at a subsequent stage. Therefore, even if the respondent has wrongly corrected and or amended the date of birth, of any employee, it would not confer any right upon the petitioner to get his date of birth corrected on the ground of discrimination as such act of amending/altering the dates of birth of any employee by the respondent, on the face of it was contrary to the language of the Circulars/Office Memorandums.
13. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Circulars issued by the respondent do not have statutory status, therefore, the respondents in law, were restrained from relying upon such circulars which restrict the amendment in the date of birth in the service record.
We are not impressed by the contention of the learned Counsel. Admittedly, the respondent- Organization has statutory Service Rules and issue of date of birth, even if is not mentioned in these Rules can be made applicable by issuing administrative instructions which are in line with the service law. In this respect we could not loose sight of the Provisions of Rule 12A of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, which specifically provides that the date of birth once recorded at the time of joining government service shall be final and thereafter no alteration in the date of birth of a Civil Servant shall be permissible. In the first place, the respondent-Company in order to regulate the service of its employees had issued S.R.O.521(I) on 31-7-2000, with the identical terms and since than no alteration in the date of birth of any employee could be allowed by the respondent. We have also perused the order of the learned High Court passed on 19-11-2009 in C.P. No,D-522 of 2009, which is authored by one of us. The facts which reveal from the order are distinct from the facts of the present case. Moreover the learned High Court was not properly assisted in the said case in as much as that the respondent has not brought in the notice of the Court, the circulars which restricted the amendment in the date of birth, therefore, the order of the nature will be of no help to the petitioner, which we believe was passed without proper assistance.
14. We have also examined the documents relied upon by the petitioner for the purpose of correction of the date of birth of the petitioner. The contents of these documents are required to be proved in terms of the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The certificate issued by the E.D.O (Education) Jacobabad, authorizing the change in the date of birth of the petitioner has no legal sanctity nor could bind the respondent to change and or amend service record. The medical certificate issued by the Civil Surgeon, Jacobabad, is also of no significance as the Civil Surgeon has not formed his opinion on the basis of Radiological Reports which are essential for determining the age of a person. The academic certificates obtained by the petitioner were based on the affidavit sworn in by the petitioner and cannot sanctify the correct date of birth, unless this material is proved before a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction by recourse to the Civil Suit. The petitioner has also challenged the circulars dated 6-3-1989, 16-10-2001 and 29-3-2006 which were issued way back through the Constitutional Petition after a lapse of 20 years and no explanation has been offered by the petitioner either in the Constitutional Petition or before us to justify as to what prevented him from challenging these circulars immediately on his joining the service.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered view that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity, which could warrant interference. Consequently, this petition is dismissed and leave refused.