1. ' Petitioners are special persons (disabled) as defined under Ordinance No.XL f 1981 f the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (referred to as the 1981 Ordinance) and their names are duly registered in the Employment Exchange, that was created under section 5 of the 1981 Ordinance. The petitioners were employed in October, 2000 and in February, 2012 they were retrenched from service on the ground f reorganization of respondent No.4. The petitioners have challenged their retrenchment seeking a declaration that the same be declared unlawful. Apart from such declaration the petitioners have also sought direction to the respondent No.4 to fulfill its obligations under the 1981 Ordinance for observing 2% quota reserved for disabled persons.
2. ' Counsel for the petitioners argued that he would not press the ground f legality f retrenchment but would only be seeking enforcement f provisions of 1981 Ordinance. He argued that Pakistan has ratified Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) Convention, 1983 and therefore the provisions of the Ordinance are to be given effect and the employment quota for the disabled persons is to be maintained by every institution which comes within the ambit of 1981 Ordinance.
3. ' On the other hand counsel for the respondent No.4 argued that KESC is not amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction f this court and therefor, the petition may be dismissed as not maintainable. In support of his arguments he relied upon decisions of the court as well as of the Supreme Court that are reported as 2012 PLC (C.S.) 1205, 2008 CLC 339, 2009 PLC (C.S.) 888, 2001 PLC 607, 2010 PLC (C.S.) 899=2011 SCMR 333. He also argued that provisions f 1981 Ordinance are no more enforceable as after the 18th amendment all the labour laws are to be made by provincial governments as the labour has now become subject f the provinces.
4. ' In response to the arguments of counsel for the respondent No.4, the petitioners' counsel referred to Article 141 of the Constitution read with Item No.32 f the Fourth Schedule which reads as follows :- -- "141. Extent of Federal and Provincial laws.---Subject to the Constitution, [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] may make laws (including laws having extra-territorial operation) for the whole or any part of Pakistan, and a Provincial Assembly may make laws for the Province or any part thereof."
5. ' Item No.32 of the Fourth Schedule "[32. International treaties, conventions and agreements and International arbitration. ]"
6. ' He states that by virtue of provisions of Article 141 read with Item No.32 of the Fourth Schedule it is evident that 1981 Ordinance is in line with international treaty/convention and thus Ordinance comes within the ambit f Item No.32 of the Fourth Schedule f the Constitution and within the competence of Federal legislature being a Federal subject and thus duty is cast upon all establishments governed under the said Ordinance to maintain quota for disabled persons.
7. ' The 1981 Ordinance was promulgated to rehabilitate disabled persons through employment. It is a beneficial legislation. The establishments defined under the said Ordinance were required to maintain quota for employing special persons (disabled persons). We are of the view that 1981 Ordinance cannot be strictly called law for workmen only but the real purpose is to provide employment to disabled persons. We have noticed that judgments referred to by counsel for respondents No.4 apply to organization whose employees' services are not protected by statutory laws and where the services of the employees are protected by statutory laws only then jurisdiction f this court under, Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. However, in the present case the petitioners are seeking enforcement of the provisions contained in Ordinance XL of 1981 which is a beneficial legislation intended to rehabilitate disabled persons. There is no special judicial or quasi judicial forum available for providing efficacious remedy for enforcement of the rights f disabled persons hence, jurisdiction of this court under Article 199 of the Constitution can be invoked. It is an admitted position that the petitioners were permanent employees of the respondent No.4 who had been employed in the year 2000 and their services were terminated in 2012 on the ground of retrenchment. During these 12 years they have been discharging their duties without any stigma. Suffice to say that when services f an employee are terminated on the ground of retrenchment it does not leave stigma on his service record and if a law entitles him to be retained on employment on certain conditions then if he fulfills the requisite criteria then his services cannot be retrenched. In the present case question of the retrenchment of the petitioners, who are disabled persons, should have been examined by respondent No.4 keeping in view the quota reserved for disabled persons.
8. ' We therefore, direct respondent No.4 to first apply the quota under the 1981 Ordinance to the petitioners' case. After maintaining 2% quota in case the petitioners' services remain protected then the petitioners shall be re-employed.
9. ' With these directions the petition stands disposed of.