' ATHAR MINALLAH, J.---Briefly stated, the petition was fixed before this Court as an Objection Case.
The Office raised an objection that the petitioner had no locus standi to file the instant petition.
Overruling the objection, the petition was taken up for hearing.
2. As the objection is removed, therefore, it is deemed that this petition is numbered and the office is directed to assign the same.
Main Petition ' The petitioner is a Member of the Bar and argued the petition at length. Through the petition, he has challenged the vires of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The petitioner has further sought a direction to the respondents to enact a new law "after thorough deliberation, research and taking into consideration the work carried out by the petitioner. It is also prayed that guidelines may be laid down for fresh legislation".
2. The learned counsel read out the grounds taken in his petition, from 'A to Z'. He particularly stressed three grounds i.e,
(i) that there is no definition of a voter;
(ii) that it is a class based society, and as such the impugned legislation fails to cater to the needs of the under privileged and has become obsolete; and
(iii) Sections 14 and 15 of the impugned legislation have failed to ensure proper scrutiny of the candidates.
3. After hearing the learned counsel at length, the findings of this Court are as follows:
4. The contention of the petitioner that the law does not provide a definition of a voter is misconceived. The eligibility of a 'voter' is provided in Article 51(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution", as follows: ' Article 51(2):- A person shall be entitled to vote if-
(a) he is a. Citizen of Pakistan;
(b) he is not less than eighteen years of age;
(c) his name appears on the electoral roll; and
(d) he is not declared by a competent court to be of unsound mind,
5. The other grounds taken by the petitioner as articulated in the petition and during his arguments are 'purely' political in nature and at best can be termed as the political opinions of the petitioner.
His main thrust is on an article published in the daily "Khabrain" in support of elections on the basis of "proportional representation". The petitioner, therefore, on the basis of his political opinions has challenged the vires of the Act and seeks a direction to the committee constituted by the Majlis-e- Shura (the Parliament) for electoral reforms.
6. It is settled law that purely political questions are not justiciable.
' As a rule, political questions, as far as possible, should not be decided by Courts, and ought to be left for consideration to the wisdom of the Parliament. This rule, however, is not absolute, and the Courts do not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction of judicial review, if the aggrieved person can demonstrate that the question raised, though having a political content or complexity, involves a legal or constitutional issue. This Court concurs with the view taken in the case of "M/s. Hudablya Paper Mills Ltd. v. National Accountability Bureau' (PLD 2012 Lahore 515) that the doctrine of Political Question postulates two questions for determining whether the Court would exercise its jurisdiction, i.e,
(a) whether there is a legal standard or criteria to adjudge the issue, and
(b) whether it is desirable to decide the dispute in Court or should it be resolved by other organs of the State.
7. The fact that a question is political in nature will not deter a Court to exercise its powers of review, provided the same involves interpretation of the Constitution, or if the validity of such question is to be determined on the touchstone of the Constitution. Actions taken, acts done or policies framed in violation of the provisions of the Constitution or not permissible by law, regardless of the political context of the question, will not bar the jurisdiction of the. Court. However, purely political questions are outside the ambit of judicial review and, therefore, not justiciable. Reliance is also placed on "Watan Party and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others" (PLD 2012 SC 292), "Mehmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others" (PLD 1997 SC 426), "Khawaja Muhammad Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division Government of Pakistan and 18 others" (PLD 1988 SC 725), "S. A. Raft and another v. Government of West Pakistan through Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others" (PLD 1973 Lahore 539), and "United States v. Munoz-Flores" (United States Supreme Court) reported as 1997 SCMR 119.
8. It may also be emphasised that while examining the vires of the legislation enacted through the legislative process provided under the Constitution, the powers of the Courts are limited to examine whether the primary legislation is repugnant, inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, whether the legislature had the legislative competence as envisaged in the Constitution, and whether it violates or abridges the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The petitioner has not been able to raise any ground which may persuade this Court to exercise its jurisdiction, so as to go into the question of the B vires of the Act.
9. The narrative of the petitioner raises questions which essentially relates to the wisdom of the Parliament in enacting the Act. It is settled law that the wisdom of the Parliament in enacting a law is outside the scope of judicial review. As long as the legislature has the competence to legislate, the grounds or wisdom of legislation remains its exclusive prerogative. "There is a strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to the problems manifested by experience, and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds". 'Middleton v. Texas Power and High Co.' (249 US 152).
10. It has been aptly observed in 'Radice v. People of the State of New York' (264 US 292) that "Where the Constitutional validity of a Statute depends upon the existence of facts, Courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for a Judge to set up his opinion in respect of it against the opinion of the lawmaker".
11. The august Supreme Court of Pakistan observed in 'The State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49) as follows: "On the other hand it is equally important to remember that it is not the function of the judiciary to legislate or to question the wisdom of the Legislature in making a particular law if it has made it competently without transgressing the limitations of the Constitution. Again if a law has been competently and validly made the judiciary cannot refuse to enforce it even if the result of it be to nullify its own decisions. The legislature has also every right to change, amend or clarify the law if the judiciary has found that the language used by the Legislature conveys an intent different from that which was sought to be conveyed by it The Legislature which , establishes a particular Court may also, if it so desires, abolish it."
12. In the case of Sh. Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 504), the august Supreme Court has held that: "No mala fide can be attributed to the Parliament as it is a sovereign body to legislate on any subject, for which it has been empowered to legislate. The Court cannot strike down a statute on the ground of mala fide, but the same can be struck down on the ground that it is violative of the Constitution"
13. The wisdom of the Parliament is, therefore, not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court, let alone being substituted. Reliance is also placed on the case of "Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P and another" (PLD 1995 SC 66) and "Mr. A. K. Fazalul Qader Chaudhty v. Syed Shah Nawaz and others" (PLD 1966 SC 105).
14. Lastly, I advert to the question whether a direction can be made to the Parliament or the Sub- Committee constituted for the electoral reforms. The Constitution is the paramount law and is based on the concept of separation of powers. In the words of honourable Hamood-ur-Rehman, Chief Justice, in the case of "The State v. Zia-ur-Rehman and others" (PLD 1973 SC 49), that while exercising the power of judicial review, the judiciary claims no supremacy over the organs. Even where it declares a legislative measure unconstitutional and void, it does not do so because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity of the legislative power; but because the constitution has vested it with the power to declare what the law is in the cases which come before it. It merely enforces the Constitution where it comes in conflict with it. It is the Court's duty to see that the Constitution prevails.
15. It has been unequivocally held by the august Supreme Court in the case of 'AI-Jehad Trust through Habibul Wahab Al-Khairi, Advocate and 9 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad and 3 others' (1999 SCMR 1379) that no direction can be issued to the legislature to legislate a particular law. However, a direction can be issued to the executive authority to initiate "administrative and legislative measures" for complying with the mandate of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on 'An! Ali Zardari v. Federation of Pakistan and others' (PLD 1999 Karachi 54).
16. Moreover, the proceedings of the Sub-Committee constituted by the Parliament fall within its "internal proceedings" and, therefore, the same being outside the jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Article 69 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, a settled law and the mandate of the Constitution that neither can a direction be give to the legislature nor can it be dictated to regarding the manner in which it can legislate.
17. The petitioner being a competent member of the Bar ought to have exercised due care. It is the duty of both the Bench and the Bar to protect the process of the Court and endeavour that the public time of the Court is not wasted in frivolous litigation. Such litigation clogs the judicial system causing delays for the actual stakeholders i.e, the bonafide litigants and the general public. Delays caused by frivolous litigation subverts the course of justice for the bona fide litigants as, indeed, justice delayed is justice denied. It may also be noted that it erodes public confidence and trust in the judicial system.
18. In the light of the above, the petition is without any merit and not maintainable. The same is, therefore, dismissed with costs. The petitioner shall deposit Rs,10,000/- as costs. The costs shall be deposited with the Deputy Registrar (Accounts/DDO) of this Court within four (04) weeks, who shall handover the amount to the President District Bar, Islamabad for depositing the same in the fund established by the Bar for welfare of the young lawyers.