' M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, J.--Through this constitutional petition, the petitioner has sought indulgence of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 by making the following prayer:- "In view of the above, it is therefore respectfully prayed that instant Writ Petition may kindly be allowed and the respondents may kindly be directed to extend the lease period of the petitioner according to lease agreement for five,years and the impugned letter dated 18-9-2013 may graciously be set aside."
2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner entered into a lease agreement in respect of land measuring 3 acres situated at ABK Station. The agreement was executed on 15-10-2003 and was initially for a period of 10 years. The petitioner being lessee was under an obligation to pay an amount of Rs.10,500 per annum to the respondent Pakistan Railways. The initial period of 10 years expired on 15-10-2013 and thereafter a letter dated 18-9-2013 was issued by the Deputy Director, Property and Land, Pakistan Railways Multan, directing Assistant Executive Engineer, Pakistan Railways, Khanewal, to take over the possession of land leased out to the petitioner upon expiry of 10 years lease.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned letter dated 18-9-2013 is tainted with mala fide. It is further argued that the petitioner has a right that his lease period be extended for another period of 5 years after 5% increase over the initial approved bid in terms of clause (i) of the lease agreement. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Mahmood Ali Butt v.
Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 10 others (PLD 1997 SC 823) and Brig. Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim and others (PLD 2004 SC 271).
4. Conversely, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent department argued that the present writ petition is not maintainable as contractual obligations cannot be enforced by having a recourse to the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel for the respondent department has further argued that the railway land is a State property and the petitioner is getting benefit of the said land for the last 10 years by paying a rent of Rs.10,500 only and want to continue this gain/benefit for another period of 5 years. The learned counsel has placed on record bid receipt in respect of the property and, according to the said offer, Pakistan Railways has been offered Rs.60,500 per acre per annum which brings the total amount of rent of the land to Rs.1,81,500 which is about 20 times more than the amount which is being paid by the petitioner. It has been further argued that the policy has been framed by the competent authority and it is in pursuance to that policy that after a period of 10 years the lease of the petitioner has not been extended.
5. I have considered the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties.
6. As far the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Mahmood Ali Butt v.
Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 10 others (PLD 1997 SC 823), the relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced as under:-- "Before parting with this judgment, we may add that the plea that a High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction vested under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot direct payment of money in any case is without substance. The High Court normally does not entertain a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution to enforce the civil liability arising out of a breach of contract to pay the amount of money due to the claimant and ordinarily leaves it to the, aggrieved party to agitate the question in a civil suit filed for that purpose but an order for payment of money may be made in Constitution petition against State or its functionaries to enforce a statutory obligation."
7. Similarly, I am afraid that the judgment reported in Brig. Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim and others (PLD 2004 SC 271) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help to the petitioner wherein it has been held as under:-- "It is well settled by now that Article 199 casts an obligation on the High Court to act in aid of law, protect the rights of the citizens within the framework of the Constitution against the infringement of law and Constitution by the executive authorities, strike a rational compromise and a fair balance between the rights of the citizens and the actions of the State functionaries, claimed to be in the larger interest of Society. This power is conferred on the High Court under the Constitution and is to be exercised subject to Constitutional limitations. The Article is intended to enable the High Court to control executive action so as to bring it in conformity with the law. Whenever the executive acts in violation of the law, an appropriate order can be granted which will relieve the citizen of the effects of illegal action."
' This in itself indicates that whenever there is a violation of some constitutional right of a citizen or executive acts in a manner which is against law, High Court can interfere to bring the executive action in conformity with law and that interference should be subject to constitutional limitations.
In the judgment, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is abundantly clear that when the executive authorities act in violation of some law an appropriate writ can be issued by the High Court.
' Even otherwise the facts of the case, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are entirely different from the present case. In the judgment, referred to, the State land had been allotted in favour of the appellant who was an army officer while the land had already been allotted to the respondents. The act of re-allotment of land was challenged in the High Court and the High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, set aside the subsequent notification of allotment on the ground that the land was not available for allotment as the same had already been allotted to the respondents. Hence, the question of its further allotment without getting the same cancelled could not arise. Issuance of allotment in favour of the appellant was declared in violation to law and the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the judgment passed by the High Court.
8. In the opinion of this Court, the prayer clause of the writ petition in itself makes it explicit that the petitioner is, seeking the indulgence of this Court to direct the respondents to extend the lease period for another 5 years which, to my mind, is basically a relief which can only be granted in a suit for specific performance of a contract. The honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in a judgment reported in Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others (1998 SCMR 2268) has held as under:-- "While routine contractual disputes between private parties and public functionaries are not open to scrutiny under the constitutional jurisdiction, breaches of such contracts, which do not entail inquiry into or examination of minute or controversial questions of fact, if committed by the government, semi government or Local authorities or like controversies if involving derelictions of obligations, flowing from a statute, rules or instructions can be adequately addressed to for relief under the jurisdiction."
9. It is established from the dictum laid down by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan that routine contractual dispute between private parties and public functionaries are not open to scrutiny under the constitutional jurisdiction. To my mind, it is a settled proposition of law that writ would not lie to enforce a contract simplicitor.
' In every contractual matter giving rise the enforcement of contractual obligations or dispute which can be redressed through other remedy available under the law, writ petitions are entertained, then this would defeat the very purpose of law under which competent Courts are established and. Vested with jurisdiction under the law:
10. The petitioner, in order to seek enforcement and due observance of statutory rules and obligations on part of the public/executive functionaries, must successfully demonstrate that there exists in his favour clear and undisputed right or interest which needs to be recognized and respected and only then the petitioner can seek enforcement of corresponding obligations. I am fortified in my opinion by a judgment reported in Owaisco v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1999 Karachi 472) wherein the learned Division Bench of the Karachi High Court has held that writ petition is not maintainable to enforce a purely contractual obligation.
To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction, the petitioner is under an obligation to demonstrate that a vested right has accrued or is existing in his favour which he intends to get enforced through a writ of mandamus. The term "vested", according to Oxford English Dictionary, means "clothed, roped, dressed especially in ecclesiastical vestments---vested rights essentially differ from rights which are contingent---that is, completely created---vested interest may perhaps be defined as rights based not upon contracts but upon custom".
' As far the question of mala fide is concerned it is observed that the impugned letter dated 18-9- 2013 has been issued in pursuance to the policy formulated by the competent authority and has been made applicable throughout Pakistan. Mala fide is a question of fact and has to be specific and not vague in absence of which a policy, framed by the competent authority, could not be annulled on such ground alone.
11. As discussed earlier, the respondent department has received a bid of Rs.60,500 per acre per annum as against the approved bid of Rs.10,500 per annum which is being paid by the petitioner for 3 acres of land. I must observe that it is a consistent view of the superior Courts that discretionary relief, by way of writ, cannot be granted to help retention of ill-gotten gain even where the impugned action has been taken in deviation of certain recognized norms and procedures. The High Court, in writ jurisdiction, will not extend the protection to retain an undue gain and privilege. In the present case, when the respondent department is getting an amount of Rs.1,81,500 per annum for the property leased out to the petitioner for which the petitioner is paying a meagre amount of Rs.10,500 per annum. I shall not hold myself from observing that the railway land is a public property which belongs to the people of this country and cannot be allowed to be utilized as a peanut at a throwaway price/rent.
12. It would not be out of place to refer to a policy formulated by Pakistan Railways and circulated on 14-4-2014 which provides that railways land shall not be leased out for a period of more than 3 years. It further provides that no further extension beyond 10 years will be granted in case of already leased land. I must observe that under Article 199 of the of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, High Court, in absence of any illegality, arbitrariness or established mala fides, would not annul the policy framed by the competent authority and cannot sit as a court of appeal over the policy decision made by the executive as the same would amount to sit as a court of appeal over the policy decision and substitute the policy made by an executive by its own decision.
' If the present petition is allowed, it would mean that the policy framed by the competent authority has been nullified by this Court which would be in violation of the dictum laid down by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Dossani Travels Pvt. Ltd and others v. Messrs Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. And others (PLD 2014 SC 1) wherein the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that where a policy has been framed by a competent authority; then in absence of any illegality, arbitrariness or established mala fides it is not open for the High Court to annul the policy framed by the competent authority.
13. For what has been discussed above, this Writ Petition is dismissed.