1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.--The only question raised in this petition for leave to appeal, directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 27-9-1981 (in Writ Petition No. 2637 of 1980), is whether the application made by the respondent to the Labour Court on 25-4-1,979 against the order of his termination, passed on 18-1-1979, was within the limitation or not ?
2. According to the petitioners, the respondent had sent a telegram against the order of his termination to the Managing Director, Karachi, seeking his intervention and for re-instatement in service, but this request was rejected by him in a telegram sent to the respondent on 20-2-1979.
3. The Managing Director, also being the employer of the respondent, directed him that if he felt aggrieved by his decision he should have approached the Labour Court within a period of two months from the date of the aforesaid communication and, therefore, the application filed before the Labour Court on 25-4-1979 was out of time.
4. This question has been considered at great length by the Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal who have held that the Managing Director was not the employer of the respondent in the relevant regard and that the Branch Manager, who had actually passed the order of termination, was, in fact the employer and the respondent had duly been served with the grievance notice on 27-3-1979 and a reply thereto was received on 10-4-1979 and the application was filed to the Labour Court within two months after the receipt of the said reply.
5. The High Court, however, while deciding the writ petition, held in its impugned order that though it was possible to regard the Managing Director to be also the employer of the respondent, within the meaning of section 2 (8) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (hereinafter called the I. R. O.) in addition to the Branch Manager but it was to be noted that even after the aforesaid reply sent by the Managing Director on 20-2-1979 he had in a subsequent telegram sent to the respondent (on 21-3-1979 in response to his telegram dated 15-3-1979) advised him to contact Mr. Sartaj Hussain, Manager, Lahore "who is only competent to deal with your case" and he further stated that his petition -had been forwarded to him for necessary action. It was after the receipt of this telegram that the respondent moved a formal grievance notice before the Branch Manager at Lahore on 27- 3-1979 and that the said notice alone was the proper grievance notice contemplated under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the earlier telegram sent by the respondent on 18-2-1979 and the reply received thereto on 20-2-1979 could not be regarded as the formal grievance notice, within the meaning of the provisions of the I. R. O.
6. Kh. Habib Ullah, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of this petition, has drawn our attention to the terms of the telegram dated 20-2-1.979 sent by the Managing Director at page 77 of the record and has argued that its terms left no doubt that the service of the respondent had been terminated in accordance with law and no review of that decision was warranted. The grievance of the respondents had been attended to and rejected and thereafter he should have moved the Labour Court within two months.
7. We are, however, inclined to agree with the High Court that the telegram sent by the respondent on 18-2-1979 to the Officer higher than the Branch Manager, who terminated his nervices, was in the nature of a request for intervention to the higher authorities to save him and was not the formal grievance notice, as contemplated by section 25-A of the I. R. O. We consider that the provisions of Labour laws should be construed liberally and as they have been enacted to benefit workers, they should be construed in sense favourable to the interests of the employees and not used as a trap.'
8. Therefore, we are inclined to agree with the High Court that it was only the formal grievance notice sent by the respondent to the Branch Manager, who bad terminated his services, which should, in the circumstances of this case, be regarded as the formal grievance notice envisaged by the relevant law.
9. In any case, we observe that the respondent had filed an application under section 65-B of the I. R.
10. O. For the condonation of delay, as a measure of abundant caution and in the circumstances set out above, this was clearly a proper case in which the delay of five days was liable to be excused.
11. This is not a fit case for interference, which must therefore fail and is dismissed hereby.