ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J./MEMBER.--- This appeal under section 5 of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 1991 is directed against the impugned order/notification dated 12-5- 2005 passed by the respondent whereby appellant was dismissed from service.
2. Brief facts essential for adjudication of this appeal are that appellant was appointed as Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate on 16-1-1988. During his service the appellant earned adverse remarks touching integrity, etc. In his Annual Confidential Reports. The Authority after perusing the appellant's service record decided to dispense with the regular inquiry under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999 and issued a notice to the appellant on 6-10-2001 to show cause as to why penalty of dismissal from service be not imposed upon him on the charge of being guilty of corruption/reported to be corrupt falling within the purview of Rule 3(c) of the Rules (ibid). The appellant filed a representation under section 6(3)(c) of the Rules on 13-10-2001 against show-cause notice, which was declined by the Authority vide letter dated 25-10-2001 and he was directed to file reply to the show-cause notice within seven days. The appellant submitted reply to the show-cause notice denying all the allegations levelled against him in the said show-cause notice. The Authority after considering the appellant's reply to the show-cause notice unsatisfactory issued him final show-cause notice of dismissal from service. The appellant filed reply to final show-cause notice and also lodged a representation against the issuance of final show-cause notice. The Authority after providing an opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant dismissed him from service vide impugned Notification No,95/RHC/CJJ. Dated 12-5- 2005. Hence this appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that in the background of allegation of misconduct against the appellant necessitating a regular inquiry as ordered by the learned Authority the impugned order of dismissal without conducting a regular inquiry is illegal, against the principle of due process, untenable and liable to be set aside.
4. Conversely learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appellant earned adverse remarks with regard to his integrity in his Annual Confidential Reports which being a matter of record, holding of regular inquiry was not necessary; that no illegality or prejudice was caused to the appellant; that the impugned dismissal order has been passed by the Authority after perusing the whole service record of the appellant and providing him opportunity of hearing; that impugned dismissal order does not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error therefore appellant has no case to call for interference by this Tribunal.
5. We have given patient hearing to learned counsel for the parties and examined the record.
6. It would be advantageous to narrate the proceedings which culminated in the dismissal of the appellant. The appellant joined the subordinate judiciary as Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate on 16-1-1988. In the year 1995 he was serving as Civil Judge Ist Class Faisalabad when the learned Reporting Officer and learned Countersigning Officer evaluated him as a corrupt and dishonest officer in his Annual Confidential Report for the period from 1-1-1995 to 31-12-1995. The relevant extract of the said Annual Confidential Report of the appellant is as under:--- "PART V
(a) pen picture There were complaints about his integrity The Officer has recently performed UMRA and started using restraint.
PART VI
(c) Integrity Reported to be corrupt.
PART VII
(a) REMARKS OF THE COUTERSIGNING OFFICERDid not personally receive any complaint about his integrity but since his reporting officer has done so, he needs to be closely watched."
The above adverse remarks were conveyed to the appellant vide letter dated 31-7-1997. The appellant filed a representation for expunction of the adverse remarks before the respondent which was rejected vide order dated 27-3-1999. Being aggrieved appellant filed Service Appeal No,46 of 1999 before this Tribunal which was dismissed vide judgment dated 7-3-2002.
7. The same learned Reporting Officer recorded the following adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Report of the appellant for the period from 1-1-1996 to June, 1996:--- "PART III Attitude
(a) Financial responsibility Below Average PART V
(a) Pen Picture The officer has having reputation of being corrupt. He has paid no need to my counseling PART VI
(b) Fitness for Pro-motion Not yet fit for Promotion
(c) Integrity Reported to be Corrupt The said remarks were conveyed to the appellant through letter dated 17-8-2001 and his representation against the said adverse remarks was rejected vide letter dated 2-10-2001. The appellant filed Service Appeal No,90-2001 before this Tribunal which was dismissed vide judgment dated 7-3-2002.
8. The appellant challenged the judgment dated 7-3-2002 of this Tribunal dismissing his Service Appeals Nos.46 of 1999 and 90 of 2001 directed against the adverse remarks in his ACRs for the period from 1-1-1995 to 31-12-1995 and 1-1-1996 to June, 1996 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan by filing Civil Appeals Nos.633 of 2002 and 634 of 2002 which were dismissed vide judgment dated 4-12-2003. Being dissatisfied appellant lodged review petitions against the judgment dated 4-12-2003 before the Hon'ble apex Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 1-2-2007.
9. It is important to note that in the year 1999 when the appellant was posted as Civil Judge in District Rajanpur, the learned District and Sessions Judge Rajanpur/learned Reporting Officer recorded adverse remarks in the appellant's ACR for the period from 1-9-1999 to 15-12-1999 with regard to his integrity. The appellant filed representation against the said remarks before the respondent which was dismissed vide order dated 7-6-2001. The appellant preferred Service Appeal No,18 of 2001 before this Tribunal which was accepted vide order dated 27-2-2004 and the said adverse remarks were ordered to be ignored merely for the reason that the appellant had worked under the 'learned Reporting Officer only for 85 days which was shorter than the period of three months as required under Instruction No,4 of the 'Instructions about Confidential Reports' issued by the Government of the Punjab.
10. On the basis of entries with regard to the integrity recorded in the appellant's ACRs for the period from 1-1-1995 to 31-12-1995 and 1-1-1996 to June, 1996 the Authority while dispensing with the holding of regular inquiry issued a show-cause notice on 6-10-2001 for imposition of major penalty of dismissal from service to the appellant. In response the appellant raised his plea of holding a regular inquiry into the matter by appointing some Inquiry Officer through representation under section 6(3)(c) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999. But the Authority while declining the appellant's plea informed the appellant to file reply to the said show-cause notice. On submission of reply to show-cause notice the Authority being dissatisfied issued final show-cause notice to the appellant. At this juncture it may be expedient to quote that Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Shabbir Hussain v. Registrar Lahore High Court (PLD 2004 SC 191) has candidly held as under:- "Judicial Officers are expected to guard their reputation jealously and Reporting Officers/Countersigning Officers are obliged to assess their conduct after careful consideration and without being led away by any prejudice or bias."
11. It may also be relevant to reproduce an extract from the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shehzad v.
Lahore High Court through Registrar and another (2007 SCM R 1786) which reads below:--- "5. Conversely, respondents have relied upon the dictum laid down by a Larger Bench of five Judges in Nawab Khan v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 222. It was held in this case that the question whether a major, punishment can be imposed on a civil servant without holding enquiry would depend upon facts of each case. It was laid down that the Authorized Officer is empowered to dispense with the enquiry but he is required, by an order in writing, to inform the accused of the action proposed along with the grounds of action and to give him reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the-action proposed. It may not be out of context to point out that the appellant was duly informed that the competent authority had decided to dispense with the regular enquiry; the allegation against him were made known to him and he was afforded reasonable opportunity of personal hearing by a sitting Judge of High Court nominated by the competent authority. He was also informed of the proposed, action, therefore, it can safely be concluded that the authority, before passing the impugned order, had duly complied with the provision of law and the rules of natural justice. Thus, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that he was condemned unheard or that he was deprived of explaining his position.
7. Adverting to the contention of learned counsel that the petitioner was proceeded against on account of adverse remarks for a period only of 19 months and that, such short period could not form the basis of the show-cause notice, as it had the effect of blocking his career, Factually, it may be observed that the petitioner had challenged the correctness and validity of his adverse remarks for a period of two years and seven-months and preferred appeals for different periods before the Tribunal, which were dismissed on merits. He had preferred Civil Petitions Nos.2780-L of 2001 and 2782-L of 2001 for leave to appeal and expunction of adverse remarks before this Court but the same were dismissed, after providing an opportunity of hearing to him before this Court.
Civil Review Petitions against the judgment were also dismissed on 27-4-2004. Nevertheless, there is no rule of law that adverse entries reflecting consistent and chronic reputation regarding lack of integrity cannot form the basis of a show-cause notice. Indeed, a larger number of appeals in Shabbir Hussain's case (supra) were directed against the judgments arising out of adverse annual confidential reports. The doctrine of double jeopardy is, therefore, neither involved nor can it be argued that the petitioner has been vexed twice for the same act."
12. In the light of above quoted dictums of Hon'ble apex Court it is important to note that in this case the appellant was having general and persistent reputation of being a corrupt judicial officer as assessed by learned Reporting and Countersigning Officer and it was maintained by the Hon'ble apex Court in two cases referred above. On that basis the appellant was informed that the Authority had decided to dispense with the regular inquiry. The appellant was afforded reasonable opportunity of personal hearing by a sitting Judge of the High Court nominated by the Authority. He was also informed of the proposed action therefore it can safely be concluded that the Authority before passing the impugned order had duly complied with the relevant provision of law and the principle of fair and due process of law for safe administration of justice. Thus it cannot be said that appellant was condemned unheard or that he was deprived of his right to explain his position.
Needless to say that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shehzad (supra) has candidly laid down that the Authority is fully empowered to opt whether to hold a regular inquiry or not as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Besides it is important to note that appellant has not raised any plea of bias, prejudice and malice qua the Authority. The work and conduct of judicial officers is supervised by the High Court in terms of Article 203 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and the evaluation made by the Authority is based on credible material, information and personal observation, free of any bias. In the attending circumstances we have no hesitation to hold that the case in hand having been fairly and equitably dealt with by the Authority does not warrant any interference by this Tribunal.
13. For the above reasons, this appeal having no merit is dismissed.