' IBAD UR REHMAN LODHI, J.---The basis of the suit for specific performance, filed by the present appellant, was a document available at page 58 of the present appeal, which was entered in the evidence during trial as Exh.P.1, and according to the learned counsel for the appellant, was an agreement in between the parties to the suit.
2. In the courts below, the plaintiff-appellant remained unsuccessful, when firstly, his suit was dismissed on 12-7-2005, and thereafter the appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on 15-3-2006.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant, at the start of his arguments, was asked to bring Exh.P.1 into the definition of an agreement, which admittedly was not signed by one of the party to the suit, to which the learned counsel has responded that even 'oral agreement can be asked to be specifically performed/enforced.
' The learned counsel for the appellant is mistaken in this regard, for the reason that, if a plaintiff seeks specific performance of an oral agreement, he has to prove the promise made by one party and acceptance of such promise by the other side, but even in cases of oral agreement, unilateral offer not accepted by the other side could not have been made basis of a suit for specific performance.
4. We have to look into the definition of "agreement" in order to evaluate Exh.P.1 on the touchstone of the law on the subject. Section 2(b) of the Contract Act, 1872, provides the definition of "Promise", whereas, section 2(c) of the said Act provides the definitions of "Promisor" and "Promisee". The definitions whereof are reproduced herein-below:-- "Promise". When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes promises".
"Promisor" and "promisee". The person making the proposal is called the promisor, and the person accepting the proposal is called the 'promisee' and the term "agreement" is defined in section 2(e) of the Act, which is reproduced herein-below:- "Agreement. Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement".
' The joint reading of the above definitions give us a picture that such unilateral document, not signed by one party, was not mutually enforceable, thus, no decree could have been passed on the basis of such document by treating it as an 'agreement".
5. On interpretation of such provision of law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mst. Gulshan Hamid v. Kh. Abdul Rehman and others (2010 SCM R 334) has in clear terms held that, a unilateral agreement not signed by one party cannot be treated as an agreement.
' This Court in the case of Syed Ahmed through Special Attorney v. Syed Muzaffar Hussain through L.Rs. (2008 CLC 175) has in an unequivocal terms held that, for constitution of valid agreement, there must be at least two persons i.e. Promisee and promisor who agree with their free consent for a lawful object and legal consideration, and in absence of offer and acceptance thereof, such document cannot ripe into an agreement.
' Again this Court in case of Faqeer Bakhsh v. Khan Muhammad (2013 M LD 955), while interpreting section 2 of the Contract Act, 1872, has held that offer and acceptance reduced into writing, if not signed or thumb marked by one of the parties, could not, be termed as a valid "contract" enforceable under the law.
6. The learned courts below were, thus, right in non-suiting the plaintiff-appellant, and the learned counsel for the appellant has failed to point out any exceptional circumstances warranting interference by this Court in concurrent findings of courts below.
7. Resultantly, this appeal having no merits is dismissed.