ATHAR MINALLAH, J. --- The petitioner was employed as Assistant Salesman in BPS-5, on contract basis. His appointment was made on 05.06.1995. His contract was extended, but according to the assertions made in the petition, the services of the petitioner were terminated in 1998 through an oral order without assigning any reason and no written order was served on him. Admittedly, at the time when the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was enforced and notified in the official Gazette dated 08.12.2010; the petitioner had already reached the age of superannuation. He was, therefore, to be treated under 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the latter had been running from to post Section 3 of the Act. To enforce his right under the Act. He has relied on cases of Hidayatullah v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications and 2 others [2011 PLC (C.S.) 1299] and Waqar Alam and others v. Secretary, Establishment Division and others [2013 PLC (C.S.) 12].
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the petitioner had not applied for the benefits under the Act within the period specified by the legislature under Section 3 of the Act.
He has relied on cases of Muhammad Idrees Alvi v. Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution and 4 others [2001 PLC (C.S.) 1048], Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board and others v. Khawaja Shahid Nazir [2006 SCMR 1862] and Al-Karam Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Powerof-Attorney v.
Sindh Labour Court No. 4 and another [2010 PLC 104].
4. The learned counsels have been heard and the record perused with their able assistance.
5. The Act was promulgated and notified in the official Gazette on 08.12.2010. Section 5 of the Act deals with the employees sacked, but had reached the age of superannuation on or before the date of enactment of the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act is as follows:-- "3. Application of sacked employee.-- (1) A sacked employee, as defined in Section 2 above, may file an application, within ninety days of the enactment of this Act, to an officer of his employer for reinstatement of his service where the sacked employee shall clearly write the date of application appearing on the face of application."
The other sub-sections of Section 3 provides for the manner in which an application was to be filed.
The above provision is unambiguous and provides for a limitation period for availing the benefit under the Act. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner did not file any application under Section 3 of the Act. It is also an admitted position that the petitioner had been pursuing the case under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Ordinance, 2009 and the Sacked Employees (Re- instatement) Ordinance, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinances"). Under both the Ordinances there was no provision which related to such employees, who had already retired after reaching the age of superannuation.
6. In the circumstances, the application made by the petitioner under the two Ordinances was neither relevant nor can it be treated as an application under the Act. The legislative intent in enacting Section 3 is obvious and, therefore, a person who cannot demonstrate to have complied with the provisions thereof cannot be entitled to claim benefits under the Act. In case the legislature had intended to extend the benefit under the Act to employees who had applied under the two Ordinances then the language of the Act would have catered to such a situation. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that no application was filed by the petitioner on or after the enactment of the Act. The application filed by the present petitioner under the Act in 2014 was obviously hit by Section 3 thereof and could not be entertained.
7. In the above circumstances, the petition is without merit and the relief claimed cannot be granted in the light of Section 3 of the Act. The petition is, therefore, accordingly dismissed.