CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD JAHANGIR,J:- The facts emanates from the available record of the case are that Mohammad Din predecessor-ininterest of respondents being plaintiff had preempted a sale reflected in sale deed dated 16.10.1969 by filing a suit for possession through pre-emption against Khushi Mohammad etc/vendees (the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners) on 14.10.1970, which was received by the officer of the court/Ahlmad and presented the same before the Tehsildar, Pasrur, District Siaklot, as there was no Civil Judge in the court on that crucial day. Thereafter the suit file was presented before the learned Civil Judge, Pasrur, on his availability for the first time on 21.6.1971. The vendees/petitioners contested the said suit on various grounds alongwith the objections of limitation. In the light of divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- "1. Have the plaintiffs superior right of pre-emption? OPD
2. Were rs.40,000/- fixed in good faith or paid as sale price? OPD
3. What is market value? OP.Parties
4. Whether Mohammad Din did not affix his thumb impression on the plaint? if so to what effect?
OPD
5. Is the suit result of collusion? if so to what effect? OPD 5-A. Whether the suit is within time? OPP
6. Relief."
2. After framing the issues learned trial court recorded the evidence adduced by the parties. Both the courts below delivered their divergent findings in the earlier round of litigation and ultimately this Court while deciding C.R. No.1846/1985 filed by the petitioners vide judgment dated 01.10.1991 remanded the suit to learned trial court with the following directions:- ' 'During the course of arguments before me when was opined by me that the learned additional District Judge had committed a material irregularity in declining to look into the petitioners' argument again the finding of the learned Trial Court with regard to presentation of plaint, learned counsel for the parties agreed to the following arrangements:-
(1) Judgment and decree passed by two Courts below may be set aside aril the suit remanded to the learned Civil Judge for fresh decision after resolving the issue of limitation with reference to presentation of the plaint.
(ii) Before deciding the above issue again, the learned Civil Judge shall, after receiving such evidence as may be produced by the parties, record findings on the following questions:---
(a) Whether there was a post of whole-time Civil Judge, at Pasrur, on '14th October, 1970; and if so, whether the post was lying vacant or there was any Civil Judge holding that post?
(b) If the above post had an incumbent on the 14th October, 1970, whether he was on leave on that date?
(c) If there was a Civil Judge but he had gone to Sialkot or any other lace on tour, or otherwise, whether he had gone there alongwith his staff, including the Reader?
(d) Whether the Reader or any other official of the Court was authorized, in writing or otherwise, to receive plain in terms of Order IV, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, on 14th October, 1970; and if so, who was the officer so authorized and by whom he had been authorized to do so?
(iii) The learned Civil Judge shall not re-decide any issue other than the issue of limitation and that too with reference to the presentation of plaint only.
(iv) If and when an appeal is presented against fresh judgment and decree to be passed by the learned Civil Judge, the learned Appellate Court shall also decide the appeal to the extent of question relating to presentation of plaint only without expressing any opinion with regard to other issues or questions involved in the suit.
(v) If the suit is again decreed by the Appellate Court, the petitioners would be at liberty to challenge the findings already recorded by the learned Appellate Court, including the one relating to payment of Court-fee, as well as its fresh finding with regard to the presentation of plaint, when the matter is brought before this Court.
(vi) Parties may be left to bear their own costs.
' In view of what has gone above, this civil revision is accepted, judgments and decrees passed by the two Courts below are set aside and the suit remanded to the learned Trial Court with the direction that it shall be re-decided by the Court in terms of the aforesaid arrangement. If and when an appeal is presented against fresh judgment and decree to be passed by the learned Trial Court, the learned Appellate Court shall also act in accordance with the same arrangement.
Parties are left to bear their own costs."
3. In post remand proceedings the suit was decided by the learned Trial Court, but it was again remanded by the learned lower Appellate Court vide judgment dated 24.7.1994 to the learned Trial Court with a direction to decide the suit afresh as per direction of this Court delivered in C.R. No. 1846/1985 and finally the learned Trial Court answered issue No. 5-A in favour of the pre- emptors/respondents and decreed the suit vide impugned judgment and decree dated 9.3.1992, whereas the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the learned lower Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 24.4.1995, Being aggrieved the instant civil revision was filed by the petitioners/vendees in the year 1995.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners/vendees has argued that both the Courts below without keeping in mind the directions issued by this Court vide judgment dated 1.10.1991 passed the impugned judgments and decrees; that both the Courts below while misinterpreting the material/evidence on record answered issue No. 5-A against the vendees/petitioners and that Ahlmad or other official on behalf of the Judicial Officer was not authorized to receive the suit filed by the pre-emptor. The learned counsel for the Petitioners while relying upon the cases reported as "Nazar Mohammad v. Murad Ali and others" (PLD 1960 Lahore 757) and' "Rehmat Ali and another v.
Noor Muhammad" (PLJ 1981 Supreme Court 327) prayed for the acceptance of the civil revision, setting aside of the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below and that suit for pre- emption filed by pre-emptor/respondents be dismissed.
5. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents/pre-emptors supported -the impugned judgments and decrees rendered by Courts below.
6. Arguments heard. Record of the case and the reports submitted by the office of this Court as well as learned District Judge,- Sialkot, also perused.
7. This Court is restricted only to give findings according to the mandate of the remand order reproduced in pars 2 ante that if the suit is again decreed by the Appellate Court, the petitioners would be at liberty to challenge the findings already recorded by the learned Appellate Court, including the one relating to payment of Court-fee, as well as its fresh finding with regard to the presentation of plaint, won the matter is brought before this Court. A perusal of Order IV, Rule 1, CPC, reveals that the said provision regarding presentation of suit is procedural in nature. It should be presented either to the Court or to such officer duly appointed in this behalf. For ready reference the said provision is reproduced as under:-- "(1) Suit to be commenced by plaint---(1) Every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf"
' The Court according to the provisions ibid constitutes a Judge and officer appointed in this behalf.
As per paragraph 7 (c) of Chapter 1-B of High Court Rules and Orders, Volume 1 another officer of Court can receive the plaint when an officer is temporarily absent, on leave, tour or otherwise. The said rule is reproduced hereunder:- "Reception by ministerial establishment prohibited.---The members of the ministerial establishment are strictly forbidden to receive petitions, plaints or other documents direct from lawyers and their clerks or from litigants except when the Judge is on leave and no other Judicial Officer is in charge of his current duties. District Judges should however, invariably make arrangements for the reception of plaints and petitions, etc, by another officer of a Court when an officer is temporarily absent, on leave, tour or otherwise. Where there is a single Judicial Officer at a station such as a Mofassal or outlying Courts and who is on leave, arrangements should be made for the reception of plaints, petitions, documents etc. By the Tehsildar or the Naib Tehsildar in consultation with the Deputy Commissioner."
' It further clarifies that Court means the Presiding Officer or an officer of the Court authorized to receive the plaints and even in special circumstances a plaint can be received by the Tehsildar or the Naib Tehsildar
8. In post remand proceedings to discharge the onus of issue No. 5-A, the pre- emptors/respondents produced Ghulam Ahmad Bhatti PW3/1. He was Ahmad of the concerned Court Pasrur, when this suit for pre-emption was presented by the pre-emptor, who deposed that in absence of Presiding Officer and Reader of the Court, he was authorized to receive the plaint and he had not only received the suit rather he also proceeded accordingly. He further stated that High Court fad issued the instruction for presentation of the suit before the Tehsildar after receiving the same and on 14.10.1970 the suit filed by the preemptors/respondents was duly received by him and it was presented by him before the Tehsildar as per directions. Muhammad Shall, English Clerk of Sessions Court was also produced by the respondent/pre-emptor as PW4, who produced copy of letter/order of District Judge, Sialkot (Ex:P5) whereby Tehsildar, Narowal and Shakargarh who already were receiving the suits were directed to sign the challan form for the deposit of rent and other amounts in the absence of learned Civil Judge. He also deposed that record of Tehsil Pasrur regarding tour programme of learned Civil Judge was not available. It is admitted fact that on 14.10.1970 there was no Civil Judge or Reader of the Court at Pasrur and the suit was received by Ahlmad PW3/1, who on the same day presented it to Tehsildar and he duly signed the same for presentation of suit before the learned Civil Judge, Pasrur on 26.10.1970. The statement of PW3/1 and letter Ex:P5 fully prove the fact that it was duly received by the officer of the Court and was presented before the Tehsildar concerned. This evid3nce could not be rebutted by the petitioners/defendants by producing any concerned witness rather only judgment of District Court Ex.D3 and judgment of this Court Ex.D2 were produced by the petitioners/vendees. The minute perusal of said judgment (Ex.D3) reveals that one suit for pre-emption was dismissed on the score of limitation and this Court vide judgment (Ex.D2) maintained the same. It is note worthy that the question of limitation was not thrashed by this Court in the said judgment, but this Court dismissed the pre-emption suit as pre-emptor failed to prove the Talabs.
9. It is well-settled principle of law that the decision of the learned lower Appellate Court of the District are not precedents for the learned Trial Court and both the Courts below rightly ignored the said judgment Ex.D3. The emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioners that judgment of (Ex.D3) was confirmed by this Court as the revision was dismissed by this Court vide judgment Ex.D2 is misconceived. The minute perusal of Ex.D2 reveals that in this judgment the issue of limitation of presentation of suit before officer of the Court or before Tehsildar was not touched/thrashed. This clearly proves that the judgment Ex.D3 was not confirmed by this Curt on the relevant point. On the other hand, a chain of authorities rendered by superior Courts is available, which supports the stance of the pre-emptors/respondents. In a case reported as "Abdul Razaq and others v. Manzoor Ahmad" (PLD 1989 Lahore 43):---it is observed as under:--- "Generally all officials acts are presumed to' have been correctly done and it was for the petitioner to have established by evidence that the Reader had no authority to receive the plaint on 9th of September, 1976 when the Presiding Officer was on leave. Order 4, Rule 1 of the CPC provides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plain to the Court or such other official as it appoints in this behalf. This rule does not require that the authorization must be in writing. It may well be verbal. Even the petitions or plaints put in the box outside the Court are deemed to be valid presentation. Reference in this connection may be made to Lahore High Court Rules, Volume I, Chapter 1-B. In Shamas-uz-Zaman and others v. Abdul Ghafoor (PLD 1971 Azad J&K 16), it was observed that when sub judge is on leave, the office remains open and the plaints are received by his Clerks, it shall be presumed that the Clerk has teen authorized to receive the plaint and the authorization need not be through a formal order in writing. The Clerk can be authorized even verbally to receive the plaint. This judgment is on all fours with the present case. It may also be noted that when the suit came up for hearing before the learned Civil Judge no objection regarding the presentation to his Clerk was raised which also shows that the presentation was to an authorized person."
10. In addition, in a case reported as "Rehmat Ali and another v. Noor Mohammad" (1981 SCMR 159) it is observed as under:--- "According to Order VI, Rule 1, CPC a plaint can be presented to the Court or to such Officer as it appoints in this behalf. It is not in dispute that the learned Civil Judge had authorized his Ahlmad to receive the plaints in his absence and this is what exactly was done in this case, and the aforesaid presentation was further authenticated by the Tehsildar Alipur, according to the relevant procedure of the place."
11. In a case reported as "Khushi Muhammad v. Mst. Nazir Begum and others" (1989 CLC 1984) it is observed as under:- "In the circumstances, respectfully relying on the two cases cited by learned counsel for the respondents, I hold that if the Reader was authorized to entertain the plaint in question in the absence of the learned Civil Judge, its presentation before the Reader on 24th September, 1970 was in order. If the position was otherwise, the Court will be deemed to be closed till the plaint was placed before the learned Civil Judge on 6th October, 1970 and, in that event, by giving the respondents the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, the suit would be held to be within time.
Looked from any angle, the suit was not tithe-barred." t
12. The august Supreme Court of Pakistan in another authoritative judgment reported as PLD 1992 Supreme Court 47 after discussing other judgments of superior Court also authenticated the verdict of the Courts enumerated above. The relevant portion thereof in paragraphs 6 and 7 is reproduced here-under:-
6. *** In the present case, the admitted position is that the learned Civil Judge who was on leave had not authorised any officer to receive the plaint in his absence. The learned District Judge, Bannu, has also not delegated such power to any other Judge. Under Order 4, rule 1, C.P. C. Every plaint shall be presented to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. The power to receive plaint can be delegated by a separate order. The Court in which a plaint has to be presented is generally the Court of lowest grade competent to try the matter (S.15, C.P.C.). The power to receive plaints can be delegated by a 'specified order. The presentation of a plaint to an authorised officer is the proper presentation. If no authorisation is made then the plaint can be presented on the first day of re-opening of the Court. Section 23 comes into effect in the event of temporary absence of a Presiding Officer. Under Rule 7(c) of the High Court Rules and Orders (Chapter 1, Part B) the District Judge may make arrangements for reception of plaints and petitions by another officer of a Court when an officer is temporarily sent on leave. In the present case, no such arrangement was made. In Nazar Muhammad v. Murad Ali PLD 1960 (WP.) Lah. 757, it has been observed as hereunder:- "Applying these tests to the facts of the present case one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Gujranwala, was closed on the 16th August, 1954, so far of the presentation of plaints in that Court was concerned. This is so because the Presiding Officer of the Court was on leave and the plaint could not be presented to him. On the 16th of August, 1954, officials of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Gujranwala, were probably all present in the Court- room, or in a room attached to it, but as none of them had been authorised by the Senior Civil Judge, Gujranwala, to receive plaints on his behalf, their presence was entirely immaterial. What I have said above about the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Gujranwala, applies with equal force to the Court of the District Judge, Gujranwala. It follows, therefore, that Section 4 of the Limitation Act comes to the aid of the plaintiff and because the Senior Civil Judge, Gujranwala, returned from leave on the "8th of August," 1954, I have no hesitation in holding that his Court remained closed from the 14th of August, 1954, till the 27th of August, 1954 and a plaint, which should have been presented on the 14th of August, 1954, must be held to have been presented within time if it was presented on the 28th of August, 1954. That the plaint under consideration was placed before the Senior Civil Judge. Gujranwala. On the 28th of August. 1954, is clear from the fact that he passed an order thereon on that day and even if there was any dercet in the presentation of the plaint on account of the fact it had been presented to the Duty Magistrate, Gujranwala who could not, in law, receive it-defect for which the plaintiff was in no way responsible-it was curad by reason of the fact that the was placed before the Senior Civil judge, Gujranwala, on the 28th of August, 1954."
' Rehrnat Ali v. Noor Muhammad 1981 SCMR 159, it has been held that "plaint can be presented to Court or such officer as appointed by the Court in such behalf'. In this case, the Civil Judge had authorised his Ahlmad to receive plaints in his absence. It was held that the plaint was validly presented."
13. From the analysis of above precedents, it cannot be doubted that pre-emptor had presented the plaint on 14.10.1970, which was duly, received by the Ahlmad (officer of the Court) and he under the rules presented it to the Tehsildar. The arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners that after an elapse of many years, how the Ahlrnad PVV3i'l has been able to state about the instruction given to him to receive the suits is also without any force. It may not be the solitary occasion during the service period of PW3/1 and there would have been several occasions of the identical nature arisen during the tenure of the same Presiding Officer being served by the Ahlmad. The sword of cross-examination was with the petitioners, who subjected the PW3/1 to cross-examination him at length but nothing could shatter his testimony. Even the petitioners did not opt to produce any witness from the office of the District Judge/Senior Civil Judge. The petitioners to rebut the deposition of PW3/1 could summon the judicial officer/Presiding Officer or concerned Tehsildar (to whom the suit file was presented by the Ahmad) or any other official of the Court or of the office of Tehsildar of the relevant period, but they with-held the same and inference has to be drawn that if any such witness was summoned, he might have deposed against the petitioners. The case-law referred by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not helpful to the petitioners as it runs on different footing rather the case of Rehmat Ali and another (supra) helps the stance of the respondents/pre-emptors.
14. As regards the other objection of Court-fee, suffice it to say that from the perusal of the plaint, it reveals that net profit of the disputed property for the year preceding to the presentation of the plaint was Rs.
44.51 and after its multiplication with 10 time, it comes to Rs.
445.10 and at the time of presentation of the suit, the respondent was required to affix the Court of Rs.
33.75 and thereafter the deficiency of Rs.
5.25 was made up by the respondent on 28.7 1971. No doubt the deficiency of Court-fee was made up by the plaintiff-respondent when the period for presentation of suit had already been elapsed, but the defendant's contention does not find favour because the record shows that Court did not bother to perform the duties enjoined upon it under O.VII, R.11(c), C.P.C. And no order was passed directing the plaintiff to pay the Court-fee. Even otherwise by now it is well established that the Court is required to grant an opportunity to the plaintiff with specific determination to make up the deficiency of Court-fee within the specified time. As the deficiency of Court-fee was made up by the plaintiff-respondent before the learned Trial Court, the learned lower Appellate Court had rightly answered me said point in the earlier round of litigation, which being fully supported by the case-law relied upon by him does not call for any interference by this Court.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioners I as failed to point out any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional defect in The impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. The scope of interference in provisional jurisdiction by this Court is restricted and narrower, which is only meant for correcting errors of law and facts, if are found to be committed by the subordinate Courts in the discharge of their judicial functions, which is not the case in hand.
16. Sequel of the above discussion is that the instant revision petition being devoid of any merit and force is dismissed.