1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 21st May, 1978 passed by the learned 111rd Additional District Judge, Karachi, maintaining the Rent Controller's order dated 2nd October, 1977 directing eviction of the appellant from the residential bungalow, situated at Delhi Muslim Co- operative Housing Society, Tipu Sultan Road, Karachi.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the aforesaid premises, owned by respondent No. 2, were rented out to the appellant by respondent No. 1, attorney and father of respondent No. 2, under a written agreement dated 1st February, 1973. On 19th January, 1977 respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 signed by both, seeking eviction of the appellant on the grounds that the appellant had committed default in the payment of rent and that the premises were in good faith required by respondent No. 2 for his own occupation, as he along with his family was presently residing with his father and three married brothers and their families in one house consisting of four bedrooms only and due to shortage of accommodation he was occupying a room over the Car Porch which was actually meant for a servant, and he being a qualified Architect also needed a separate room for his office and to interview his clients.
3. Appellant contested the application and denied both the grounds. As to the default, the appellant averred that he had sent rent to the respondent for the relevant months through cheques, but the latter did not encash them. As to the other ground of personal need, the appellant alleged that the respondent did not bona fide need the premises for self occupation but wanted to let out the same on increased rent.
4. The learned Rent Controller framed the necessary issues on which both the parties led evidence.
5. Respondent No. 1 attorney and father of respondent No. 2 was examined in support of the eviction application, while appellant examined himself and his were to oppose the application.
6. The learned Rent Controller decided both the grounds against the appellant by finding that the appellant had committed default in payment of rent for the months of November and December, 1976, and that the premises were bona fide required by respondent No. 2 for his personal use, and directed ejectment of the appellant by his order dated 20th October, 1977.
7. Being aggrieved, the appellant went in appeal wherein learned Additional District Judge reversed the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the issue regarding default by holding that no default had been committed by the appellant. The learned Additional District Judge, however, concurred with the finding of the learned Rent Controller that the premises were bona fide required by respondent No. 2 for his own occupation and, in the result, by his order dated 21st May, 1978 maintained the order of the learned Rent Controller directing eviction of the appellant. Hence this second appeal.
8. The only question for consideration in this second appeal, therefore, is whether the concurrent finding of the two Courts below that the premises in question were bona fide required by respondent No. 2 for his own occupation calls for interference.
9. Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Memon, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that inasmuch as respondent No. 2 for whom the premises were required did not himself step into the witness-box, he had failed to prove l/ his personal bona fide requirement of the premises. He next contended that the tenancy lease having been extended four times, it showed that the premises were not required by respondent No. 2, bona fide ; consequently, the finding of the Courts below on the said issue was not proper and legal. In support the learned counsel placed reliance on PLD 1976 Kar.
10. 1231.
11. I find no merit in either of the contentions. It is an admitted position on record that, in addition to respondent No. 1, the eviction application was also filed and signed by respondent No. 2 himself. In the said application it was elaborately stated that respondent No. 2 along with his family was presently residing with his father and three married brothers with their families in one house consisting of 4 bed rooms and because of lack of accommodation, he and his family- members were residing in one room over the Car Porch which was actually meant for a servant and therefore, the present accommodation being insufficient for his needs, he genuinely required the house for his own occupation, and he being a qualified Architect also needed a separate room for his office and to interview his clients. The above assertions by respondent No. 2 were fully substantiated on oath by the respondent No. 1, who besides being attorney and father of respondent No. 2, deposed to the facts from his personal knowledge by stating that there were only 4 bedrooms in the house where he and his four married sons were residing with their families and due to insufficient accommodation, respondent No. 2 was residing with his family in one room over the Car Porch which was actually meant to be a servant quarter and, therefore, he bona fide required the house in question for personal use, and that, he, .Respondent No. 2, had no other house in Karachi nor had he vacated any house lastly. He further deposed that respondent No. 2 being a qualified Architect was visited by respectable people in connection with his professional work but he had no place to see them and, therefore, he also needed a separate room for his office. Explaining the extensions of tenancy lease, he deposed that he extended it because during that time the respondent No. 2 was at Lahore building a Palace for the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, but after he came over to Karachi the lease was not extended by him and the eviction application was filed within three weeks of the expiry of the last extension granted to the appellant. The cross- examination of this witness would show that his above testimony as to the accommodation in the house, the number of families residing therein and the fact that respondent No. 2 was residing with his family in one room over the Car Porch and had no separate space for his office to interview his clients was not challenged.
12. He also categorically denied that the premises were not needed in good faith by respondent No. 2.
13. Indeed, the depositions of the appellant and his were would show that even they admitted in their evidence that 4 brothers and their father with their families were residing in one house, and their only objection was that the respondents were used to a joint family system and therefore they did not need the premises in question. This, however, can hardly be a valid objection, apart from the fact that the suggestion was specifically denied by respondent No. 1 in his cross-examination. It is also not disputed that respondent No. 2 did not own any other house except the one occupied by the appellant. That being so, the above evidence of respondent No. 1, who deposed to the facts not only as an attorney of respondent No. 2 but from his, undisputed, personal knowledge, being the father and residing in the same house with his son respondent No. 2, was most relevant and, it having successfully with--stood the test of cross-examination and veracity was entitled to great weight and reliance. Thus, the case set up by respondent No. 2 in the eviction application that the present accommodation was insufficient for his needs and he genuinely required the premises in question for his own occupation. Stood amply proved within the meaning of the provisions of section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Ordinance. Thus, in the circumstances stated hereinabove non-stepping of the respondent No. 2 in the witness-box was not material and did not recoil on the proof adduced and established in support of his bona fide requirement of the house in question for personal use.
14. As to the, learned counsel relying on PLD 1976 Kar. 1231, the facts of that case were entirely different. In that case, it had been the tenant's case that the daughters were not willing to join their father in the x'' proposed expansion of his Clinic, and the Courts also observed that the fact that the daughters Who held independent employment were not shown .To be working in the already existing Maternity Section made it doubtful if they were ready and willing to join their father in the proposed expansion of the Clinic. The facts of the instant case are, however, totally different and do not attract the application of the above-cited case.
15. As to the contention of the learned counsel that since the lease agree--ment was renewed four times it showed that the premises were not bona fide required by respondent No. 2 for his personal use, it was explained by respondent No. 1 on oath that the lease was so extended because during the period respondent No. 2 was away at Lahore building a Palace for the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, but after he returned no further extension was granted and this stood confirmed by the fact that the eviction application was filed within 3 weeks of the expiry of the last extension of the lease. The explanation offered stands supported by the record and is adequate. Indeed, reading of the evidence of respondent No. 1 by me has left no doubt in my mind as to the honesty, straightforwardness and truthfulness of the witness, and I have no hesitation in holding that both the Courts below were perfectly justified and right in relying on his testimony for their finding against the appellant and the same does not call for interference, apart from the fact that the two Courts below having given concurrent finding on the issue, which essentially is one of fact, it will neither be appropriate nor open to this Court to interfere with their finding ~in this second appeal.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, I see no merit in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. The appellant is however given two months time to vacate the house in question and hand over its peaceful possession to respondent No. 2. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.