' The petitioner challenges the order dated 2nd March, 1981 passed by the lower Appellate Court decreeing the suit filed by the respondent. The effect of the decree was that the order of the petitioner, terminating the services of the plaintiff/respondent was declared to be illegal, ultra vires, against facts, collusive being malicious. The petitioner was further restrained from acting upon the impugned order to interfere with the respondent in the discharge of his duties as Assistant Director.
2. Briefly the facts of the case, according to the pleadings of the parties, are that the respondent was appointed as Assistant Director on 20th May, 1978 by the petitioner on ad hoc basis. He joined service on 21st May, 1978. His services were terminated on 6th of October, 1979 after one post of Assistant Director was declared surplus. The respondent challenged that order is a suit for declaration as stated above on 13th October, 1979. He pleaded that no show-cause notice was served and that in any case the services of the junior most should have been terminated in accordance with the Rules. The petitioner controverted the pleas on which the suit was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 24th May, 1980. The appeal of the respondent, however, succeeded as referred to above.
3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the terms and conditions of the service of the petitioner were not regulated by any law and as the same were subject to the agreement settled by the petitioner under section 9 of the Punjab Development of Cities Act, no right accrued in his favour so that he could be continued in service. Reference was made to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and the case of Burmah Eastern Ltd. v. Burmah Eastern Employees'
Union and others (1).
4. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the statement of D.W./2, under Order XII, rule 5, who admitted in Exh. P14 the contents of para. 15 of the facts mentioned in the notice of the respondent (Exh. P/3). It was conceded therein that the services of the respondent had been regularised on 15th of January, 1980. In para. 16 of his reply the petitioner stated that pending approval of the Faisalabad Development Authority Service Regulations, the Government Rules are applied.
5. Postponing the consideration of the effect of adopting the Government Rules to the employees of a statutory body for a while, it is to be noted that none of the Rules confer any right of service on an ad hoc employee. Reference may particularly be made to rule 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 which rather provides that an ad hoc appointment shall not confer any right, on the person so appointed, in the matter of regular appointment.
6. The learned counsel then relied on section 10 (2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act which provides that in case of abolition of posts or redundancy the junior most should go. The learned Civil Judge held that firstly Exh. P/1 was not admissible in evidence as it had not been proved. Further, he found that the document did not show that the two other employees pointed out by the respondent to be junior to him were also ad hoc employees. The respondent did not prove that he had been confirmed and was no longer an ad hoc employee. In this view of the matter, he could not say that the two others were to go before him.
7. Again, even if it be accepted for the sake of argument that the respondent had two other juniors to him and section 10 (2) of the Civil Servants Act had also been adopted, the short question arising for {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1967 Dacca 190 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' determination would be to know the effect of the adopted rules. The learned counsel relied on raiz Ahmad v. The Registrar Co-operative Societies, West Pakistan Lahore and another (1) and Zainul Abidin v. Multan Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Multan (2) ; to say that the mere adoption of the rules of the Government would not mean that the same had any statutory force so far as the petitioner organization is concerned. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on R. T. II. Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation (3) ; Shahid Khalil v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi (4) ; Pakistan Refugee and Rehabilitation, Finance Corporation, Lahore and another v. Syed Karamat Hussain (5) and Muhammad Aslam vs. National Shipping Corporation, Karachi through its Chairman and 2 others (6) last para.
8. It is to be noted that the petitioner is a statutory body established under the Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976. Its section 9 confers on the petitioner a power to engage officers and servants. It reads as under :- "Appointment of officers and employees.-The Authority may appoint such officers, advisers, experts, consultants and employees, as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit,"
9. The contents of the above section do make it absolutely clear that the fixation of terms and conditions of the officers and servants is within the discretion of the petitioner Authority. There is no requirement either to frame rules, Consequently, any terms and conditions settled between the parties, even though it be by adopting other laws or rules, shall have a contractual as against statutory effect. Any violation of such terms and conditions, therefore, may only call for a suit for damages, in case any one of the parties feels aggrieved, as it would be a breach of the relationship of master and servant between the parties. Thus the appellate Court could not impose the services of the respondent on the petitioner..
10. The question that such adoption of rules does not lend any statutory force has also been considered in Sh. Muhammrd Arif v. .Rawalpindi Improvement Trust, Rawalpindi (7) ; Abdul Ghafur v.
The Thal Development Authority, Jauharabad (8) and Rahim Khan v. Miss Nisar Begun; and others
(9) ; to hold that such adoption does not give them any statutory status. 1 have already taken the same view in Writ Petition No, 2242/80 in the case of Khalid Parvez whose services had also been terminated by the petitioner-Authority. I am told that even an Intra Court Appeal against that order has already been dismissed.
' In view of the above, this petition is allowed and the decree and order passed by the Appellate Court are set aside. The respondent shall bear the costs throughout.
Petition allowed. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1962 SC 315 (2) PLD 1966 SC 445
(3) PLD 1974 SC 146 (4) 1971 SCMR 568
(5) PLD 1966 (W. P.) Lah. 442 (6) PLD 1979 Kar, 246
(7) 1979 CLC 483 (8) PLD 1958 LA, 169
(9) PLD 1969 Kar. 204 {{FOOT NOTE}}