' CH. MUHAMMAD MASOOD JAHANGIR, J.---The petitioner/plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration as well as specific performance of contract dated 29-12-2003 regarding the land measuring 5 Kanals 8 Marlas before the learned trial court on 16-10-2009. The respondent/defendant No,1 contested the suit by filing the written statements through Mian Muhammad Afzal, Advocate, but afterwards the alleged compromise was recorded on 7-4-2010 between the petitioner/plaintiff and the alleged appointed counsel of the respondent/defendant No, 1 . On the basis of said compromise, the learned trial court disposed of the suit vide order dated 9-4-2010.
2. The respondent/defendant No,1 assailed the aforesaid order dated 9-4-2010 by filing an application under section 12(2) of C.P.C. The petitioner/plaintiff contested the said application and the learned trial court after analyzing the divergent pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues:--
(a) Whether in the light of averment of written statement i,e, blanket refusal of agreement to sell counsel for the petitioner company Mian Muhammad Afzal Advocate was not authorized to make consenting written statement and to receive any amount of consideration? OP Parties.
(b) Whether the concessional statement dated 7-4-2010 by submitting a new agreement Mark-A was not permitted as per Wakalat Nama of the company issued in the name of Mica: Muhammad Afzal, Advocate? OP. Parties.
(c) Relief.
3. After recording the evidence of the parties, the learned trial court accepted the application filed by respondent/defendant No I vide order dated 9-12-2011, hence the instant Civil Revision.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff has argued that the impugned order passed by the learned trial court is against facts and circumstances of the case; that the learned trial court has committed illegality and material irregularity while passing the impugned order; that the counsel for respondent/defendant No,1 being the attorney was fully authorized to enter into compromise on the basis of power of attorney, who had rightly entered into compromise with the petitioner/plaintiff after receiving the amount on behalf of respondent/defendant No,1; that the learned trial court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested to it in a proper manner through the impugned order, which is liable to be set aside by allowing the instant revision petition.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent/defendant No,1 has refuted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff and submitted that the alleged agreement to sell dated 29-12-2003, the bone of contention of the suit for specific performance filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, was a forged document having been prepared without the knowledge and consent of the respondent/defendant No,1; that Mian Muhammad Afzal, Advocate had been appointed as a counsel for appearance in the court to contest the suit, who was not especially authorized by respondent/defendant No,1 to settle the dispute while effecting compromise with the petitioner-plaintiff or to make any Iqrarnama and the act of the said counsel was apparently based on fraudulent and without authorization, therefore, the learned trial court has rightly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it while invoking the provision under section 12(2), C.P.C. On valid reasons through the impugned order, which is liable to be maintained while dismissal of the titled revision petition having no merit.
6. Arguments heard and record perused.
7. The petitioner/plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance on the basis of alleged agreement to sell dated 29-12-2003 against the respondent/defendant No,1. The said suit was contested by respondent/defendant No,1 as well as respondents Nos.3 to 14 by filing independent written statements. It is pertinent to note that in para 3 of the preliminary objections, respondent/defendant No,1 categorically asserted that the impugned agreement dated 29-12- 2003 was a fraudulent document having been forged and maneuvered by the petitioner-plaintiff as M. H. Shah, the alleged executants/signatory thereof had been retired from their company on 16-12-1996 and thereafter he died on 14-9-2002. Respondents Nos.3 to 14 also denied the existence of the disputed agreement on the objection as narrated above as well as other factual aspects.
Thereafter, the counsel appointed by respondent No,1 made a statement on 7-4-2010 and furnished a compromise deed Exh-R-2 before the learned trial court on the basis whereof the suit was disposed of vide order dated 9-4-2010 in the following manner:- "***Hence, suit is disposed of in the light of statements of parties dated 7-4-2010 but for the purpose of registration of suit property in the name of plaintiff parties are directed to approach the concerned registering authority who after verifying the title documents of defendants No,1 qua suit property and after taking the requisite stamp duty/transfer fee etc. Will do the needful to transfer the suit property in the name of plaintiff. It is also mentioned here that the plaintiff and defendants Nos.3 to 14 are claiming themselves to be occupants of the suit property, therefore, both these parties are directed to avail alternate remedy in this regard. No order regarding determination of possession of these parties is made here".
' A perusal of the said order reveals that the learned trial court did not decree the suit rather directed the parties to appear before the Sub-Registrar for registration of the deed regarding the suit property. The said order dated 9-4-2010 passed by the learned trial court was in no way helpful to the petitioner/plaintiff as to may view it is not executable in the eye of law.
8. The respondent/defendant No,1 came forward by filing an application under section 12(2), C.P.C.
On the ground that the aforesaid order having been based on fraud and, misrepresentation was liable to be set aside and the counsel for the respondent-defendant No,1 had acted beyond the authority conferred upon him. In support thereof, the respondent-defendant No,1 produced its authorized agent Iftikhar Ahmad, as AW-1, who stated that although Mian Muhammad Afzal, Advocate had been appointed as a counsel, but he was not authorized to enter into compromise with the petitioner/plaintiff while, delegating any specific authority to him in this respect and he was also not authorized to receive the amount from the petitioner/plaintiff on behalf of respondent/defendant No,1 and he has done all this without the permission and at the back of respondent-defendant No,
1. Conversely, the petitioner-plaintiff himself appeared as RW-1 and produced Muhammad Ijaz (RW2) and Intikhab Alam (RW3). The stance of the said RWs that compromise deed (Exh.R2) had been executed in their presence and it was signed by Mian Muhammad Afzal, Advocate on behalf of the respondent-defendant No,1 is not helpful to the petitioner-plaintiff as their testimony is silent on the issue that the said attorney had specifically been authorized to effect compromise on behalf of the respondent-defendant No,1 and he had acted in letter and spirit of the authority conferred upon him through the power of attorney (Exh.R1).
Even otherwise the petitioner-plaintiff also failed to' produce Mian Muhammad Afzal, Advocate to prove the contents of power of attorney (Exh.R1). On the other hand a careful study of the said Vakalat namapower of attorney (Exh.R1) reveals that the executant/respondent defendant No,1 had authorized the said Advocate only to receive on his behalf the sums and amounts deposited in his account. So, said clause of the power of attorney appears to have not been strictly construed and it can be safely inferred that Mian Muhammad Afzal, Advocate had never been authorized to receive amounts from the petitioner/plaintiff unless it was deposited in the account of respondent/defendant No,
1. A further perusal of the said ,,power of, attorney (Exh.R1) also reveals that no specific authority had been conferred on the counsel/attorney for formation of compromise deed (Exh.R2) and production thereof before the court to settle the dispute in the shape of compromise.
9. It is settled principle of law that power of attorney should always be construed strictly and the power/authority having not been specifically given to any attorney or omitted to flow from the contents of document should not be deemed to have been conferred on the attorney concerned.
General terms occurring in such document for the purpose of appointing the attorney should be interpreted with reference to the object for which such power of attorney was executed. So intention and object for which such power of attorney was construed is an important factor. It has been held in PLD 1987 Lahore 392 that under Order III Rule 2, C.P.C. Specific powers to be given to the recognized agent otherwise acts should not be binding. A safe reliance can also be placed on 1987 CLC 813. Moreover, on the authority of the case-law declared in PLD 1969 Karachi 123 and 1995 CLC 1572 it is observed that power of attorney confers only those powers, which are specified therein and the agent, may neither go beyond nor deviate from the terms of this instrument. The august Supreme Court in the case reported as 1992 SCMR 1488 has held that in case of conflict and ambiguity it should be construed for benefit of the executant whereas in PLD 1985 SC 341 the law was laid down that the courts should be vigilant particularly when allegation by the Principal is of fraud. Moreover, as held in1991 CLC Notes 67, the duty of the counsel is very sacred and he represents parties in adjudication of their rights.
10. For the foregoing discussion, this court is left with no option except to observe that Mian Muhammad Afzal, Advocate having not been authorized specifically by respondent/defendant No,1 to settle the dispute in the suit through compromise, the statement made by him before the court and the compromise deed (Exh. R2) were nothing, but a deviation from the authority actually conferred by respondent/defendant No,1 upon him to contest the suit while executing power of attorney in his favour and the order dated 9-4-2010 impugned by filing application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Cannot be sustained in the eye of law as the act of the attorney amounted to play fraud with the court as well as the client to defeat his rights. As such the said order has rightly been struck off by the learned trial court while exercising powers conferred under section 12(2), C.P.C.
Through the impugned order, which cannot be interfered with by this court in the revisional jurisdiction as the same is not found to be illegal or tainted with misreading or non-reading of the evidence on the part of the learned trial court. Resultantly, this Civil Revision having no force is dismissed.