FAZLE-AKBAR, J.-This appeal, by special leave raises the question whether section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to a petition under section 7 of the west Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959. This question arises under the following circumstances.
2. Under Notification No. 3 (81)-Auqaf/60, dated 1st June, 1960 the Chief Administrator, Auqaf, West Pakistan in exercise of the power conferred on him under section 6 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1959, took over possession on 11th June, 1960 of land measuring 27 kanals 19 marlas bearing Chak No. 120,/9-L (Ramit),. Tehsil and District Montgomery, as Waqf Properties attached to the shrine of Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Pariah Sahib.
On 12th July, 1960, the appellant filed an application under section 7 of the said Ordinance of 1959 in the District Court of Montgomery for declara--tion that the said land did not appertain -to the shrine of Hazrat Khawaja Muhammad Pariah Sahib. Under the said section 7 the period of limitation for filing an application against a notification issued under section 6 is 30 days from the date of publication of such a notification. The appellant's plea was that a copy of the official Gazette containing the aforesaid notification was not received in his village and hence he had no means of knowing of assumption of his private property as dargah property. The District Judge who heard the petition being of the opinion that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to a petition filed under the Ordinance, dismissed the petition as time-barred and his order was upheld on appeal by the High Court.
3. The learned counsel has found it difficult to contend that section S of the Limitation Act would apply to a petition under section 7 of the Ordi--nance. There can be no doubt that for the purposes of section 29 of the Limitation Act this Ordinance of 1959 is a special law. Now section 7 of the Ordinance clearly states that an application against a notification should be filed within 30 days, it does so because of the provisions already made by the Limitation Act in section 29 which attract the operation of section 3 and make that period of time effective as the period of limitation.
Furthermore, the last part of clause (2) of section 29 makes it clear that section 5 would not apply to an application under a special or local law.
4. The next question is whether we can say that in the Ordinance itself there can be discerned any intention that the Court should have the power given by section 5 of the Limitation Act. This question involves a careful examination of the Ordinance. Subsection (2) of the section 7 empowers the District Court for reasons to be recorded, to refuse to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purposes of examination or the production as any document or other thing if it considers that it has been made for the purpose of vexation or delay. Section 8 provides for an appeal against the decision of the District Court to the High Court.
Section 9 forbids the District Court and the High Court to issue temporary injunction or order.
Section 10 says that "if there is no appeal, the decision of the District Court or when there is an appeal, the decision in appeal shall be final" section 15 ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil or Revenue Court in certain matters. Sec--tion 16 says that "Every Order made and action taken under this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any document, decree or order of any Court, deed, enactment having effect by virtue of any such enactment other than this Ordinance". It is thus clear that this Ordinance gives very wide power to the Court in deciding the applications that are filed under the Ordinance. Further it can also, for good and sufficient reasons, ignore the provisions of the Evidence Act. No section of the Ordinance has been brought to our notices as having a possible bearing upon the question of limitation, We are, therefore, satisfied that the provisions of the Ordinance do not contemplate and provide that the District Courts shale exercise the power of dispensation for sufficient cause which is contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act.
5. The learned counsel has contended that it will be somewhat alarming that even in a proper case the District Court should have no power to condone the delay for good and sufficient reasons, but it is not possible for us on the ground of hardship to introduce section 5 in the Ordinance when it is not there either expressly or by implication.
6. In this view of the matter this appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.