' ATIR MAHMOOD, J.---Through this writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has called in question the vires of order dated 31-10-2013 passed by respondent No2/Inspecting Officer/Assistant Director, Local Government and Rural Development Department, Lahore whereby the divorce certificate dated 17-11-2012 was set aside.
2. Brief facts of the case as narrated in the writ petition are that the petitioner Muhammad Zubair Riaz got married with respondent No.1 Kalsoom Tufail on 8-7-2010 whereafter, the petitioner went to U.K. Respondent No.1 also went there and started living with the petitioner. From the wedlock, a daughter was born on 10-4-2011. After the birth of the child, the parties came to Pakistan and due to some differences, there was separation between the parties. A divorce deed dated 21-10-2011 was sent to respondent No.1 and its copy was sent to the Secretary Union Council which was duly received by him. The Secretary Union Council did not initiate any proceedings upon the said divorce deed/notice. Respondent No.1, thereafter, went back to U.K. And by ignoring the divorce given to her filed a petition before the Birmingham District Registry for dissolution of marriage. The petitioner received notice from the court of Birmingham.
3. After receiving the said notice, the petitioner again filed an application before the Chairman of the Union Council for issuance of certificate for confirmation of talaq on the basis of divorce deed dated 21-10-2011 but no certificate was issued. Then the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No.27798/12 before this Court seeking direction to Secretary Union Council for issuance of divorce certificate.
The writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 8-11-2012 with the direction to the Secretary, Union Council to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Thereafter, the divorce certificate was issued on 17-11-2012. On placing the divorce certificate before the Birmingham Court, the petition filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed vide order dated 19-7-2013.
4. Feeling aggrieved of issuance of divorce certificate, respondent No.1 filed a writ petition before this Court which met with office objection made vide diary No.123622/12 that writ petition was not competent. The objection was also sustained by the Court vide order dated 31-12-2012. It was held in the order dated 31-12-2012 that the writ petitioner had remedy to approach Inspecting Officer, Local Government and Rural Development Department, Lahore for redressal of her grievance.
Respondent No.1 then instituted a revision petition which was allowed and divorce certificate dated 17-11-2012 was set aside vide order dated 31-10-2013 passed by respondent 2 which is under challenge in this writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (the Ordinance), no appeal or revision is provided, hence respondent No.2 wrongly assumed his jurisdiction; that respondent No.2 has failed to appreciate that in spite of non-compliance of mandatory requirements of section 7 of the Ordinance, the divorce is effective; that the petitioner divorced respondent No.1 on 21-10-2011 but the Secretary Union Council in collusion with respondent No.1 did not issue the divorce certificate; that despite repeated requests even after filing of petition by respondent No.1 before the Birmingham Court for dissolution of marriage, the divorce certificate was not issued; that when the Secretary Union Council failed to issue the divorce certificate after lapse of statutory period of 90 days, the petitioner approached this Court through a writ petition; that after issuance of direction by this Court, the divorce certificate was issued; that the stamps papers upon which the divorce deed was written were found correct by the SHO Police Station Islampura after due verification; that the impugned order is against law and fact; that respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter in view of section 7 of the Ordinance, therefore, this writ petition be allowed and impugned order dated 31-10- 2013 be set aside.
6. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has strongly opposed this writ petition and supported the impugned order. Learned counsel asserts that respondent No.2 had jurisdiction to deal with the matter who after perusal of record and in view of evidence led by the parties, has rightly set aside the divorce certificate as the proceedings before the Secretary Union Council were based on a forged and bogus divorce deed, never sent to the respondent-wife or to the Arbitration Council as alleged; that the petitioner participated in the proceedings before respondent No.2 without challenging his authority, as such, he is estopped by his conduct; that Administrator of Union Council did not constitute Arbitration Council as required under section 7(4) of the Ordinance, as such, he had no authority or jurisdiction to deal with the matter; that there is no evidence that efforts for reconciliation of the parties were ever made during the said proceedings; that during the pendency of divorce proceedings before Birmingham Court, respondent No.3 had no lawful authority to conduct proceedings for issuance of divorce certificate, therefore, this writ petition has no force, as such, it be dismissed.
7. I have heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record.
8. The legal question raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that this Court erred in law while holding that the respondent lady had remedy before the Inspecting Officer under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 against divorce certificate dated 17-11-2012 on the basis of alleged forged divorce deed dated 21-10-2011; that the said law was not applicable at the relevant time and that respondent No.2/Assistant Director, Local Government and Rural Development, Lahore (Inspecting Officer) who declared the divorce certificate null and void had no authority to deal with the matter.
9. According to the petitioner, he divorced respondent No.1 vide divorce deed dated 21-10-2011 with a copy of the same to the Secretary Union Council at that time but the divorce certificate was issued on 17-11-2012 after a direction made by this Court in Writ Petition No.27798/12 vide order dated 8-11-2012 which divorce certificate was ultimately declared illegal vide impugned order.
10. Scanning of record reveals that respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No. 27798/12 challenging validity of the divorce certificate dated 17-11-2012 issued on the basis of divorce deed dated 21-10- 2011. The learned Judge while relying on the law laid down in case titled "Hussain Bakhsh Khan v.
Deputy Commissioner D.G. Khan and others (1999 CLC 88) held that the Inspecting Officer/respondent No.2 under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 had authority to call for and inspect the bogus and fictitious record in possession of the Chairman of the Union Council, therefore, the writ petition was not maintainable. With due respect to the Hon'ble Judge, I am of the view that since the matter pertained to the years 2011 and 2012, relevant law applicable to the case was Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 and not the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. I have gone through the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 2001 but remained unsuccessful to find out any provision therein giving authority to respondent No.2 to look into the genuineness or otherwise of a divorce certificate. In my view, there is no express provision in the. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 or in the Local Government Ordinance, 2001 by which the issuance of certificate of talaq could be challenged. But at the same time, I am of the view that there is no specific provision in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 which empowers the Chairman Arbitration Council to issue any certificate in this regard.
11. Subsequent to the said order passed by learned Single Judge, respondent No.1 filed a revision petition before respondent No.2/Assistant Director Local Government with the allegation that the certificate of talaq dated 17-11-2012 issued on the basis of divorce deed dated 21-10-2011 was bogus. The petitioner appeared before respondent No.2 and contested the revision petition of the respondent No.l. The respondent No.2 after recording statements of the parties, perusing the record and hearing both sides set aside the divorce certificate dated 17-11-2012. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner participated in the proceedings before respondent No.2 without objecting to his authority and has only raised such objection when the decision came against him. As such, he is estopped by his own conduct to challenge the proceedings conducted by respondent No.2.
12. Report and parawise comments were called from respondent No.2. Relevant paragraph of the comments is reproduced below:-- "In divorce cases the procedure provided under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 is adopted. The respondent No.1 stated that he sent original divorce paper to his wife and copy thereof to concerned Union Council. Whereas it transpired from the record that the Attorney of respondent No.1 gave an application to the Union Council on 19-7-2012 along with a photocopy of divorce deed and he stated that his son has divorced his wife and have already sent a copy to Union Council, therefore on the basis of that copy divorce certificate might be issued. But it was confirmed by respondent No.4, Secretary Union Council No.37, that no notice of Talaq was ever received before subject application dated 19-7-2012 and he initiated proceedings on basis of that application/photocopy."
(Emphasis provided)
' In the inquiry held by respondent No.2, it was established that no notice of talaq, in original, was ever received by the Secretary Union Council No.37 prior to application dated 19-7-2012. The said application was filed subsequent to the petition filed by the respondent No.1 before the court of Birmingham.
13. The stance of the petitioner is also belied by a document i.e. Special power of attorney executed by the petitioner in favour of his father on 31-5-2012, which has been appended with this writ petition by the petitioner himself, wherein the petitioner has given powers to his father to institute a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the present respondent No.l. Relevant paragraphs of special power of attorney dated 31-5-2012 are reproduced below:-- "(1) To file a suit on my behalf for restitution of conjugal rights against my wife Kalsoom Zubair daughter of Muhammad Tufail, resident of House No.Ll-B, Street No.16-C, Aziz Park, Mehmood Booti, Baghbanpura, Lahore.
(2) To serve her in the suit in any manner whatsoever as court may direct and he has to bear all the expenses regarding the above mentioned suit on my behalf and any other suits if filed by my wife.
(3) To defend any suit if my wife Kalsoom Zubair filed regarding dissolution of marriage, recovery of dowry amount, dowry articles, maintenance, etc. And any other suit if filed by her in any court of law."
14. It is pertinent to note that the special power of attorney was executed by the petitioner in favour of his father on 31-5-2012 giving him authority to file a suit on his behalf for restitution of conjugal rights and also to contest the suit for dissolution of marriage if filed by the respondent No.1. This clearly shows that at least, till that time, there was no divorce by the petitioner to the respondent No.l. Had the petitioner sent divorce deed dated 21-10-2011 to respondent No.1 and the Secretary Union Council, he would have not asked his father to file a suit for restitution of conjugal rights or contest the suit for dissolution of marriage if filed by the respondent No.1 on 31-5-2012 when the special power of attorney was executed by him in favour of his father. Meaning thereby the marriage was intact at least at the time when the said power of attorney was singed on 31-5-2012.
15. Furthermore, a person who wishes to approach the court for some relief must come to the court with clean hands. The petitioner while instituting the writ petition has failed to bring on record the proceedings conducted by respondent No.2 but has appended only the impugned order. The impugned order clearly depicts that the same was passed after hearing the parties and recording the statements of the parties but no such record has been produced before this court by the petitioner which shows mala fide on the part of the petitioner. In the circumstances, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this score alone.
16. In view of the discussion made in the preceding paragraphs, it is unambiguously clear that no notice of talaq/divorce deed 21-10-2011 was ever served by the petitioner upon the respondent nor any copy thereof was supplied to the Secretary Union Council, as such, the claim of petitioner to this extent is false and the divorce deed dated 21-10-2011 is result of fraud and forgery. In my firm view, a court cannot be used for protection of gains gotton by someone illegally, unlawfully and fraudulently. Even if an order has been passed without jurisdiction but it advances the cause of justice, the court should not interfere therewith as neither any fraud and forgery committed by anyone should come in the way of justice nor writ jurisdiction can be invoked in aid of injustice.
When the impugned order dated 31-10-2013 passed by respondent No.2/Inspecting Officer/Assistant Director, Local Government and Rural Development Department, Lahore advances the cause of justice and sets aside the document which was obtained through fraud and forgery, the same cannot be set aside. Respectful reliance is placed on the dictums laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in cases reported "The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others (PLD 1975 SC 3310)" and "Mst. Shahida and another v.
Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Larkana through Chairman at Larkana and 5 others (PLD 2001 SC 26)."
17. In a nutshell, the divorce deed dated 21-10-2011 as well as divorce certificate dated 17-11-2012 are result of fraud and forgery which cannot be protected by this Court. As a result, this writ petition is without any force. The same is dismissed.