' MAHMOOD AHMAD BHATTI, J.---This civil revision is directed against the orders dated 25-4-2013 and 13-2-2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Multan and an Additional District Judge, Multan, respectively, whereby an application for the grant of temporary injunction moved by the petitioner was dismissed and an appeal preferred thereagainst also met the same fate.
2. Concisely put, the facts are that the petitioner instituted a suit for possession through specific performance, contending therein that he entered into an agreement to sell dated 21-5-2009 with late Mst. Niazi, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents/ defendants. It was further averred in the plaint that the deceased lady had agreed to sell land measuring 5 kanals 5 marlas bearing Khewat No.147/148 Khatuni No.374, situated at Village Dumra Tehsil and District Multan for a consideration of Rs.5,25,000 and that out of the total sale consideration, the petitioner/plaintiff had paid an amount of Rs.4,00,000 as earnest money, while the balance of the sale consideration amounting to Rs.1,25,000 was to be paid by 21-11-2009. However, the aforementioned vendor fell ill and passed away in the year 2010, due to which the suit land could not be transferred to the petitioner/plaintiff.
3. It goes without saying that the respondents/defendants entered appearance, filed written statement, controverting the pleas of the plaintiff both on the factual and legal plane. It was strongly denied by them that late Mst. Niazi ever entered into the agreement to sell with the plaintiff. It was maintained by them that the alleged agreement to sell is a fake, forged and fabricated document, which is also evident from the fact that it bears/carries the snap/photo of a lady, who is not the mother of the defendants. In other words, the pasting of the photo of a stranger on the agreement in question indicating her to be late Mst. Niazi negates the assertion of the plaintiff that she ever made any agreement with the plaintiff/petitioner. It was pointed out that the petitioner/ plaintiff is a nephew of late Mst. Niazi, and they wondered that if he could go to the extent of affixing the photo of a stranger to the agreement to sell, what would be the veracity of his claim.
4. Along with the plaint, the petitioner had also moved an application for the grant of temporary injunction. It was prayed that the defendants/respondents be restrained from alienating the suit land and they be ordered not to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the suit land.
5. The learned Civil Judge seized with the suit dismissed the application of the petitioner/plaintiff for the grant of ad interim relief vide order dated 25-4-2013. It was challenged by filing an appeal before the learned District Judge, Multan. Ultimately, the appeal filed by the petitioner/plaintiff was dismissed by an Additional District Judge, Multan vide order dated 13-2-2014. Hence this revision petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that both the impugned orders passed by the learned Courts below suffer from misreading and non-reading of the pleadings of the parties to the suit as also the documents annexed thereto. He argues that the learned Appellate Court passed the impugned order in a slipshod and mechanical manner. He stresses that since the possession of the petitioner/plaintiff regarding the suit land has not been denied by the defendants/respondents, it is a proof enough that the possession of the petitioner originates in and bears relation to the agreement to sell. At any rate, the case of the petitioner is covered by the provisions contained in section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. He also makes the argument that the petitioner has a strong prima facie case and that balance of convenience also lies in his favour. He concludes his arguments by making the submissions that both the Courts below did not exercise the 'jurisdiction vested in them and/or that they committed material irregularity in exercising the same. In support of his submissions he places reliance on the judgment reported as "Mst. Saeeda Sultana and another v. Mst. Roshan Ara and others" (2002 SCM R 1345).
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the record annexed to the revision petition with his assistance, besides going through the judgment cited at the bar.
8. From the resume of the facts set out hereinabove, it is crystal clear that the petitioner is laying claim to the suit land on the basis of an agreement to sell, which he allegedly entered into with late Mst. Niazi, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents/ defendants. At the moment, there is no proof that any payment was made to the alleged vendor through Cheque, Pay Order, Draft or T.T.
None of the defendants are stated to be round the corner when their mother is alleged to have made an agreement with the plaintiff. Therefore, the question of the availability of an independent advice to the late Mst. Niazi is one of the factors which seems to have influenced the orders passed by the learned Courts below. The petitioner/plaintiff has still a long way to go to prove the transaction in question, in addition to the execution of the agreement to sell in question. He has also to adduce evidence as to how, where and when he allegedly paid a huge consideration of Rs.4,00,000 to late Mst. Niazi. Above all, the factum of pasting of the photo of a fake lady on the agreement to sell, showing her to be late Mst. Niazi, raises eyebrows, casting grave doubts on the claim of the plaintiff, especially when he is closely related to the deceased. It is well-established law that while granting temporary injunction, the Courts of law would also take into consideration whether the petitioner/ plaintiff has approached the Court with clean hands or not. In other words, they would look to the conduct of a party, and if the same is not above board, the grant of relief of ad interim injunction may be refused on this sole ground. In this respect, reference may be made to the judgment of the apex Court reported as "Irshad Hussain v. Province of Punjab and others"
(PLD 2003 SC 344). As for the claim of the petitioner that he has been in possession of the suit land and he is entitled to the grant of temporary injunction on this score alone, I am attempted to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as "Muhammad Ali v. Mehnga Khan" (2004 SCM R 1111) in which it was authoritatively held that mere possession would not entitle a plaintiff to the grant of interim injunction. Furthermore, the possession of a person over a piece of land is one thing, and his possession under an agreement to sell is quite another. It has been disputed by the respondents/defendants that possession was ever delivered to the plaintiff under the alleged agreement to sell. This aspect of the controversy cannot be resolved even while making tentative assessm ent of the material produced by the parties. Even otherwise, the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in section 52, C.P.C. Is there to safeguard the rights and interests, if any, of the petitioner/plaintiff. For the present, it may be observed that the petitioner would not suffer any irreparable loss in the event of refusal of an injunction. On the other hand, respondents/defendants would be at a disadvantage and they are likely to suffer incalculable loss in the case of granting an injunction by this Court. It has been rightly held by the superior Courts that unless all the ingredients, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable loss are there and they concur in favour of a party, an injunction is not to be granted in routine. In this case both the Courts exercised their discretionary jurisdiction in accordance with law and I am not persuaded to interfere with the orders passed by them. To me, they did not commit any material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction. They adverted to each and every aspect of the case and they made an appraisal of the evidence, albeit tentatively, while coming to the conclusion to deny the relief of temporary injunction to the petitioner.
9. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and reported as "Mst. Saeeda Sultana and another v. Mst. Roshan Ara and others" (2002 SCM R 1345) (supra) is clearly distinguishable. It proceeds on its own facts. In that case, there was a dispute among son and four daughters of a deceased. The son was making claim on the basis of a gift deed, while the daughters who had instituted a suit for declaration had maintained that the same was invalid.
Against this background, protection was afforded to the daughters to the extent of their Islamic shares in the properties bequeathed by the deceased owner and interim injunction was granted to protect and safeguard their shares. On the face of it, this case has no application to the facts of the instant case. The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the aforesaid judgment handed down by the apex Court is not apposite, to say the least.
10. The upshot of the above discussion is that this revision petition being without merit is hereby dismissed in limine.