' MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J.--- Through the instant Service Appeal under section 5 of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act, 1991 the appellant has assailed the order dated 15-3-2006 and Notification No,62/RHC/CJJ, dated 17th March, 2006, issued by the Registrar of this Court whereby he has been dismissed from service.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was appointed as Civil Judge in the year 1987. He earned adverse remarks in his ACRs for the period from 10-3-1997 to 1-7-1997, 2-7-1997 to 31-12- 1997 and 1-1-1998 to 31-12-1998. He made representations for expunction of adverse remarks, which were declined. He filed Appeals bearing Nos.63, 64 and 65 of 2001 before this Tribunal, which were all dismissed. Consequently, he was proceeded against under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999, on the charge of having reputation of being corrupt, on the basis of adverse remarks recorded in the aforesaid Annual Confidential Reports. A show-cause notice of imposition of major penalty of dismissal from service was issued to him to which he filed reply.
Thereafter, he was issued final show-cause notice as to why he should not be dismissed from service. He was afforded an opportunity of personal hearing by an Hon'ble Judge of Lahore High Court on behalf of the authority. After perusing note of personal hearing, the competent authority concluded that the charge stood proved against the appellant and he was dismissed from service, vide order dated 15-3-2006 and notification issued on 17-3-2006. The appellant filed departmental appeal/representation under section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, which was declined.
Hence, the instant appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the impugned order of dismissal of the appellant from service is against law and facts on the record; that the countersigning officer of ACR of the appellant for the period from 10-3-1997 to 1-7-1997 and 2-7-1997 to 31-12-1997 did not afford opportunity of hearing to the appellant before recording adverse remarks as such he has been condemned unheard; that it was not a case in which regular inquiry could be dispensed with; that the first ACR was for a period of only 3 months and 20 days and second was for the period of 9 months 20 days and both were countersigned by the same Inspection Judge, therefore, opinion of the countersigning officer in one calendar year could not be counted twice in the form of two ACRs; that the third ACR was advisory in nature and did not touch upon the integrity of the appellant; that in reply to the show-cause notice the appellant had refuted the allegations by giving details of his source of income, which he had been showing in his declaration of assets; and that while passing the impugned order the competent authority has erred in law and deviated from the rules applicable to the case of the appellant, hence, the same is liable to be set aside.
4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as the matter could be thrashed out on the basis of available record, therefore, there was no need for holding a regular inquiry in the matter; that the appellant possessed persistent reputation of being corrupt and in three consecutive ACRs he earned adverse remarks against which his representations and appeals were dismissed; that countersigning authority was not under any legal obligation to afford an opportunity of hearing before recording adverse remarks in the ACR of the appellant; that a report pertaining to a period of more than 3 months is considered a complete ACR and in one calendar year more than one ACRs may be recorded by different Reporting Officers; that in view of conduct of the appellant the competent authority was justified in passing the impugned order.
6. We have heard the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent and have also gone through the record.
7. During hearing of the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant laid emphasis mainly on the point that the impugned order of dismissal of the appellant from service has been passed on the basis of adverse remarks recorded in the aforesaid three ACRs which proceeded on wrong presumption of law and facts on record. Admittedly, the adverse remarks recorded in aforesaid three ACRs were challenged by the appellant by submitting representations to the competent authority and all of them were dismissed. Thereafter the appellant preferred service appeals, in which all the pleas raised herein this appeal were taken up and duly considered but they did not find favour with the Tribunal and dismissed. In this view of the matter, this Tribunal cannot again examine the legality of the adverse remarks recorded in the said three ACRs as the same have attained finality. The only question, which needs adjudication by this Tribunal is dismissal of the appellant from service. We see no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant could not be dismissed from service without holding a regular inquiry into the matter. As the allegations levelled against the appellant were supported by documents and this being a matter of record, no regular inquiry was needed before taking penal action against the appellant. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case of Nawab Khan and another v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and others (PLD 1994 SC 222) and Syed Aqleem Abbasi Jaffari v. Province of Punjab through Secretary Irrigation Department and others (2005 SCM R 1901). The respondent has thus rightly dispensed with conducting of regular inquiry in the matter of the appellant's dismissal from service.
8. The appellant earned three consecutive adverse ACRs, touching upon his integrity. He was found guilty of having persistent reputation of being corrupt and liable for imposition of major penalty.
Rule 3 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999, which provides grounds for imposition of major penalty is reproduced hereunder: "3. Grounds for penalty: A civil servant, who,---
(a) is inefficient or has ceased to be efficient; or
(b) is guilty of misconduct; or
(c) is corrupt, or may reasonably be considered corrupt because---
(i) he, or any of his dependents or any other person through him or on his behalf is, in possession of pecuniary resources or of property disproportionate to his known sources of income, which he cannot reasonably account for; or
(ii) he has assumed a style of living beyond his ostensible means; or
(iii) he has a persistent reputation of being corrupt; or
(d) is engaged, or is reasonably suspected of being engaged in subversive activities, or is reasonably suspected of being associated with others engaged in subversive activities or is guilty of disclosure of official secrets to any unauthorized person, and his retention in service is, prejudicial to national security;"
' The case of the appellant squarely falls within the purview of Rule 3(c)(iii) of the Rules ibid. He was a judicial officer and his earning three consecutive adverse ACRs was a valid ground to hold him guilty of having reputation of being corrupt. Such a conduct shown by the appellant was unbecoming of a judicial officer. We are not impressed by argument of the learned counsel for the appellant to repel the allegation of being corrupt that the appellant had sufficient landed property before induction into service because the word "corruption" cannot be limited to the act of "making money" alone by taking illegal gratifications as there are so many other acts/actions which come within the definition of "corruption". Even otherwise, the desire of accumulating more wealth is borne out of lust, which is a state of mind irrespective of a person being "rich" or "poor". The competent authority has thus rightly imposed major penalty of dismissal from service upon the appellant. The impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional defect.
8. For what has been discussed above, we see no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.