Through this writ petition, Muhammad Shafique, the petitioner has assailed the validity of the order dated 12.11.2013 passed by learned Judge Family Court, Multan, whereby he fixed the interim maintenance of Kanwal (minor), Respondent No, 3 at Rs, 3000/- a month.
2. The facts, in brief, are that Mst. Fahmida and Kanwal (minor), Respondents Nos.2 & 3 instituted a suit for the recovery of maintenance as well as maternity charges and dowry articles worth Rs, 24, 93,640. It goes without saying that the petitioner herein filed a written statement, controverting all the pleas of the plaintiff and maintaining that Respondent No, 2 had left his house of her own accord. It was also asserted by him that since Respondent No, 2 had failed to perform her matrimonial obligations, she was not entitled to maintenance at all.
3. Efforts at reconciliation between the spouses failed. However, learned Judge Family Court, Multan proceeded to fix interim maintenance of Kanwal (minor) aged 03 at Rs, 3000/- a month in terms of Section 17-A of the W.P. Family Courts Act, 1964. It bears repeating that this very order dated 12.11.2013 is the subject matter of the instant writ petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the interim maintenance fixed by learned Judge Family Court is excessive and oppressive and that the petitioner did not have any source of income to comply with the impugned order. He submits that the petitioner has love and affection for Kanwal (minor), but he is also to look after his aged parents, and if he was made to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs, 3000/- a month, the petitioner would have to borrow money from his relatives and friends.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for Respondents Nos.2 & 3 supported the impugned order dated 12.11.2013 passed by learned Judge Family Court, Multan. He has argued that the petitioner is a man of means. He runs a shoes shop, earning a lot of buck. He has stressed that the petitioner has only one daughter and when he professes his love for his minor daughter, he should spend all his money on her.
6. Since final adjudication as to the maintenance to be fixed for Kanwal (minor) is yet to be made, which would entail the recording of the evidence for the parties, I would refrain from prejudging the issue. I am also loath to pre-empt and arrogate to myself the jurisdiction of learned Judge Family Court, Multan. Therefore, he would be free to pass the final judgment and decree after completing all the formalities of a trial. But for the present, I have no hesitation in holding that he exercised his discretion wisely, justly, equitably and in accordance with the law. In this day and age, when the prices of everyday commodities are rising rapidly, maintenance of Rs, 3000/- a month cannot be regarded as excessive or oppressive. One can hardly make both ends meet with this amount.
7. There is yet another aspect that I feel disinclined to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Multan. Under Section 14 of the W.P. Family Courts Act, 1964, an interim order cannot be challenged by filing an appeal. To be exact, sub-section (3) of Section 14
(ibid) lays down that "no appeal or revision shall lie against an interim order passed by a Family Court". When the legislature in its wisdom did not provide for an appeal or revision to bring under challenge an interlocutory order passed by learned Judge Family Court, how could the underlying objective of enacting such a provision be defeated and frustrated by allowing the parties to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court? This would be tantamount to providing them with another forum, rather a higher one to challenge the interim orders. It is well-established law that what cannot be achieved directly is not to be allowed to be achieved indirectly. This is not to say that' all interim orders passed by learned Judge Family Court would be immune and cannot be assailed in writ jurisdiction. This Court would not hesitate to exercise its power of judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic public of Pakistan, 1973 in 'a case where the impugned order is patently illegal, highly unjust, mala fide, fraud on the statute or passed in excess of jurisdiction or is violative of principles of natural justice. I am satisfied that the case of the petitioner does not fall within the purview of the exceptions enumerated hereinabove.
8. The upshot of the discussion made above is that this writ petition being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed.