' ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J.-Petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to impugn the judgment dated 18-6-2014 passed by learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad.
2. Brief facts leading to this writ petition are that petitioner lodged case FIR No,29 dated 14-1-2014 under section 365, P.P.C. Police Station City Tandlianwala District Faisalabad against respondents Nos.4 to 9. In result of police investigation respondents were found guilty and challan was submitted to the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Tandlianwala District Faisalabad who returned the file to the Prosecution for presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction.
Resultantly the learned Public Prosecutor presented the challan in the Anti-Terrorism Court Faisalabad. The learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court taking cognizance of the matter formally framed the charge against the respondents under sections 365-A, 386, 148, 149, P.P.C. And section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (hereinafter shall be called as ATA). Prosecution after examining as many as nine P.Ws. Closed the evidence. Statement of the accused under section 342, Cr.P.C.
Was also recorded by the learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court. After concluding the trial and hearing arguments of learned counsel for the parties the learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court Faisalabad passed the impugned judgment dated 18-6-2014 after discussing the evidence produced by the parties and the relevant provisions of law and thus declined to exercise the jurisdiction and directed to return the challan to the Prosecution for presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction. The concluding para of the impugned judgment dated 18-6-2014 reads below:-- "It is established on the record that accused Ashraf and Sakhi Muhammad were locking their horns over the transfer of the land of the mother of the latter, in favour of the former. So, it can easily be observed that the parties were engaged in enmity and vendetta. The purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was to attract the jurisdiction of this court, in the cases where in the design behind any occurrence was to spread fear, harassment and terror in the society or a part thereof. The Hon'ble superior Courts have ruled consistently that the jurisdiction of this court would not be in play, when the parties are settling their scores, as in this case. Given this situation, 1 am of the considered opinion that occurrence of this case, even if taken as proved, cannot be covered under section 365-A of P.P.C. It was not a peculiar instance of the abduction for ransom, which had been defined in section 2(n) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The motive behind this occurrence was not to unleash terror and harassment in the society. It was a family affair. Both the sides are closely related inter-se and saddled in a dispute of land. I refrain from discussing the sufficiency or otherwise of the prosecution evidence, in juxtaposition with the defence plea. It is a matter to be seen by the court of competent jurisdiction. It is held under section 23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 that this court has no jurisdiction in this case, as the alleged offence is not falling under section 365-A of P.P. C. Read with section 2(n) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Therefore, the challan be returned to the prosecution for presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction. The accused Muhammad Siddique, Muhammad Ashraf, Zafar lqbal and Muzammil are in custody.
They be sent to jail, so as to be summoned from there by the court of competent jurisdiction. Khan and Yasin accused are on bail and they are also relieved for the time being and will be summoned by the transferee court, on the date of its choice."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court erred in law and facts by holding that the offence does not fall within the purview of section 365-A, P.P.C. As defined in section 2(n) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; that the learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court also misconceived by formulating the opinion that jurisdiction of the said court merely attracts in the cases wherein the design behind any occurrence was to spread fear, harassment and terror in the society or a part thereof; that the learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court has miserably failed to appreciate that offence under section 365-A, P.P.C. Read with section 2(n) of the ATA is a scheduled offence as provided in the Third Schedule of the ATA exclusively triable by the Anti- Terrorism Court; that the impugned judgment being against law and facts is untenable and liable to set aside.
4. Conversely learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contends that since the element of spreading fear, harassm ent and terror in the society or a part thereof is missing in the alleged occurrence and the claim of any ransom by the accused is also not alleged in the FIR therefore learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court has rightly observed that the alleged occurrence does not fall within the purview of section 365-A, P.P.C. Read with section 2(n) of ATA and do not attract the exclusive jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court; that with the right formulation of the said view the learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court has rightly returned the challan in terms of section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
5. Arguments heard. Record perused.
6. At the outset it will be expedient to reproduce the provisions of section 365-A, P.P.C., section 2(n) and relevant extract of Third Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 which read below:-- "365-A P.P.C. Kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc.: ' Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person for the purpose of extorting from the person kidnapped or abducted, or from any person interested in the person kidnapped or abducted, any property, whether movable or immovable, or valuable security, or to compel any person to comply with any other demand, whether in cash or otherwise, for obtaining release of the person kidnapped or abducted, shall be punished with (death or) imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to forfeiture of property. "
"Section 2 of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997: In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context;
(n) "Kidnapping for ransom" means the action of conveying any person from any place, without his consent, or by force compelling or by any deceitful means inducing him, to go from any place, and unlawfully detaining him and demanding or attempting to demand, money, pecuniary or other benefit from him or from another person, as a condition of his release."
"The Third Schedule:
(1) Any act of terrorism within the meaning of this Act including those offences which may be added or amended in accordance with the provisions of Section 34 of this Act.
(2) Any other offence punishable under this Act.
(3) Any attempt to commit, or any aid or abetment of, or any conspiracy to commit, any of the aforesaid offences.
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of the above paragraph, the Anti-Terrorism Court to the exclusion of any other Court shall try the offences relating to the following, namely:-
(1) Abduction or kidnapping for ransom.
(ii) ..........................................
(iii) ..........................................
7. Bare reading of the FIR in this case reveals that complainant duly reported the alleged forcible abduction of Sakhi Muhammad by Muhammad Ashraf/respondent No,5 along with his co- accused. It is established that purpose of lodging the FIR is merely to ignite the process of law.
During the course of investigation after recording the statement of Sakhi Muhammad alleged abductee and relevant P.Ws. Prosecution built up its case that the accused have been claiming ransom from the abductee and the concerned P.Ws. During the period of his illegal detention. The alleged offence therefore prima facie attracts the provision of section 2(n) of the ATA which is exclusively triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court as provided in the Third Schedule of the said Act. The learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court therefore was misconceived while declining to exercise the jurisdiction with reference to absence of any act or attempt to spread harassment or terrorism.
8. At this juncture it will be expedient to reproduce the provisions of Sections 6(1)(a) and (2)(e) and Section 7(1)(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 which reads below:-- "6. Terrorism: (1) In this Act, "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls with the meaning of subsection (2).
(2) An "action" shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), if it: (e) involves kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking.
7. Punishment for acts of terrorism:---(1) Whoever commits an act of terrorism under Section 6, whereby:
(e) the offence of kidnapping for ransom or hostage-taking has been committed, shall be punishable, on conviction, with death or imprisonment for life."
9. In view of all above, without touching the merits of the case or deeper appreciation of the evidence produced by the prosecution and leaving it to the learned Anti-Terrorism Court to determine as to whether the prosecution evidence qualifies to prove the charge against the accused persons beyond any shadow of doubt, we are of the considered view that in the given set of facts and material available on the record in the light of afore-quoted provisions of law the Judge Anti-Terrorism Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try the offence relating to kidnapping for ransom. The learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court Faisalabad therefore misconceived and erred in law by declining to exercise the jurisdiction through the impugned judgment which is untenable and liable to set aside.
10. For the above reasons this writ petition is allowed, impugned judgment dated 18-6-2014 passed by learned Judge Anti-Terrorism Court Faisalabad is set aside and he is hereby directed to decide the case in accordance with law after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties.