' While posted in Traffic Sector Mall-I, Lahore the appellant was departmentally proceeded against vide Show-Cause Notice No. 22/PASSP/Ops dated 27.05.2010 issued by the Respondent No. 1/ Senior Superintendent Of Police, Lahore under the PEEDA Act, 2006 on account of alleged absence from duty on 25.05.2010 at about 10.00 P.M. His written defence was found unsatisfactory. Subsequently, Mr. Muhammad Asif Zafar, Senior Traffic Officer, Superintendent of Police, Operations, City Traffic Police, Lahore the Respondent No. 1 awarded him minor penalty of censure vide impugned order dated 09.06.2010. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the appellant called in question this order in departmental appeal before the Respondent No. 2/CCPO, Lahore which was rejected vide impugned order dated 4.8.2012 being barred by time. Hence this appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant stated that under the law and rules on the subject Senior Traffic Officer/Respondent No. 1 was not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and award the punishment to the appellant. According to him Chief Traffic Officer, Lahore being a competent authority was authorized in this regard. He stated that the entire departmental proceedings and impugned orders dated 09.6.2010 and 04.8.2012 are without jurisdiction , void and professed for the acceptance for the appeal and setting the aside the impugned orders.
3. Learned DA opposed the contentions as raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and stated that the appellant was rightly punished by the departmental authorities, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief. He further added that the departmental of the appellant was grossly barred by time. He prayed for dismissal of the instant appeal.
4. Arguments heard and record perused.
5. The following two questions are important for the disposal of this appeal:--
(i) Whether Respondents No. 1 the Senior Superintendent of Police, Operations, City Traffic Police, Lahore was competent to initiate departmental proceedings against the appellant and award him impugned penalty under the PEEDA Act, 2006.
' Whether the limitation would run against an order which has been passed by an incompetent authority.
' According to a notification dated 20th September, 2007 issued by the Govt. Of Punjab (Home department) published in the Punjab weekly Gazette 26, September 2007 the appointing authorities were notified in the scheduled-1 attached to the notification. This schedule shows that in case of Traffic Warden (BS-14) the Capital City Police Officer/ City Police Officer concerned was the appointing authority. Article 14 of notification (ibid) speaks unequivocally that Chief Traffic Officer shall exercise administrative and operational powers including punishments but subject to the control and supervision of Capital City Police officer, Lahore in the general police area. In this regard I would also refer to a judgment of the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 2.8.2013 passed in CP No. 403-L of 2013 wherein question of competence of Senior Traffic Officer came under discussion and the honourable Supreme Court of Pakis held as under: "The Senior Traffic Officer was not competent to proceed against the petitioner and that the competent authority in this regard was the Chief Traffic Officer. On that score, on Court query, he further conceded that the order passed against the petitioner was without jurisdiction."
6. Being guided by the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan (ibid). It is found that the impugned order passed by the Respondent No. 1/ Senior Superintendent of Police Operations, City Traffic Police, Lahore is without lawful authority and corem non judice, therefore, the action taken by Respondent No. 1 against the appellant is not sustainable. The assumption of the authority by the Respondent No. 1 to commence the departmental proceedings is without authority and unlawful.
7. The honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in a judgment reported in 2009 SCM R 339 held:- "It is a settled principle of law that when the initial order of the very act which relates to the initiation of a proceeding is contrary to law and illegal then all subsequent proceedings and actions taken on the basis of such illegal and unlawful action would have no basis and would fall."
8. So far as the question of limitation qua filing of departmental appeal against the impugned order is concerned, it has been settled principle law that neither the bar of limitation would attract nor period of limitation would run against the order passed by the incompetent authority. (see 2014 SCM R 1189 at page 1194 & 1195).
9. In the above context, the appellate authority has also failed to take into account the aforesaid legal aspect of the matter and has erred in law while dismissing the departmental appeal of the appellant, therefore, the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eye of law and liable to be set aside. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed, impugned orders are set aside. The case is remanded to the competent authority with the direction to hold a denovo proceedings under the law on this subjects.