' MUHAMMAD IRSHAD KHAN (MEMBER).-The appellant, then a Grade 21 Officer of the Secretariat Group was removed from service by the Competent authority in exercise of the powers conferred by section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 vide the following notification :- "Rawalpindi, the 9th March, 1981. Notification No, 40/5/80-AI (A).-In exercise of the powers conferred under section 12-' A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, the competent authority is pleased to remove Dr. A. Q. K. Afghan, a Grade 21 officer of the Secretariat Group/Officer on Special Duty, Establishment Division from service with immediate effect or if any leave is at his credit and is applied for by him within 10 days of the date of issue of this Notification and granted to him, on the expiry of such leave.
(SO .
(Raja Muhammad Ikram Ullah Khan) Deputy Secretary to the Government of Pakistan."
2. The appellant submitted the Establishment Division a leave application containing a certificate from an Assistant Accounts Officer of the AGPR to the effect that leave on full pay for 389 days was at his credit. Vide a Notification of the Establishment Division dated 19th March, 1981 it was notified that the appellant was granted leave on full pay for 120 days, on expiry whereof, i,e, on 6th July, 1981 he shall stand removed service. Through an application, dated 24th March, 1981 the appellant represented against the above notification questioning the decision of the respondent curtailing his leave from 389 days to 120 days only. However, his representation was turned down and he was informed that the officers removed from service under section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, are not entitled to any leave, but the appellant was granted 120 days' leave on full pay as a matter of grace. The appellant through a separate appeal filed in this Tribunal, had assailed the order of his removal from service. We have dismissed in limine that appeal today. By the appeal in hand the order granting him 120 days, leave instead of 389 days allegedly at his credit has been challenged.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. He contended that it was specifically mentioned in the notification of appellant's removal from service that the appellant would retire from service with immediate effect or if' any leave is at his credit and is applied for by him within 10 days of the date of issue of the notification and granted to him, on the expiry of such leave.
Therefore, it was the right of the appellant to avail 389 days' leave on full pay, and the competent authority erred in granting him only 120 days' leave, the order of the competent authority was therefore, it was submitted, illegal and wrong. It was, therefore, prayed that the impugned orders may be set aside and the respondent be directed to allow the appellant to avail of leave on full pay for the entire period of leave at his credit or alternatively, for 365 days as for a person on LPR.
4. The contention has no force. It has been provided in section 12-A of the Civil Servants Act itself that the removal of a person under that section would be effective from such date as directed by the competent authority. In the case in hand, the competent authority had directed that the removal of the appellant would be effective immediately or on the expiry of the leave applied for, due and granted to him. Quite obviously on his removal, the appellant was not entitled to any leave as of right. Indeed only a privilege of availing the to him was conferred by the impugned order itself. It, therefore, remained in an unfettered discretion of the competent authority to grant full or any portion of the leave due to the appellant or to refuse it totally. As correctly clarified in reply to the appellant's representation, leave for 120 days was granted to the appellant as a matter of grace. It seems plain that the appellant could not claim A the leave for a single day as a matter of right. In the circumstances, the impugned order granting only 120 days' leave to the appellant is quite lawful and is not open to any exception. The appeal, having no merits, is accordingly dismissed in limine.