Petitioner, Muhammad Iqbal, being Senior Headmaster of Government High School, Lashkarpur, Multan through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 has called in question the letter No.PA/DS(SE)ResultsMultan/2013 dated 19.9.2013 issued by the Government of the Punjab, School Education Department whereby a direction has been issued to the Executive District Officers(Education), of Multan, Vehari, Lodhran and Khanewal to take action against the heads of the schools whose 9th Class Secondary School Certificate Examination, 2013 results were below 25%; and, a show cause notice No.SO(E&D-I)/Res.(2013/Multan) dated 31.3.2014 issued to him under Section 7(b) read with Section 5 (1) (a) of the Punjab Employees, Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006.
2. As regards the impugned show cause notices, it is suffice to say that show cause notice or a charge-sheet is merely an expression made by a Department/Organization against its employee stating therein that particular acts of misconduct are alleged against him. This is the first step of the disciplinary proceedings and being interlocutory orders are in the nature of a step towards a final order eventually to be passed and will be merged with the final order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Allah Bukhsh vs DIG, Police"(2003 UC 60) has held that constitutional petition against show cause notice is not maintainable and civil servants in disciplinary proceedings will have to wait till a final order is passed. It is also settled principle of law that a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is not maintainable against intermediate stages or steps of departmental disciplinary proceedings. In this regard reference may be made to the case of "Abdul Wahab Khan vs Government of the Punjab and three others" (PLD 1989 SC 508) and "Muhammad Javed vs Executive District Officer(Education) Sialkot and two others" (PLJ 2002 Lahore 1393). Interference in the interlocutory orders such as charge-sheet/show cause notice and putting an end to them at their inception, unless same are shown to be without jurisdiction, would amount to stifling of disciplinary proceedings. In view of above, this is not the stage at which this Court should entertain the petition filed by the petitioner challenging and for quashing show cause notice and appropriate course for the petitioner to adopt is to file his reply to the impugned show cause notice and invite the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. Prior to that stage, any petition for quashing show cause notice is premature.
3. The other grouse of the petitioner is with respect to the validity of letter No. PA/DS (SE)Results- Multan/2013 dated 19.9.2013 issued by the Government of the Punjab, School Education Department whereby a direction has been issued to the Executive District Officers(Education), of Multan, Vehari, Lodhran and Khanewal to take action against the heads of the schools whose 9th Class Secondary School Certificate Examination, 2013 results were below 25%. It is settled principle of law that ordinarily High Court does not interfere with the policy matter in its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. However, if policy is in conflict with any provision of law or is violative of fundamental right of a citizen, the same may be challenged before this court in its constitutional jurisdiction. In this regard reference may be made to the case of "M/S. AlRehman Travels and Tours(Pvt) Ltd and others vs Ministry of Religious Aaffairs, Hajj, Zakat and Usher through Secretary and others" (2011 SCM R 1621). In this context I have examined the above said impugned letter. The Articles included in the Part-II, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, that is, Articles 29 to 40 contain principles which are required to be followed by the State both in the matter of administration as well as in the making of laws. They embody the aims and objects of the State under the Republican Constitution, e.g, that it is 'Welfare State' which shall: (a) promote, with special care, the educational and economic interests of backward classes or areas;(b) remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education within minimum possible period; and (c) make technical and professional education generally available and higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. In continuation to afore mentioned principles of policy, the State as per Article 25-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is bound to provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such a manner as may be determined by law. Realizing the manifesto of the policies and programs of the State, the School Education Department, Government of the Punjab, vide letter dated 19th September, 2013 has taken notice of the low percentage of school results of Secondary School Certificate Examination-2013 and, therefore, has directed to take action against the heads of the schools whose 9th Class Secondary School Certificate Examination-2013 were below 25% so as to maintain standard of education, to remove illiteracy; and, to achieve the afore-stated objectives of the State. The Policy/letter in question being one of the modes to check mal-practice and creating hurdle in upgrading the standard of education and making the citizens of Pakistan literate is not violative of any law or provision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
4. Before parting it is apposite to state here that the questions involved in this petition were also the subject matter of W.P.No.16143 of 2014. The said petition was dismissed vide order dated 27.1.2014 and the same was upheld by the learned Division Bench of this Court in ICA. No.463 of 2014. Thus, the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench in ICA No.463 of 2014 is applicable to the case in hands and in view thereof I am clear in my mind that the prayer made by the petitioner cannot be acceded to.