Muhammad Tariq Abbasi, J:- This appeal is directed against the order dated 10.07.2004, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Section-30 Multan, whereby while invoking jurisdiction under Section 249-A Cr.P.C., the respondent No.1 was acquitted in case FIR No.89 dated 03.04.2001 registered under Sections 406/420 PPC at Police Station Chahalyak District Multan.
2. The facts are that a vehicle, registration No.1446/MNR which was a case property in case FIR No.148 dated 25.04.1996 registered under Sections 379/419/420/467/468/471/411 PPC at Police Station Chahalyak District Multan and on Spurdari given to the National Bank of Pakistan Multan, through Macibool Ahmad Khan an authorized officer of the bank. The said property was riot produced in the above mentioned case and it revealed that it was sold out, hence the learned trial court wrote the following letter, to the SHO of Police Station Chahalyak District Multan:- "The SHO P.S. Chehlyak Multan. Subject:- Registration of Case. The vehicle No.1446/MNR was the case property of case FIR No.148 dated 25.04.1996, for the offences punishable U/Ss 419/420/467/468/471/379/411 PPC, which was taken on superdari by National Bank of Pakistan Multan through Mr.Maqbool Ahmad Khan, officer Grade, duly authorized by Zonal Chief, National Bank of Pakistan Zonal office, Multan. The Superdar Maqbool Ahmad Khan has died, therefore, the case registered against Zonal Chief, National Bank of Pakistan, Zonal Office Multan and the Vehicle No.1446/MNR should be taken into custody U/S 406 PPC."
Consequently the above mentioned FIR No.89 dated 03.04.2001 was chalked out.
3. During investigation it revealed that Maqbool Ahmad Khan, the bank employee, who on behlaf of the bank, had received the vehicle in question on Spurdari had died and the respondent No.1 as well as Afzal Mohy-ud-Din (co-accused), the employees of the bank were held responsible, hence challaned to the court. Both of them sought their acquittal under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. On the ground that vehicle in question was not obtained by them on Spurdari or misappropriated in any manner whatsoever, hence there was no probability of their conviction in any offence. The learned trial court through the impugned order accordingly acquitted the respondent No.1, whereas the application of Afzal Mohy-ud-Din (co-accused) was dismissed.
4. Arguments heard. Record perused.
5. After obtaining the vehicle, by the bank on Spurdari, the proceedings were conducted and the vehicle was auctioned. Nothing is available on the record if the respondent No.1 was aware of the fact that the vehicle was a case property and as such his involvement in the case was not justified, hence when the learned trial court had realized the attending facts and circumstances and especially the learned counsel for the present appellant made no objection on relieving the respondent No.1 from the case, had passed the impugned order.
6. The main stress of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there was no application under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. On behalf of the respondent No.1, hence the impugned order towards his acquittal was not justified. The said argument is ill-founded because to invoke jurisdiction under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. a formal application is not required and even the said jurisdiction can be invoked suo moto, when it is found that the charge against an accused is groundless and there is no probability of his conviction in any offence.
7. Provision of section 249-A Cr.PC is meant to decide a criminal case, without completion of trial, when it is found that charge is groundless and there is no probability of conviction of accused in any offence. Section 249-A Cr.P.0 reads as under:- [249-A. Power of Magistrate to acquit accused at any stage. Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence."
8. Trial Court has wide discretion to invoke the powers under this provision of law even at its own motion if charge is groundless or there is no probability of the accused being convicted. From bare perusal of the above mentioned provision, it is crystal clear that to exercise powers under section 249-A Cr.P.0 or 265-K Cr.P.0 a court has to fulfill only three following conditions.
1. The court shall hear the prosecutor;
2. Shall also hear the accused and
3. Take into consideration the overall facts/circumstances and the evidence.
Except the above mentioned, there is no other embargo upon the court to exercise powers under the above mentioned provisions of law and the court has ample powers to acquit accused even if he has not moved any application because the above mentioned provisions are meant to prevent the rigours of a prolonged trial, when it is apparent from the record that there is no probability of accused being convicted of any offence. Furthermore, the use of expression at "any stage of the case" is indicative enough of the intention of the Legislature that to exercise powers under section 249-A Cr.P.0 or 265-k Cr.P.C, an application in each and every case is not mandatory and any such stage could be the very initial stage, after taking cognizance or it could be a middle stage after recording some proceedings, or even, it could be latter stage as well.
Reliance in this respect may be made to the cases of "The State Versus Asif Ali Zardari and another"
(1994 SCM R 798), "Muhammad Sharif Versus The State" (PLD 1999 Supreme Court 1063) and "Chairman Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and another Versus Mumtaz Khan" (PLO 2010 Supreme Court 695). In the case of Chairman Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (Supra) the Honible Supreme Court held as under:- ".... An acquittal could also be recorded under section 249-A Cr.P.0 or section 265-K Cr.P.0 when the charge against the accused person was found to be groundless or there appeared to be no probability of his being convicted of any offence."
9. As a result of what has been discussed above, the appeal in hand does not have any merit or substance, hence dismissed.