MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J-Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 27-3-1982 of the Lahore High Court, thereby the petitioners (vendees-defendants in a pre-emption suit) civil revision, was dismissed.
2. The respondent's (plaintiff pre-emptons) suit against the present petitioners filed on 16-2-1978 before the trial Court on account of the rejection of his plaint under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. Because as held by the trial Court, he had failed to pay proper court-fee under the then prevailing law on the basis of ten times the land revenue. The respondent filed an appeal on 9-3-1978 before the learned District Court and valued it under the then prevailing relevant law on the basis of the net profits at Rs. 49,485.90 and paid the court-fee accordingly. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court admittedly on the day of the filing of the appeal was up to Rs. 5,000. This aspect, it appears, was noticed by the Court in September, 1978 when the appeal was returned to the respondent by order dated 30-9-1978 for presentation before the High Court as regular first appeal. The respondent submitted it in the High Court alongwith an application under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act (regarding the time spent. In the meanwhile, it was admitted to regular hearing by order dated 2-10-1978 to consider whether the District Judge had not misconstrued the law relating to the pecuniary jurisdiction. However, after some period of pendency this appeal was sent by the High Court to the District Judge for hearing and disposal because it was noticed that in the meanwhile, the pecuniary juris--diction of the District Court had been increased to Rs. 50,000. After some further proceedings on the question whether the District Court should hear the appeal or not, it was ultimately heard and decided by learned, Additional District Judge on 23-2-1981. The same was allowed and a decree for pre--emption in favour of the respondent was passed on court-fee rendered against the respondent-plaintiff was revered. The petitioners then moved a civil revision in the High Court which was dismissed on 27-3-1981. They have now sought leave to appeal.
3. Learned counsel has raised two-fold pleas of limitation and court-fee. He has contended that on the day when the District Court returned the appeal to the respondent i. e. 30-9-1978 the said Court bad the pecuniary juris--diction to hear that appeal because on 20th September, 1978, the law whereby the pecuniary jurisdiction was increased, was enforced: That being so, the return of the appeal, its presentation in the High Court, and its remission by the High Court to the District Judge was without justification and the period so spent could not be condoned. In the alternative, according to him, 'the respondents appeal having been admitted by the High Court to consider the question whether the District Court had no jurisdiction to decide it, should have taken to its logical conclusion by hearing the same in the High Court and deciding the same, instead, it has remitted to the-District Court without final decision. He has also contended that the petitioners having obtained possession of the land in dispute on 8th May, 1972, the period of limitation for filing the suit had started running on that date, therefore, the suit filed by the respondent on 25-5-1973, was time barred and should have been dismissed as such, notwithstanding the fact the mutation of sale was sanctioned on 27-5-1972. On the question of court-fee, the learned counsel stressed that the decision of the learned appellate Court that land revenue for purpose of determining the amount of court-fee did not include the rates and cesses was wrong, as, the definition of land revenue in.
Section 4 (14) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 included the rates payable on account of increase "in the value of land due to irrigation" That being so, the rejection of the plaint by the learned trial Court should have been upheld by the High Court.
It is admitted by the learned counsel that when the respondents filed his first appeal before the learned District Court on 9-3-1978, it was within time. If the said Court would have heard and decided it in routine, no objection could have been raised by the petitioners on the basis of law of limitation. It was on account of an act of court that the appeal was returned to the respondent for presentation in the High Court. Notwithstanding the same he took the plea before the High Court that the same would have been heard by the learned District Court and to consider this question the appeal was admitted in the High Court. However, as the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court had been increased on 20-9-1978 which was neither noticed by the learned District Judge nor by its office (presum--ably, because of lack of information regarding the amendment brought about hardly ten days earlier) the appeal was rightly sent to the District Court for bearing and disposal, when it, as stated by the respondent's side was sent under the orders of the Chief Justice.
That by itself would not --render the hearing of the appeal by the District Court as illegal. No judicial order was necessary in this behalf. This the question of limitation in 'the light of the afore- stated facts, losses significance. The appeal would be treated to have been presented before the District Court within time. The contention of the learned counsel that the High Court should have decided the question on which the first appeal was admitted, namely, as to what was the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court. It is not denied that the law had been amended on 20- 9-1978 and according to the learned counsel himself, the appeal as valued would be competent before the District Court as because the jurisdictional value of the subject-matter then calculated was less than Rs. 50,000.
4. The other question of limitation regarding date of possession as distin--guished from the date of -the sanction of the mutation, was not pressed from the petitioner's side before the first appellate Court nor before the High Court. We do -not consider it a fit case to permit the petitioners to raise it now.
The question of court-fee, it seems, stands concluded by a finding of fact. The learned appellate Court was conscious of the definition of `land' revenue' in the Act of 1967. The relevant provisions are quoted in the appellate judgment. On facts, however, it was found that none of the rates mentioned in Dhal Bacch (Exh. P. 2) was on account of increase in the value of land due to irrigation. Learned counsel has drawn our attention to an entry in Dhal Bacch which appears to be relatable to increase in the value of the land but it has not been shown that the increase was "due to irrigation" as mentioned in section 4 (4) of the Land Revenue Act. That being so, no further comment is necessary in this behalf. None of the arguments of the learned counsel has any force.
This petition accordingly dismissed.