' SHAHID MUBEEN, J. --- Briefly the facts of the case are that one Abdul Rehman was permanent Lamberdar of Chak No. 337/G.B., Tehsil and District, T.T. Singh. On his death the post of Lamberdar fell vacant. Applications were invited for the appointment of Lamberdar. Tehsildar, T.T. Singh recommended the name of Muhammad Ramzan, but DDO (R), T.T. Singh recommended the name of Azra Parveen (respondent No. 2). DO(R), Faisalabad. After observing codal formalities appointed JVluhammad Ikhlas as lamberdar vide order dated 26.8.2010. Aggrieved by the order dated 26.8.2010 four appeals were filed before EDO (R), T.T. Singh which were transferred to EDO (R), Faisalabad by order of Senior Member, Board of Revenue vide order dated 7.12.2010. Respondent No. 6 EDO(R) T.T. Singh appointed Azra Parveen (respondent No. 2) as lamberdar of the said Chak.
Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 7.12.2010, four RORs were filed out of which ROR No. 308/2011 was filed by the present petitioner. Vide order dated 31.3.2015, the revision petition was dismissed, hence, this petition.
2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 2 is debarred under Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 of West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 to be appointed as Lambardar. The relevant clause reads as under:- "A female is not ordinarily eligible for appointment to the office of a headman, but may be appointed, when she is sole owner of the estate, in which the appointment has to be made, or, for special reasons."
3. This provision came under discussion in number of cases and in case-law titled as "Mst. Nasreen lqbal v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another" (PLD 1993 Lahore 423), it has been held as under:--- "Viewed from this angle, it is but obvious that clause (d) of sub-rule (19) clearly offends against the command of sub-Article (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. On its plain wording, the only ground for non-appointment of a female as Lambardar is her sex. The discrimination is so obvious that it calls for no further comment except for notice may be taken of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that clause (d) is not violative of sub-Article (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution, but merely provides that ordinarily a female should not be appointed. This argument, on the face of it, is fallacious as the clause in question certainly places females at a disadvantage. As has been pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner, the post of a Lambardar is no more ceremonial in nature as in addition to the commission which is payable to a Lambardar on the various Government dues collected by him, grant of 100 Kanals of land is also attached to that post. The refusal to appoint a female as Lambardar merely on account of her sex would amount to deprivation of that property. In the face of clear provisions of Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, such injustice cannot be allowed to prevail."
' In another judgment reported as "Mst. Sarwari Bibi v. Arshad Ali Khan and others" (2007 YLR 702) it has been held as under:- "Viewing fron any angle the petitioner cannot be ignored for the appointment, only on the ground of her being a female, if she is otherwise most suitable for such appointment. The impugned order dated 9.4.2003 passed by learned Member Board of Revenue, speaks of the suitability of respondent No. 1 only. It is silent with regard to suitability of the petitioner for the appointment in question."
' In case-law titled as "Mst. Zubaida Begum v. Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another" (2002 YLR 3393) it has been held as under- "I have gone through the several documents placed on record of this writ petition, with the assistance of the learned counsel. By now it is well-settled that in the matter of appointment of a Lumbardar the opinion of the District Collector holds much weight. j find that after comparing the comparative merits of the two candidates, he found that apart from the fact that she is daughter of the deceased Lumbardar she is residing in Chak No. 263/R. B where her children are studying and that after the death of her father she had been performing the duties of a Lumbardar. The only objection before the respondent No. 2 was that she is a female being a non-resident of the said Chak, is not a fit person to be appointed as a Lumberdar. The learned District Collector found the fact that the petitioner is resident of Chak and proceeded to appoint her as Lumbardar. The learned Commissioner while dealing with the appeal of the respondent No. 2 agreed with the Collector. The learned Member, Board of Revenue proceeded to set aside the order only with reference to rule 19(2)(d) of the Land Revenue Rules, 1968. The precise reason is that she is a female. Now the matter stands settled in the case of Shrin Munir and others v. Government of the ,,Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and another (PLD 1990 SC 295) whereby any discrimination against women for the sole reason that they are women, has been held to be violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. Now on the same touchstone the said rule 19(2)(d) of the Land Revenue Ruts, 1968 has been held to be violative of the said provisions of the Constitution of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan while disallowing Civil Petition No. 828/L of 1993 against the said judgment of this Cburt being relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I, therefore, do not find that the learned respondent No. 1 while passing the impugned order has proceeded in violation of the law as laid down by the superior judiciary of the country and his order is without lawful authority."
' In case-law titled as "Mushtaq Hussain v. Mst. Naseem Akhtar, etc." (PLD 1982 Supreme Court 271), it has been held as under:- "The learned counsel further contended that Ghulam Razaq died on 26.10.1978 and according to the rule quoted above, the petitioner, who was the younger brother of the deceased Lambardar, was the nearest eligible heir being the descendant of Abdul Ghani, in the male line, and Mst.
Nasim Akhtar respondent. Therefore, was not entitled to be appointed as Lambardar. This argument has no force as there is nothing in the rules to deprive the respondent of the right of Lambardari by applying the Rules of primogeniture. Under rule 19(2)(d) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 a female is not ordinarily eligible for the office of a headman but may be appointed when she is the sole owner of the estate for which the appointment has to 'be made, or for special reasons in other cases. Under this rule a woman can be appointed as Lambardar.
Therefore; there was no violation of the law and the orders of the Revenue Authorities are not without jurisdiction. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed."
' Lastly, in a celebrated judgment reported as "Shrin Munir and others v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and another"(PLD 1990 SC 295), it has been held that any discrimination against women for the sole reason that they are women, has been held to be violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.
4. Relying upon the afore-noted judgments it can safely be concluded that rule 19(2)(d) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 is violative of Article 25 (2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and there is no bar for a female to be appointed as Lambardar.
5. The next argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that petitioner is having more qualification than that of respondent No.
2. According to him, the petitioner is B.A., L.L.B whereas respondent No. 2 is F.A. This contention of learned of the petitioner is fully answered in case-law titled as "Haji Muhammad Zaman Khan v.
Member, Board of Revenue Punjab and others" (2014 SCMR 164) as under:- "The argument that petitioner is F.A. And respondent is Middle pass and therefore be given preference is not tenable in law: first, because Rul 17 of the Land Reform Manual does not list it as one of the factors to be taken into account; second, the level of education of a candidate could be one of the considerations which the revenue officer may keep in view at the time of appointment of a Lambardar. It is, however, the totality of qualifications, virtues and experience of candidates which should ultimately weigh in the process."
6. According to the record, it appears that petitioner is absentee and an absentee cannot be appointed as Lambardar as has been held in case-law titled as "Ch. Ghulam Ullah v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others" (1984 CLC 2973) as under:- "Rule 16 specifies the grounds for dismissal of a village headman. A headman appointed is liable to dismissal from the post of Lambardar if owing to his age, physical or mental incapacity or absence from the estate he is unable to discharge the duties of his office. Combined reading of rule 17(ii)(c) with rule 16(ii)(c) goes to show that an heir entitled to succeed to the office of Lambardari can be ignored by the appointing authority on the ground of his absence from the estate, if in the opinion of the authority his absence from the estate hindered the performance of his duties as Lambardar."
' And in case-law titled as "Masood Ahmad v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue and others"
(1982 CLC 357) it has been held as under:- "The authorities have not treated the matter of the appointment of the Lambardar under rule 17, but, obviously, under rule 19 of the W.P. Land Revenue Rules. A perusal of the orders clearly shows that the merits and demerits of the various candidates were considered and on findings of fact which are concurrent now by all the forums below the decision was reached that respondent No. 4 is more suited to the appointment than the petitioner. The fact of the petitioner being related to the deceased Lambardar was also taken into consideration but it was found that be being an absentee and not living in the Chak and doing his business elsewhere in Sargodha would not be able to discharge his duties and thus his case would attract the provisions of rule 18(2)(c) of the aforesaid Rules. Now explanation to rule 19 empowers the Collector to refuse to appoint a person as Lambardar who is claiming the post as an heir on the ground which would justify the dismissal of that person 'from the office of Headman. That being so, rule 18(2)(c) could legitimately be read in rule 19 while making an appointment of a Lambardar thereunder. No exception can therefore be raised to the manner of appointment of respondent No. 4 as Lambardar and holding that the petitioner is not so entitled."
7, Even otherwise, no one has vested right to be appointed as Lambardar. In this regard reliance can be placed on latest pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case-law titled as "M. Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Aslam and others" (2013 SCMR 363) in which it has been held as under:- "As the entire effort of the revenue authorities in this behalf should be to find out and locate the most suitable person for the job, because no one, as mentioned above, has a vested right to the appointment, rather a Lambardar is saddled with certain responsibilities in connection with the collection of the land revenue, Abiana and other government dues etc. Therefore, for choosing the best available person, on whom trust can be reposed, the condition and requirement of qualifications in strict terms, which may be adhered to in some other kinds of recruitments in the government service etc. Especially in relation to and by a given and a specific date meant for applying for such posts/appointments, should, not be strictly followed in the lambardari matter."
8. This Court while considering the case of appointment of lamberdar, is not supposed to sit as a Court of appeal, but only has to examine, if there is any jurisdictional error in the order of revenue authorities. Reliance is placed on "M. Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Aslam and others" (2013 SCMR 363).
9. If any other judgment is needed then reference may be made to case-law titled as "Abdul Ghafoor v. The Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue and another" (1982 SCMR 202).
10. The findings of revenue authorities except DO(R) are concurrent in nature which does not require any interference by this Court while exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction, hence, appointment of respondent No. 2 by the revenue authorities is legal and does not require any interference by this Court.
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that this writ petition has no force, hence, dismissed in limine.