' Through this petition, the petitioner has assailed the validity of the order dated 19.2.2013 passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Sahiwal, whereby the application of the petitioner seeking to absolve him of the liability arising out of a surety bond executed by him, was dismissed.
2. The facts, in brief, are that Mst. Abida Kausar and Mst. Sajida Kausar, the minors (Respondents Nos. 2 and 3) had instituted a suit for maintenance against Riaz Ahmad, Respondent No. 4, their father. The suit was decreed by the learned Judge Family Court, Sahiwal vide judgment and decree dated 23.2.2008. All in all, the aforementioned Riaz Ahmad was ordered to pay an amount of Rs.40,8000/- to the minors by way of maintenance, and he was ordered to pay future maintenance at the rate of Rs.6000/- per month. Since the judgment-debtor/Respondent No. 4 herein failed to pay the decretal amount to the decree-holders, an execution petition was filed by them. On 03.2.2012, the judgment-debtor was arrested and produced before the learned Executing Court. He paid an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to the decree-holder's. As regards the remaining amount, he managed a surety bond. In consequence thereof, he was ordered to be released forthwith.
3. In point of fact, the petitioner herein stood surety for Riaz Ahmad, the judgment-debtor. He filed the surety bond on a stamp paper worth Rs.100/-. As per his undertaking, the petitioner undertook to pay an amount of Rs.500,000/- to the decree-holders in the event of non-payment of the decretal amount to them by the judgment-debtor. He gave an undertaking that both his person and property would be liable for the same. In addition to executing the surety bond in writing, the petitioner got recorded his statement to the above effect.
4. Since the judgment-debtor did not abide by his undertaking and did not pay any amount, after making payment of Rs. 10,000/- to the decree-holders on 03.2.2012, the learned Executing Court was constrained to adopt coercive measures against him. Resultantly, on 26.11.2013, he was ordered to be lodged at Central Jail, Sahiwal until his paying the decretal amount to the decree-holders.
5. At the same time on 21.1.2014, i.e., 54 days after the aforementioned order passed by the learned Executing Court, the present petitioner came up with an application, requesting that he be allowed to withdraw his surety bond executed in favour of the judgment-debtor, Riaz Ahmad, thereby absolving him of liability arising out of it. He took the plea that he had simply stood surety for the judgment-debtor and he was under the impression that in the event of non-payment on the part of the judgment-debtor, he would not be personally liable for the decretal amount. After considering all of his pleas, the learned Executing Court did not find any merit in them, and his application was dismissed by it by passing a detailed, well-reasoned and well-argued order dated 19.2.2014. In his order, the learned Executing Court dealt with each and every argument made on behalf of the petitioner. It was observed by the learned Executing Court that it may adopt any procedure to execute its own decree and that it is not bound by any technical provision of any other procedure laid down in any other statute.
6. The learned Executing Court is not wide of the mark in observing that it may adopt any procedure to enforce the decrees passed by it. As a matter of fact, Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, excludes the application of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 except Sections 10 and 11 thereof. Therefore, the detailed procedure set out in Order XXI, CPC laid down by the legislature to execute civil decrees need not be followed by a Family Court. Be that, as it may, Section 13 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 provides for the mode and manner in which a Family Court shall pass a decree. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 (ibid) read as under: "Where a decree relates to the payment to money and the decretal amount is not paid within the time specified by the Court, (not exceeding thirty days) the same shall, if the Court so directs to recover as arrears of land revenue, and on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder."
7. A perusal of the afore-quoted provision of law shows that the Family Court concerned has been vested with the discretion as to how it would order the recovery of a money decree passed by it.
But - this discretion is to be exercised at the time of passing a decree. Of late, a wrong notion is taking hold among the legal circles that the decree relating to money can be executed by the Family Court only in the manner laid down in the Land Revenue Act, 1967. It is time that this misconception was dispelled/removed.
8. The very wording in which sub-section (3) of Section 13 of W.P. Family Courts Act, 1964 is couched makes it obvious that the money decree is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue only if the Court so directs at the time of passing the decree. And if no such direction has been made by the Court concerned, it may follow any procedure thereafter to implement its money decree, including the arrest of the judgment-debtor and attachment of his property.
9. This brings me to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Executing Court is to first attach the property of the judgment-debtor and if the amount realized from its sale is not found sufficient to meet the demand of the decree-holders, only then can the learned Executing Court resort to attaching and sale of the property belonging to the surety. With respect to him, I am not persuaded to agree with him. The surety is as much bound by his undertaking as was, is the judgment-debtor. Both are collectively and severally liable to make payment to the decree-holders. And if the judgment-debtor is sent behind the bars, this fact by itself would not absolve the surety of his liability.
10. I have carefully looked at the terms of the undertaking given by the petitioner recited in the surety bond furnished by him to the learned Executing Court. I have also examined his statement made by him at the time of furnishing the surely bond. They lead to the inevitable conclusion that the petitioner was quite conscious of his liabilities. At the time, he wanted to save the skin of the judgment-debtor, who is admittedly his close relative. In other words, he stuck his neck out and now he cannot be allowed to turn round to evade his liabilities arising from his being surety for the judgment-debtor, namely, Riaz Ahmad.
11. For what has been stated above, there is no merit in the instant petition, which is dismissed in limine.