' MUHAMMAD HASHIM KHAN KAKAR, J.---Through the instant revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 (CPC), the petitioners have prayed for setting aside the order dated 4th March 2015 ("the impugned order"), passed by the learned District Judge, Mekran at Turbat ("the trial Court"), whereby application filed on behalf of the petitioner for production of official surety was dismissed.
2. The facts, leading to the filing of the above revision petition, are that petitioner No,! Mst: Razya Ghulam is widow of late Ilyas Masih, who was targeted and killed by the terrorists on 12th December, 2013.
' Late Ilyas was working as sweeper in the Technical Training Center, Turbat, leaving behind his wife (petitioner No,1) and a minor adopted child (petitioner No,2). Petitioner No, 1 filed a petition under section 372 of the Succession Act 1925 ("the Act") before the trial Court for obtaining a succession certificate, authorizing her to release certain debts and securities mentioned in the Schedule attached to her petition. The Schedule disclosed that there was a sum of Rs,30,00.000/- (compensation), Rs,20,00,000/- (cash payment in lieu of plot) and monthly salary of Rs, 16,501/- to be paid to the petitioner, being the sole legal heir of late Ilyas Masih. There was no objection to the grant of the succession certificate by the other heirs of late Ilyas Masih.
3. I have heard Mr. Tahir Ali Baloch, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Shai Haq Baloch, learned Assistant Advocate General,. Balochistan, and also perused the available record with their valuable assistance.
4. Mr. Tahir Ali Baloch, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that, while dismissing the application for production of official surety, the learned trial Court has not applied its judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the instant case and has passed one line order, which cannot be termed as a 'judicial order' being without any reason. He further submitted that, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, no sureties should have been demanded by the trial Court.
5. Mr: Shai Haq Baloch, learned Assistant Advocate General, when was confronted with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, fairly conceded that this is a fit case, where succession certificate ought to have been granted without demanding securities.
6. It may be noted that the learned trial Court has passed the impugned order in a casual manner, without giving reasons for dismissal of the application. The learned trial Court did not bother to mention the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners for forming an opinion. It is observed with great disapproval and dismay that the learned trial Court, without noting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, abruptly came to the following conclusion: "Not Allowed."
7. The above order is not at all a speaking order and in no manner can be called as a 'judicial order' within the parameters of law. The tenor of the impugned order manifests non-application of judicial mind. This court has time and again disapproved passing of such perfunctory orders. In this regard, reference can be placed to the case of "Muhammad lqbal Chaudhry v. Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Production, Government of Pakistan" (PLD 2004 Supreme Court 413), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "3. It may be noted that the forums seized with the judicial matters are required to pass such a speaking judgment that it should give an impression to readers that the legal and factual aspects of the case which were raised before it for the purpose of decision have been considered and decided in the light of recognized principles of law on the subject instead of disposing of in slipshod manner.
'4. We have noted with great concern that in instant cases although, the pleadings of the parties had been reproduced through and through but the contentions of the parties and the points on which they were resting their cases were not taken into consideration at all. Be that as it may, in these circumstances, both the sides stated that instead of allowing the petitions to remain pending on the file, if leave is granted, the cases may be remanded to the Service Tribunal for fresh decision after providing opportunity of hearing to all concerned, keeping in view the observations made hereinabove."
8. The next question, which arises for consideration, is whether in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the learned trial Court was justified for demanding two sureties of Rs,50,00,000/- each or dismissing the application for dispensing with the furnishing of security on grounds contained in it?
In this respect, Mr.Tahir Ali Baloch, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that, if the case of the petitioners is not covered under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 373 of the Act, the Court within the purview of section 375 of the Act has discretion in dispensing with the furnishing of security in appropriate cases. Section 375 of the Act, which lays down the procedure for grant of succession certificate, is as follows: "375. Requisition of security from grantee of certificate.--(1) The District Judge shall in any case in which he proposes to proceed under subsection i(3) or subsection (4) of section 373, and may, in any other case, require, as a condition precedent to the granting of a certificate, that the person to whom he proposes to make the grant shall give to the Judge a bond with one or more surety or sureties, or other sufficient security, for rendering an account of debts and securities received by him and for indemnity of person who may be entitled to the whole or any part of those debts and securities.
(2) The Judge may, on application made by petition and on cause shown to his satisfaction, and upon such terms as to security, or providing that the money received be paid into Court, or otherwise, as he thinks fit, assign the bond or other security to some proper person, and that person shall thereupon be entitled to sue thereon in his own name as if it had been originally given to the Judge of the Court, and to recover, as trustee for all persons interested, such amount as may be recoverable thereunder."
9. A careful examination of the provision of subsection (1) of section 375 of the Act would show that the legislature intentionally with reference to different situations used two different expressions i,e, "shall" and "may". The word "shall" in section 375 of the Act is used with reference to the class of cases, which falls under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 373 of the Act, and in which, in spite of involvement of intricate and difficult questions of law and fact, the Court decides to proceed in a summary manner to determine the right to the grant of Succession Certificate to the applicant. In such cases, the provisions of subsection (1) of section 375 of the Act make it incumbent on the Court to order issuance of the Certificate, subject to the furnishing of a surety in addition to the execution of the bond. However, where the case for grant of Succession Certificate does not fall under C subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 373 of the Act, it is discretionary with the Court to require the person, in whose favour the Certificate is issued to give security as a condition for grant of the Certificate. Except in cases, which are covered under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 373 of the Act, in all other cases, the Court, while granting the Succession Certificate, will have a discretion either to insist or not to insist upon furnishing of security by the applicant according to the circumstances of each case. It may be observed that the object of demanding security from a person, in whose favour Succession Certificate is granted by the Court, is to ensure proper rendition of the account by him/her of the debts and securities of the deceased received by him/her and to provide indemnity to such person, who may be entitled to the whole or any part of these debts and securities. In the cases, where all the heirs of the deceased are before the Court and there is no doubt that any other person is or may be entitled to the estate of the deceased and all such persons are adult and major and they expressed their consent for the grant of Succession Certificate in favour of one of the heirs of the deceased, the Court in such clear cases may not at all insist upon furnishing of the security by the petitioner.
10. Considering the instant case on the touchstone of the aforementioned principles of law, I am of the considered view that the trial Court, after declaring petitioner No,1 to be the sole legal heir of D deceased Ilyas Masih, entitled for issuance of the Succession Certificate, should not insist upon furnishing of the securities. I am afraid that on one hand, petitioner No,1 has been deprived from her husband by the terrorists, while on the other hand, she has been compelled and dragged in unnecessary litigation by the trial Court, while declining her request for production of the official security. Admittedly, petitioner No,1, who is a widow and belonging to Christian Community, was not in a position to arrange the required securities. Even otherwise, the demanded securities are too excessive.
' For the discussion made hereinabove, I am satisfied that the petitioners have made out a case for grant of Certificate of Succession without furnishing of the required securities. I, accordingly, order that the Certificate of Succession may be issued in favour of petitioner No,1, subject to obtaining personal surety bond of any government official/officer. The petition is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside.