' HASAN FEROZ, J.---The instant IInd Appeal has been preferred by appellant above-named being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 13-5-2010, passed by learned VIth Additional District Judge Karachi South in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.4 of 2010 whereby the said appeal was dismissed along with the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act whereby praying to condone the delay in presentation of the said appeal and the appellant through this appeal has challenged the legality, propriety and maintainability of the said order inter alia on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal.
2. Succinctly the facts of the case are that on 20-5-2008 appellant being an Insurance Company had filed Suit bearing No.557 of 2008 praying for decree of Rs.1,27,564 before the learned IX-Senior Civil Judge, Karachi South against the respondent above-named who was the policy holder of the appellant to whom certain Marine Insurance Policies were issued of which but the premium amount was not paid by the respondent and as per statement of account of appellant in the year 2006 three policies dated 2-3-2006, 14-3-2006 and 25-3-2006 were issued in favour of the respondents, the details of which are:- {{TABLE}} S# Policy Number Amount of premium
1. 64123803/03/2006 Rs. 72,130
2. 64124013/03/2006 Rs. 58,876 3 . 64124520/06/2006 Rs. 26,558 Total Rs. 127,564 {{TABLE}} ' According to appellant when the premium amount was not being received, letters and reminders dated 13-3-2007, 31-3-2008 and 2-4-2008 were sent to the respondent requesting to clear the amount of outstanding premium but to no response, the appellant preferred Suit No. 557/2008 before the Court of XI-Senior Civil Judge, Karachi South for recovery of outstanding premium amount of Rs.1,27,564 against the respondent, praying therein as follows:- "That the plaintiff therefore prays for judgment and decree against the defendant in the sum of Rs.127,564 with mark up at the rate of 60% paisa per 1000 from the date of the suit till its realization and costs of the suit and any other relief or reliefs".
4. Respondent after being served, made appearance before the learned trial Court through their counsel along with an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., inter alia taking the plea that the suit filed by the appellant being barred by sections 121 and 122 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 and that plaintiff has no cause of action to file the said suit, emphasizing that the controversy so raised falls within the jurisdiction of Insurance Tribunal for adjudication.
5. Counter affidavit was filed by Nadeemuddin Farooqui, Attorney/Assistant Vice-President Legal Department Head of appellant whereby denying and opposing such stand taken on behalf of the respondent.
6. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties passed the impugned order dated 9-5-2009 whereby it converted the application Under Order VII, R.11, C.P.C. To one under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. And observed that said court has no jurisdiction to entertain and to proceed with the suit; hence ordered for return of the plaint under Order VII, R. 10, C.P.C. To present the same before the court having jurisdiction and appellant being aggrieved of the said order dated 9-5-2009 challenged the same through Civil Revision 47 of 2009 instead of preferring Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Order XLIII, R.1, C.P.C. Which was dismissed on 24-12-2009 with the observation that the order of the trial Court can only be challenged through appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1(a), C.P.C.
After the dismissal of Revision Application No. 47 of 2009 appellant preferred Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4 of 2010 which came up for hearing before learned VI-Additional District Judge, Karachi South and after hearing this C.M.A. Along with the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was dismissed through order dated 24-12-2009 holding that the appeal so preferred was barred by limitation and hence this IInd Appeal whereby the appellant has challenged the legality, propriety and maintainability of aforesaid orders passed by the two courts below.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant who has contended that the two courts below have failed to appreciate the law and facts involved in the matter that under the provision of section 14 of the Limitation Act the appeal so preferred was within limitation as according to him the appellant never slept over his right but he was agitating his grievance and the delay, if any, was condonable as the learned Appellate Court has shown unnecessary haste while dismissing the appeal and the provision contained in section 14 of Limitation Act 1908 was not attached importance and so also according to him the conclusion so reached at by the learned trial Court through impugned order dated 9-5-2009 was also not proper and in fact erroneous as the learned trial Court has failed to consider the spirit of section 122 of the Insurance Ordinance 2000 wherein it is clearly spelt out that Insurance Ordinance is promulgated to ensure the protection of the interests of the insurance policy holders as and when the policy holder has any kind of claim of grievance against the Insurance Company he can redress his grievance by invoking the jurisdiction of the insurance tribunal, whereas according to him in cases where the insurance company has any claim against the policy holder then they can file a civil suit before the Civil Court having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and according to him the Insurance Company has no jurisdiction to agitate the grievance before the Insurance Tribunal, so he has contended that the impugned orders by the two courts below merits to be set aside and further according to him the other provisions of the Insurance Ordinance 2000 such as sections 127(1). Sections 128, 129(1), (2) and 162 of the Insurance Tribunal specify as to the jurisdiction of insurance tribunal and the policy holder may move even to the Banking Ombudsman by filing a complaint under section 127 of the Ordinance or file a suit for recovery of the claim amount under section 122 of the Said Ordinance and under section 128 a reference can also be made by the Court or tribunal to the Insurance Ombudsman, if a Court or Tribunal trying the case relating to an insurance company is of the opinion that the management of the insurance company has acted in a mala fide manner and so also section 128 of the Ordinance also clarify that other than a tribunal a Court can also refer a Reference to the Insurance Tribunal and in support of his submissions he has relied upon the various celebrated decision as appeared in 1995 SCMR 584, PLD 2002 SC 630, 2012 SCMR 377, PLD 1962 (W.P.) Karachi 510, 1985 MLD Lahore 1475, 1989 CLC Karachi 1949, PLD 2004 Quetta 62, 2007 CLC Lahore 490, 2009 CLC Lahore 960, 2011 CLC Karachi 1303, 2013 CLC Sindh 1313 and Lahore 477.
8. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the impugned orders passed by the two courts below and he has contended that by the passing away of limitation valid and vested right created in favour of the respondent and since the appellant has chosen the wrong forum, therefore, it is for him to suffer and the provision contained in section 14 of the Limitation Act will not come for the rescue of the appellant. He has further contended that the submissions so made on behalf of the appellant is against the Insurance Ordinance and the Insurance Act so framed and further he has contended that under the scheme of law each day's delay is to be explained to seek condonation to which the appellant has failed to explain with reference to section 12 of the Limitation Act, the courts below were justified in passing the impugned orders, to which calls for no interference by this court.
9. I have considered the submissions made before me and have consulted the law on the subject.
10. There is substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that it is section 12 of the Limitation Act which speaks about the exclusion of time in legal proceedings and the said provisions reads:- "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.---(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appeal from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.
(3) where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
[(5)] for the purposes of subsections (2), (3) and (4) the time requisite for obtaining copy of the decree, sentence, order, judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an application for the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery].
' Reverting back to the to Section 14 of the Limitation Act on which much insistence has been made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, the said provision reads:- "Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction.---(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceedings, whether in a Court of the first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it'.
11. The bare reading of the above provisions of law and the spirit of the two sections and so also the legal propositions invoked I have no hesitation in observing that benefit of section 14 cannot be claimed when proceedings prosecuted were not maintainable being devoid of faith and in this context 1 may refer to the decision as appeared in NLR 1998 Civil (Lahore)
65. Further under the scheme of law it is settled by now that time cannot be excluded in case the review petition is dismissed on the ground other than lack of jurisdiction and in this context I may again refer to the dictum of the honourable apex Court as appeared in PLD 2000 SC 63 and PLD 1980 SC 198 and also 1982 SCMR 995.
12. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has cited the case of Dr. Syed Sibtain Raza Naqvi v. Hydrocarbon Development and others, reported in 2012 SCMR 377 wherein at page 379-A it has been laid down that 'time spent in pursuing proceedings before wrong appellate forum could not be excluded for the purpose of filing of an appeal -- If appeal is barred by time, provision of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908, could only be invoked, that too, by showing sufficient cause'. In the case of Bashir Ahmed and 2 others v. Hussain,. Reported in PLD 2004 Quetta 62 the revision so entertain had been returned to the defendant within the period of limitation for filing of an appeal before the competent forum and in such case the delay was held condonable but here in this case it is apparent that the revision against the impugned order of the learned trial court so preferred before the District Judge and same was heard and decided by learned Additional District Judge and it was thereupon that the civil miscellaneous was brought on 4-3-2010 along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, which was heard and decided by the learned appellate court through impugned order dated 13-5-2010 which in no way can be treated within the period of limitation and so on this ground I have no hesitation in observing that the impugned order dated 13-5-2010, passed by the learned appellate court was within the four corners of law to the of limitation.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed much emphasis on the point that the scope of Insurance Tribunal and its jurisdiction is limited and to support to his contention Mr. Tanveer Ashraf learned counsel for the appellant has cited the case of Messrs EFU General Insurance Limited v.
Messrs Duty Free Shops Limited as appeared in 2013 CLD Sindh 1313 wherein this Court on the similar point involved as regards application of section 122(1)(a) of the Ordinance, 2000 has held hereinbelow paragraph 17 of the said judgment as:- "It may be observed that both the trial court as well as revisional court fell into error, while arriving at such conclusion. Both the courts below failed to take note of the fact that jurisdiction of Insurance Tribunal in terms of section 122(1)(a) of the Ordinance, 2000 could only be invoked by the Policy Holder and not by the Insurance Company. Present suit was filed by the EFU Insurance Limited against its policy holders, therefore, the law as it stands today remedy to an Insurance Company against a Policy Holder could only be availed of by filing suit before a Civil Court in terms of section 9, C.P.C.".
14. This legal proposition agitated by the learned counsel for the respondent has not been controverted by producing any case-law on the subject and I have no hesitation in observing that since there is settled law on the very subject, the appellant has been able to agitate that the conclusion so reached at by the learned trial court while entertaining the application under Order VII, R.11, C.P.C. Which was treated under C Order VII, R.10, C.P.C. Was not proper and in fact it is the Civil Court which has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit under section 9, C.P.C. So filed by the Insurance Company against the Policy Holder in respect of non-payment of due premium in time whereas the scope of jurisdiction of the Insurance Tribunal is restricted and can only be invoked by the Policy Holder, as such, I accept the appeal in hand and as a consequence set aside the orders passed by the two courts below and in the result the appellant is allowed to proceed with his suit before the same learned trial Court from the stage where it was left and the said court is required to proceed with the suit in accordance to law.