' FAISAL ZAMAN KHAN, J.--- This appeal under section 64(2) of the Punjab Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 (Ordinance) is directed against judgment dated 24-8-2006 passed by Judge, Social Security Court, Punjab, Lahore.
2. The facts in brief are that appellant is a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. In order to establish a power generation plant a lease agreement was arrived at between the appellant and D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited and the same was duly established.
3. A notification was issued on 15-2-1995, through which D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited was declared amenable to jurisdiction of the Ordinance. On 10-7-1998, appellant received a notice from respondent No,2 through which a demand to the tune of Rs,814,988 as social security contribution for 107 workers for a period between February, 1995 to August 1997 was raised. A reply to that was filed, in which it was alleged that in the light of the afore-noted notification appellant is not liable to pay any amount but no heed was paid.
4. Feeling aggrieved, appellant filed a complaint under section 57 of the Ordinance before respondent No,1 who conducted an inquiry and held that appellant is liable to pay a contribution of Rs,120,517 inclusive of 50% increase to the extent of its employees and also liable to pay contribution for construction workers who are working therein under the contractors. Feeling aggrieved, an appeal was filed before Social Security Court which was also dismissed, therefore, this appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the for as below wrongly assumed that the appellant and D.G. Khan Cement Limited Company are one entity and liable to make payment. She submits that appellant is a separate entity and as it is not notified under the Ordinance therefore it cannot be coerced to make any payment. As a counter argument, she submits that under section 28 of the Ordinance contribution on behalf of construction worker is to be made by the Contractor and the owner of the building only stand as a guarantee for the payment of contribution. Her case is that the appellant cannot be saddled with the payment of contribution of construction workers working in the premises of the appellant and it is the contractors under whose supervision construction work is going on should be asked to pay. In order to fortify her arguments, she has relied on Farid Company (Pvt.) Ltd. And others v. Vice-Commissioner, PESSI and others (2012 SCM R 1428) and Nestle Milk Pack (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Secretary v. Vice-Commissioner, PESSI, Head Office, Lahore and 3 others (2003 PLC 80).
6. Learned counsel for the appellant at the outset was confronted with the situation that both the arguments raised by her are mutually self-destructive insofar as that on one hand, she is outright denying the liability incurred against the appellant-company and on the other hand, she is denying the liability to the extent of contribution to be made by the contractors for construction workers. Replying to the above, she insists that she standby both her arguments.
7. I have heard the learned, counsel for the appellant and have gone through the available record.
8. A finding of fact has been recorded by both the for as below by holding in clear and unequivocal terms that the appellant and D.G. Khan Cement Company are one entity working under one roof. It has been acknowledged by the appellant that the land upon which power generation facility has been established is owned and leased out by the D.G. Khan Cement Company; they had a mutual entry and exit and are working in tandem. In view of the afore-noted, the appellant has not been able to distinguish that how the aforesaid finding is illegal and what question of law requires interpretation of this Court.
9. As regard the other question raised, the above noted judgments would clearly show that the company, with whom construction workers are working stand as a guarantee for payment of contribution. Generally, a guarantor stands guarantee for payment of a financial liability jointly and severally. In view of the fact that it has been acknowledged that construction workers are working and the work is going on within the premises of the appellant, therefore, it has rightly been held that appellant is liable to pay.
10. For what has been discussed above, no question of law has been raised by the appellant, for which adjudication is required. For the afore-noted reasons, this appeal is dismissed.