Respondent No. 1, Fazal-ur-Rehman's Aslam, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, filed an application against the petitioner, Ch. Muhammad Sharif, for his ejectment from a house. While resisting the application, it was denied by the petitioner that there was relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties. His plea found favour with the Rent Con--troller, who was then seized of the application, with the result that the application was dismissed. The order of the learned Rent Controller in this behalf was challenged by the respondent by means of an appeal before an Additional District Judge. The appeal was accepted, the finding of the learned Rent Controller was set aside and the case was remanded to him for fresh decision. Thereafter, the learned Rent Controller made order dated 11th June, 1980 directing the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent as well as future rent in terms of the provisions of subsection (6) of section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance. The order of the learned appellate authority by which the case was remanded was challenged by the petitioner by filing a second appeal before this Court and in consequence of a petition for stay order made by the petitioner in that appeal proceedings before the learned Rent Controller were stayed. The second appeal, how--ever, abated due to the coming into force of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Ordinances of 1979 and 1980. Thereafter, the petitioner, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court to assail the order of the appellate authority but his writ petition was dismissed on 2nd November, 1980 in lmine. Subsequently, on 22nd September, 1980, when the ejectment application came up before the Rent Controller, he passed a fresh order, under subsection (6) of section 13 of the said Ordinance, for deposit of arrears of rent as well as future rent. This order was complied with by the petitioner. It was, however, pointed out by the respondent, by making an application, that the petitioner had not deposited rent in obedience to the order made on 11th June, 1980 and, therefore, his defence was liable to be struck of. The application was resisted by the petitioner contending that since he had secured compliance with the order made on 22nd September, 1980 there was no default on his part and his defence could not be struck of.
The view taken by the learned Rent Controller was that as a result of the failure of the petitioner in the proceedings filed before this Court, the order for deposit of rent made on 11th June, 1980 had been revived and since that order had not been complied with by the petitioner his defence was liable to be struck of. He, therefore, ordered accordingly and directed the petitioner to vacate the house in dispute. As for the order of deposit of rent made on 22nd September, 1980 the opinion expressed by the learned Rent Controller was that that order was of no legal consequence inasmuch as due to the revival of the order passed on 11th June, 1980 a fresh order relating to deposit of rent could not be made. The petitioner was not satisfied with the order of ejectment passed by the learned Rent Controller. He, therefore, went in appeal before an Additional Dis--trict Judge but without success. He has, therefore, filed this writ petition.
2. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that both the orders regarding deposit of rent were made by Sh. Abdur Rauf as Rent Controller but the defence was struck of by another Rent Controller, namely, Abdus Sattar Asghar. The contention raised by the learned counsel was that by not acting upon the order of 22nd September, 1980, Mr. Abdus Sattar Asghar had reviewed the said order made by his learned predecessor although he had no power to review. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the order of ejectment was without jurisdiction. It was also urged by the learned counsel that it was in pursuance of the stay order issued by this Court that the petitioner had not deposited rent in terms of the order made on 11th June, 1980 and it is a well-known principle of law that the act of Court cannot prejudice the case of a party.
3. While insisting upon the compliance of order dated 11th June, 1980 the learned Rent Controller had relied upon Messrs Ansari Brothers v. Holy Trinity Church Trust (PLD 1971 SC 700). In that case it was held by the Supreme Court that when the operation of an order for deposit of rent is suspended but the appellate authority seized of an appeal against that order, the order is automatically restored with the dismissal of the appeal. According to this ruling, therefore, the order passed on 11th June, 1980 was revived as soon as the second appeal filed by the petitioner before this Court bad abated. It was thereafter on 22nd September 1980, that the learned Rent Controller passed another order for deposit of rent. Thus, there were two orders, relating to deposit of rent, in the field when the defence of the petitioner was struck of.
4. Now the question which requires determination is whether the subsequent order for deposit of rent could at all be passed by a learned Rent Controller. The argument advanced by the learned counsel was that there was no bar to the making of that order. In this connection he had placed reliance on a case decided by me and reported as Abdul Rehman's v. Muhammad Tufail (1979 CLC 143). In that case, a Rent Controller had made an order which was not in terms of the provisions of subsection (6) of section 13 of the said Ordinance and thereafter his successor passed a fresh order under the said provisions of law which satisfied the requirement thereof. It was, therefore, held by him that since the earlier order was not in accordance with relevant provisions of law it was no order in the eye of law, and, therefore, the subsequent order was not open to any legitimate exception. In the case before me now, however, it is not contended that the order passed on l Ith June, 1'980 was not in accordance with the provisions of subsection (6) of section 13 and was, therefore, to be ignored. The case of Abdul Rehman's is, therefore, of no help to the learned counsel.
5. To my mind, the provisions of subsection (6) of section 13 contem--plate that there will be one and only one order for deposit of rent. If the Rent Controller is allowed to make such orders every now and then it would, to say the least, be ridiculous. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not cite any authority for the proposition that notwithstanding the existence of a valid order for deposit of rent, the learned Rent Controller could passed a fresh order in the matter. On the other hand, observa--tions made in the case of Messrs Ansari Brothers support the view taken by me. In that case also a Rent Controller had made a fresh order relating to the deposit of arrears of rent after the dismissal of appeal against an earlier order on the subject but the Supreme Court insisted upon the com--pliance of the earlier order. I am, therefore, in agreement with the learned Rent Controller that the subsequent order for deposit of rent could not be passed in the case in hand the petitioner was obliged to secure compliance with his previous order made in this regard.
6. It is not disputed that the petitioner had not deposited the arrears of rent in terms with the order made on 11th June, 1980. He was given a period of 17 days, by the learned Rent Controller, to deposit the arrears but, admittedly, he did not deposit the same within 17 days following the abatement of the second appeal in which the stay order was granted.
7. In view of the above discussion, the learned Rent Controller was justified in holding that the petitioner was a defaulter and his defence was liable to be struck of. There is no force in this petition. It is dismissed in limine.