Through the instant writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, petitioners have called into question the legality and validity of order dated 15.10.2011 passed by learned Civil Judge, Faisalabad whereby the application under order 1 rule 10 CPC filed by respondents No.3 and 4 was allowed and order dated 19.05.2012 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad whereby the revision petition of the petitioners was dismissed.
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that respondents No.3 and 4 instituted a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 23.06.2003 with respect to land fully described in the head note of the plaint. They also challenged the legality and validity of sale deed bearing No.1753 dated 20.10.2005 in favour of petitioners and respondents No.13 to 15. The suit was fully contested by respondents by filing written statement. Out of the divergent pleadings of the parties ten issues including Relief were framed. The respondents No.3 and 4 filed an application under order 1 rule 10 CPC for impleading the Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar / petitioner No.2 as party to the suit in whose favour Abdul Majeed, the original owner got executed sale deed bearing No.2014 dated 15.12.2005. This application was contested by the petitioners. Therefore, vide order dated 15.10.2011 passed by learned Civil Judge, Faisalabad, the application was allowed and Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar who is petitioner No.2 in this writ petition was allowed to be impleaded as party to the suit. The order dated 15.10.2011 was assailed by petitioner No.1 and respondents No.13 and 15 which was dismissed vide order dated 19.05.2012, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, hence, this writ petition.
3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar petitioner No.2 is neither necessary nor proper party. The application has been filed just to prolong the proceedings. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No.3 and 4 has supported the impugned orders passed by courts below with the assertion that petitioner No.2 Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar is necessary and proper party being subsequent vendee.
4. Arguments heard. Record perused.
5. The concurrent findings of courts below do not suffer from any illegality and material irregularity.
Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar / petitioner No.2 has purchased the share of the property by Abdul Majeed without numbers in the disputed Khewat. Even otherwise, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to protect the right of Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar / petitioner No.2 she should be impleaded as party to defend her right in the suit land, if any. It is be borne in mind that Abdul Majeed is the owner from whom the respondents No.3 and 4 as well as the petitioner No.1 and respondents No.13 to 15 and petitioner No.2 i.e. Mst. Kalsoom Akhtar, have purchased the property.
6. Plaintiffs / respondents No.3 and 4 while filing the suit for specific performance were bound to implead the subsequent vendee, provided that such subsequent sale and the name of subsequent vendee is in their knowledge. The impleadment of subsequent vendee cannot be said mere formality or an exercise in routine but a dire requirement of the circumstances. All such three parties are supposed to have interacted among themselves with regard to the sale and purchase of one and same property. Their action and conduct individually are most likely to give rise to certain facts which are co-related to the actions and conduct of all other. Some facts are alleged while others are withheld by all or some of the parties surrounding one pivotal question in dispute.
In these conditions, the conduct of all factual side being directly co-related and interdependent, hence, they all must face each other in one trial or proceedings. When the evidence of the parties is recorded, each must have opportunity to cross-examine the other. Such valuable opportunity is denied to the parties when they face each other separately in different trials where one of them is isolated in each of the proceedings. Facts which are suppressed in one suit for one's own convenience might not be easily suppressed when all at one time are available before the Court.
7. Reference may also be made to the case reported as "Rashid Ahmad v. Mst. Jiwan and 5 others"
(1997 SCM R 171) relevant portion of which is reproduced as under:- "We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. The respondents did not appear and contest the appeal. The learned Judge in Chambers declined to implead the appellant as respondent in the pending R.S.A. Solely on the ground that the property was transferred in his favour by one of the parties to the pending litigation during the pendency of 1st appeal. The view taken by the learned Judge in Chambers does not appear to be correct. The doctrine of lis pendens contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 merely provides that a transfer of immovable property during pendency of a suit, which is not collusive in nature, in which the right to such immovable property is directly and specifically in question, cannot defeat or affect the rights of any party to the proceedings under any decree or order which may be made in such suit. This provision does not preclude the transferee pendent elite from being made a party to the pending proceedings on the basis of such transfer. Order XXII, Rule 10 CPC which regulates the proceedings of a suit provides that in cases of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during pendency of suit, the suit may be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
Another provision which is relevant in such situation is section 146 of CPC which provides that where any proceedings may be taken or application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. Provisions of section 146 and Order 22, CPC apply equally to appeals."
8. Sequel to the above, this writ petition having no force is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.