The brief facts of the case are that one M. A.-Majeed was the tenant in respect of the building hearing No. RY-9 at I. I. Chundrigar Road Karachi at monthly rent of Rs. 985. He was carrying on business under the nr--me and style of Grand.Hotel. The said M. A. Majeed (the tenant) expired on 30-8-1968 whereupon his widow, Begum M. A. Majeed started to receiving rent in her own name to the landlord respondent. The rent receipts in the circumst--ances were issued exclusively in her favour.
On 1-9-1971 an ejectment case was filed against her by the Respondent/landlord which was registered as Rent Application No. 2152 of 1971 in the Court of the Rent Controller at Karachi on the ground of default in Payment of rent since August, 1970.
2. It may be mentioned here that in the meantime the present appellant and two others, claiming to be legal heirs of late M. A. Majeed, on 29-4-1974 had applied for being joined as parties to the aforementioned ejectment case then pending before the learned Rent Controller. Notice of this application was ordered to be issued but it was not disposed of and thus remained pending.
3. Against the order of refusing to strike of the defence, the present Respondent (land lady) filed an appeal which was heard by 1st. Additional District Judge, Karachi. Before the learned 1st Appellate Court an appli--cation was repeated under Order 1, rule 10, C. P. C. By the present appellant and the other two persons who claimed to be the heirs of late M. A. Majeed for being joined as parties.
The learned 1st Appellate Court by the impugned order passed on 22-5-1975 allowed the appeal against Begum Majeed and ordered that her defence be struck of. She was directed to hand over vacant possession of the property in question within one month from the date of the said order. As regards the application filed under Order I, rule 10, C. P. C. By the appellant and two others for their being joined as parties (on the basis of their claim that they were also legal heirs of the late M. A.
Majeed) the same was rejected on the ground that these persons had the knowledge of the fact that Begum Majeed had been accepted as the tenant and that she was paying rent throughout and that the circumstances showed that the said application was collusive and vexatious and had been filed in order to delay the proceedings before the court of law. Thus the appellant and the two other persons who claimed to be the heirs of late M. A. Majeed were not joined as parties either before the Rent Controller or the 1st Appellate Court.
4. The present appeal has been filed by one of the parties only, who had made applications under Order I, rule 10, C. P. C.
I have heard Mr. Safdar Hussain Fani, learned Advocate for the appellant who argued that by virtue of provisions of section 2 (il) of the then West Pakistan. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, the persons who made an application to be joined as parties before the Rent Controller and the 1st Appellant Court, are tenants being the children of the deceased tenant, besides Begum M.A.
Majeed (the widow). He further contended that the presence of all the legal heirs of deceased M. A.
Majeed (the original tenant) was necessary to decide the case and the questions involved in the proceedings.
The learned counsel for the respondent however submitted that this appeal is not competent as only Captain Rahat Majeed one of the alleged heirs has come forward to file the appeal though the original application was moved by three persons (including the present appellant) claiming to be the heirs.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find that it is not necessary to go into the questions raised as according to me this appeal is even otherwise not competent being an appeal which has been preferred against an order whereby the learned Ist Appellate Court refused to join certain persons as parties and thus rejected their application filed under Order 1, rule 10, C. P. C. This order according to me was not appealable under section 15 (4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Reference here may be made to the principle laid down in the case of Allah Ditta and another v. Muhammad Hussain and others (PLD 1965 Lah. 29) where Mr. Justice Muhammad Yaqub Ali (as he then was) held that an order passed for joinder of party was not appealable under section 15 (4) of the said Ordinance of 1959. The principle laid down in the said judgment by the learned Judge, with which I am in respectful agreement, clearly shows that only those orders which were passed under the specified provisions of the said Ordinance, were appealable. Thus the interlocutory order of the nature passed by the learned First Appellate Court would not be appealable to the High Court.
It was observed in the above case by learned High Court of Lahore, that the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge was confined to orders passed under sections 4, 8, 10 and 13 of the Ordinance of 1959 and that even under section 100, C. P. C. An appeal is confined to the decisions which are contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law etc. And that an appeal under section 15
(4) of the Ordinance must, therefore, be from such orders which are formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Controller (or first appellate Court) expressing it conclusively determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the application under one or other of the Sections of the Ordinance quoted above.
The learned Judge also observed; "The words which require special attention in this respect are; 'Conclusively determines rights of the parties. If this consideration is kept in view, there is no scope for the contention that all orders made by a Rent Controller to regulate the proceedings under the Ordinance can be brought in appeal before the High Court'
6. For the reasons discussed above I am of the opinion that this appeal against an interlocutory order refusing to join the appellant and other person as parties before the Rent Controller or before the First Appellate Court, was not appealable.
7. Before concluding however, I would like to note here the case of Khalid Saeed v. Alahdin Pahalwan (1980 CLC 133) where the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court held that the order of deposit of rent passed against the party to the case was binding upon the latter. It was further observed as follows :----- "In none of these cases it was ruled that if all the legal heirs of the deceased tenant are not impleaded as respondents an order to deposit arrears of rent under subsection (6) of section 13 of the said Ordinance cannot be made against one or more legal heirs who are actually impleaded."
The learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the case of Fazal Ahmad v. Ramzan Bibi (PLD 1975 Lah. 790) and the Muhammad Shah etc. v. Ghulam Hassan Shah etc. (1980 CLC 194) argued that the order that the order of ejectment passed against Begum M. A. Majeed cannot be executed against the legal heirs of the tenant as they are not parties to the ejectment proceedings.
However I do not find it necessary to express any opinion on these points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant as it would be for the learned Court executing the decree/order of ejectment to consider these questions, if raised before him.
With the above observations this appeal is dismissed. There shall how--ever be no order as to costs.