' This is an application under section 50, I. R.
0., for interpreting the settlement arrived at between the applicant workers' union and the respondent company on 24th March, 1981. In respect of the Charter of Demands served by the applicant union on the respondent company with their letter, dated 9th March, 1981. The need for the interpretation of the said settlement has arisen on account of the fact that doubts, difficulties and difference of opinion have arisen between the parties as to the terms thereof and their effect.
The settlement inter alia provides for ad hoc increase in the existing wages of permanent workmen, introduction of new scales of pay and substantial increase in specific allowances, including house- rent allowance and transport/conveyance allowance. It is the case of the workers' union that the increase in the wages and allowances under the settlement was given to bring the wages of the workers reasonably at par with the wages being earned by the workers in other Pharmaceutical Concerns, while according to the respondent/ company, the increase in wages and the allowances was specifically given on account of the rise in the cost of living and hence the company is entitled to set off the additional cost of living allowances provided under clause (5) of section 3 of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, against the increase in wages and allowances provided in the settlement in question.
2. Paragraph 3 of the recital clause in the settlement, which has vital bearing on the dispute between parties, specifically state the purpose for which the increase in wages and allowances is being made under the settlement. The said clause reads as follows :- "And whereas the parties held several meetings and as a result of discussions, bilateral negotiations and collective bargaining on the said Charter of Demands the union and the company have reached the following agreement taking into consideration the Cost of Living Allowance of Rs, 40 being paid by the company as additional Cost of Living Allowance in accordance with the amendment of 1980 in the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973 as promulgated by the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Ordinance, 1980 and the expected rise in cost of living, in FULL AND FINAL Settlement of all the demands contained in the said Charter of Demands and all other demands raised by and/or on behalf of the permanent workmen on the date of signing of this Agreement."
3. A bare perusal of the aforesaid paragraph indicates that the increase in wages and allowances provided under the settlement is based on 3 grounds, firstly, the additional cost of living allowance of Rs, 40 being paid by the company in accordance with the amendment of 1980 in the Employees'
Cost of Living (Relief) Act. 1980, secondly, the expected rise in the cost of living, and thirdly, in full and final settlement of all the demands contained in the applicant union's Charter of Demands.
The additional cost of living allowance provided under the Employee's Cost of Living (Relief)
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1980, as the nomenclature of the allowances itself indicates and a perusal of the provisions of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, makes clear, was given on account of the rise in the cost of living. The reference to this allowance in the aforesaid clause would, therefore, seem to indicate that rise in the cost of living allowance was an important factor in providing to the workers increase in allowances and basic wages. This inference receives overwhelming support by reason of express mention of the fact that the expected rise in cost of living was also taken into consideration in reaching the settlement.
4. Mr. S. Qamaruddin, the learned counsel for the respondent company, accordingly strongly contended that the company was entitled to set off the additional cost of living allowance payable to workmen under Ordinance XXV of 1981, against both the increase in basic wages allowed to workmen as well as at least the increase in the house rent allowance and the transport/conveyance allowance, since these increase were avowedly given to workmen on account of rise in the cost of living.
5. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned counsel for the applicant union, however, raised a 3 fold objection to the respondent company claiming set off. His first objection was that the paragraph re-produced above which has been relied upon by the respondent company, appears in the recital clause of the settlement and not in its operative part and consequently it can only be referred for the Interpretation of the document if there was any doubt in regard to the operative part of the settlement. The learned counsel submitted that as there was no indication in the operative part of the settlement that the increase in wages and allowances to workman was being given for the purposes of or on account of the rise in the cost of living, the reference in the recital clause to the expected rise in the cost of living should be ignored. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Province of East Pakistan v.
Sirajul Haque Patwari(1). In that case, the Supreme Court, while rejecting the contention which prevailed with the High Court of East Pakistan that section. 57 of the Electoral College Act, 1957, was not validly enacted by the Central Legislature as it had not first made an express declaration of the.Effect that it was assuming jurisdiction to legislate with regard to a subject which was not enumerated in the Third Schedule to the Constitution in the interest of achieving uniformity in respect of the said matter in different parts of Pakistan, observed as follows :- "Coming now to the question as to whether the condition of clause (2) of Article 131 had been fulfilled in the present case, it is significant to note that even in the High Court no question to achieve uniformity in different parts of Pakistan in respect of the manner of conferment of local Government powers on the members of the Electoral College but what appears to have been urged was that the condition precedent to the exercise of the legislative power of the Central Legislature under this clause was that the Central Legislature must first declare in express terms that it was doing so for either or any of the purposes mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of this clause. Though it was conceded that the Constitution itself had not laid down any such condition yet it was felt that it was a condition which had of necessity to be implied into these provisions of the Constitution. At any rate, it was observed, that the absence of such a declaration raised a presumption that the Legislature was not acting with any of the specified objects.
' If it was a question of presumption only, then such a presumption, even if it could legitimately be raised, would clearly have been rebutted by the substantive provisions of the statute if they manifestly appeared to have been enacted with any one of the said specified objectives. In the present case, there could be no manner of doubt that section 57 was ex facie a law which was intended to apply to both the Provinces of Pakistan and, therefore, a law clearly designed for the achievement of uniformity.
' Even otherwise I find it difficult to appreciate why such an express declaration should be at all necessary for the validity of the law itself. A legislative declaration of the purpose of a statute, though entitles to serious consideration, respect and due weight, is not binding on the Courts and certainly not conclusive. The Courts are not to look at the form of the enactment but to its substance and if from it the purpose of the legislation is clear that is enough. A legislative declaration can, in any event, be relevant only for the ascertainment of the motive of the Legislature but the Courts are not as a rule concerned with the motive of the Legislature.
' Again if such a declaration has to be made it must of necessity be incorporated in the Preamble to the Act or in a heading appended to the section, but neither of these, according to the universally {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1966 SC 854 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' accepted rules of iterpretation, can influence the meaning, scope or purpose of the enacting parts, for there is no rule that the enacting parts must be co-extensive with the preamble. In every case a review of the substantive provisions of the enactment itself has of necessity to be undertaken to ascertain its nature and scope, as the context of the preamble cannot either enlarge or abridge the meaning of the enacting parts in the absence of any ambiguity there in. A declaration contained in the preamble or a heading would, by no means, be conclusive on this question if the enactment itself discloses that it was not made to fulfil either or any of the objectives mentioned in clause (2) of Article 131. Looking, therefore, at the provisions of section 57 of the Electoral College Act, I find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it was designed to achieve uniformity of action in both the parts of Pakistan for the fulfilment of the directive contained in Article 158 (4) of the Constitution."
' Apart from the fact that the above decision is in respect of a statute while we are dealing with the construction of a settlement, the Supreme Court itself in the aforesaid decision has observed that a legislative declaration as to the motive or intent of the Legislature "must of necessity be incorporated in the preamble to the Act or to the heading appended to the section. . ..". This is precisely what has been done in the instant case. As already pointed out, the paragraph reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment is incorporated in the recital clause or heading of the settlement. In any case, since there is no clear indication in the other provisions of the settlement as to the purpose for which the increase in wages and allowances was being provided to the workman, referent must of necessity is made to the averments in the recital clause of the settlement, which forms an integral part of the settlement itself.
6. It was next submitted by Mr. Ali Amjad that set off under Ordinance XXV of 1981 of increase in wages/allowances is permitted only in those cases where the increase is specifically given to provide relief due to rise in the cost of living. He submitted that the recital clause of the settlement does not state that the increase in wages and allowances of workmen was being made to provide relief on account of rise in the cost of living but on account of expected rise in the cost of living, which was quite a different thing from providing relief against the existing or actual rise in the cost of living. I regret that I see no force in the contention of the learned counsel. The object of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, is on the one hand to compel the employer to pay to his workmen different cost of living allowances on account of the rise in the cost of living and on the other hand to entitle the employers who have already increased the wages/allowances of workmen due to rise in the cost of living to set off such increases against the statutory Cost of Living Allowance which they otherwise are required to pay to the workmen. If the employer increases the wages/ allowances of workmen, not only keeping in view the prevailing rise in the cost of living but also the expected rise in the cost of living during the years he cannot be disentitied to set off such increase against the Cost of Living Allowance payable under Ordinance XXV of 1981. In fact it is to be expected of every progressive employer to fix wages of his workmen keeping in view not only the prevailing or existing high rise in the cost of living, but also the expected or anticipated rise in the cost of living during the year.
7. It was finally contended by Mr. All Amjad that increases in wages/allowances of the workmen under the settlement was due to negotiation between the parties and that even after such increase the total wage packet of the different workmen employed in the respondent company was less than the wage packet of the corresponding category of workmen in similar organizations in Karachi, as per Chart appended to the 'rejoinder affidavit of the General Secretary of the applicant union. I am not here concerned with what the normal wage in structure in Pharmaceutical Concerns is or whether the wages in the respondent company compare favorably or unfavorably with wages given to workmen by other Pharmaceutical companies. The sole issue which falls to be determined by this Tribunal in these proceedings is whether the increase in wages/allowances under the settlement in question was given on account of rise in the cost of living. I have already referred to the provision in the settlement which specifically indicates states that the increase was on account of the prevailing as well as the expected rise in the cost of living.
No doubt, the recital clause also refers to the demands of the workers' union and recites that the settlement was in full and final agreement or all the demands, but mere reference to these demands would not eliminate the fact that basically the increase in wages and allowances was being given to provide relief to workmen against rise in the cost of living. In the case of Azad Friends and Co., Ltd. And Others v. Azad Jriends Co. Employee's Union Labour Welfare Society (Appeal No, KAP ,-586/81), decided on 4th February, 1982, while dealing with the case of S finger Industries Labour Union, I had examined the issue whether the law required that in order that the employer be entitled to set off the increase in wages/allowances provided to workmen, such increase must be given solely or exclusively to provide relief on account of rise in the cost of living, and had, in the circumstances of that case rejected this contention.
8. For the reasons discussed by him above, I am of the view, on the basis of the recital clause in the settlement as also the fact there is a substantial ad ha sc and special increase in the basic wages of the workmen provided in the settlement, that the increase in the basic wages as also the increase in the house rent and transport/conveyance allowance under the settlement was given to provide relief to the workmen against the rise in the cost of living and, consequently, the respondent company is entailed to set off the same against the cost of living allowance provided under Ordinance XX of 1981.