1. ' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Bashir Ahmad Ex-Constable has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded Inspector-General of Police, Lahore, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Multan Range, Multan and S. P. Multan. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the orders dated 8th February, 1978, 19th September, 1978, 7th February, 1979, 24th January, 1980 and 28th February, 1981 passed by the respondents Nos. 1-3 be declared illegal and be set aside. It has been further prayed that the appellant be re-instated in service with past benefits.
2. ' Brief facts of the case are that constable Bashir Ahmad No, 1091 and Muhammad Sarwar No, 340 were issued show-cause notices for major punishment, including dismissal under rules 2 and 3 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 for having involved themselves in misbehavior towards P. S. I. Abbas Shah who asked them to take care of notorious Zafar Shah whom they had let loose with the handcuffs. As the appellant could not be traced, therefore, an ex parte order dated 8th February, 1978 was passed against him by the S. P. Multan. In fact the appellant had absconded in consequence of a criminal case was registered against him in the above affair. The appellant filed an appeal before D. I. G. Which was dismissed on 19th September, 1978. He also filed a revision-cum-mercy petition to the I. G. P. But the same did not find favour and the petition was dismissed on 7th February, 1979. Later on the appellant went on filing repeated representations to the 1. G. P. And ultimately has come up before us on 29th March, 1981.
3. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned District Attorney assisted by the representative of the Department and have perused the record of the case carefully.
4. ' It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that as he was acquitted by the Court of competent jurisdiction vide order dated 19th July, 1979 for the offences which now have been made the subject of enquiry and his ultimate dismissal, therefore, he was entitled to re-instatement on this score only.
5. ' On the other hand, the learned D. A. Has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the law of limitation which would come into play against the present appeal of appellant. According to the learned District Attorney his case is hopelessly time barred and is liable to be dismissed even without going into the merits of the case.
6. ' We have attended to this preliminary objection and find that the appellant was dismissed from service on 8th February, 1978 by the S. P. His appeal before the D. I. G. Failed on 19th September, 1978 and his revision-cum-mercy petition met the same fate on 7th February, 1979. In this way the final order in this case would be that of I. G. P. Dated 7th February, 1979. From this date the time would start running against the appellant for commuting the period of limitation in his favour. In view of the above his appeal would be time barred by more than one and half years. We are not impressed with the contention of the appellant that his later representations before the I.-G. P.
7. Should be taken. Into consideration and that time should only run against him after the final decision of such representation so made by the I. G. P. On 28th February, 1981. It is a settled law that if a person chooses at his own whim and fancy to keep on filing representations to keep the limitation alive such like representations do not grant him this concession and the time is to be counted for the purpose of limitation from the date of the final order. In this case, as stated above the final order would be of the I. G. P. Dated 7th February, 1979 only.
8. ' In the light of the above discussion we are in accord with the learned District Attorney that the appeal of the appellant is hopelessly time barred and is liable to be dismissed on this score only.
9. We further find that there is also no application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act even if there had been one we would not have condoned the delay as we do not find any justification for the same in this ease. The result is that we dismiss the appeal as time barred.
10. However, there will be no orders as to costs.