' Printing Press under the name and style of M/s Prestige Printers, situated at Old Rally . Brothers Building, Talpur Road, Karachi, was taken on contract basis by the petitioner in January, 1975.
Muhammad Javed, the respondent No, 2 was employed a labourer in the press on monthly salary of Rs,
175. He on his own in search of better job left the service of the petitioner on 15th June, 1975. He also collected his emoluments on 8th July, 1975, in full and final settlement of his claim. After about a period of three months he again contacted the petitioner for re-employment. Since the petitioner had no vacancy, he refused. On 22nd September, 1975, the respondent No, 2 filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) against the petitioner. The Junior Labour Court passed an ex parte order against the petitioner on 30th September, 1975, directing re-instatment of the respondent No, 2 in service with full back benefits. The respondent No, 2 informed the petitioner about the ex parte order passed against him in the third week of October, 1975 through a registered letter. The petitioner also came to know that the respondent No, 2 had filed a complaint No, 185175 against him under section 36-E of the Ordinance in the Labour Court No, 3, Karachi on 20th November, 1975. The Court ordered issuance of summons to the petitioner on 10th December, 1975, where after the charge was framed against him. It is the case of the Petitioner that during the pendency of the proceedings the learned Presiding Officer harassed him and instructed him verbally to re-instate the respondent No, 2 and in compliance thereof he re-employed the respondent No, 2 w,e,f, 26th January, 1976, but the respondent No, 2 left the job again on 31st March, 1976. He was paid the salary for the period, the vouchers whereof have been produced by the petitioner and are available on the record.
Subsequently, the petitioner made an application before the Labour Court requesting for dropping of the proceedings against him since he had complied with the orders and re-instated the respondent No, 2 and since the Printing Press was no more with him as he had returned the same to the original owner but the Labour Court neither passed any order on that application nor made any effort to finish the proceedings which had resulted in undue harassment to him. He has, therefore, come in this petition for declaration that the impugned orders passed on 30th September, 1975 by the Junior Labour Court and 10th December, 1975 passed by the Senior Labour Court are without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. Mr. Habibur Rashid, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised two-fold contention ; firstly ; that the requirements of section 25-A of the Ordinance had not been complied with, inasmuch as, no notice which was one of the pre-conditions was served on the petitioner before filing of the application under section 25-A ; and, secondly, that the complaint filed against him under section 36-E of the Ordinance was incompetent inasmuch as it did not fulfil the requirements of section 13- B of the Ordinance, and, therefore, the impugned orders were passed without jurisdiction and were a mere nullity.
3. As regards the first contention reliance has been placed on the decisions in the case of Nasim Silk Industries v. Vth Labour Court, Sind etc. (1), Karachi Development Authority v. Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court II etc. (2) and Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited v. Sind Labour Court etc. (3). It will be worthwhile to reproduce the observations from the first case as it deals with section 25-A of the Ordinance. They are as under :- "Thus the twin conditions for the jurisdiction of the Labour Court continued to be the same as those for the Industrial Court under Standing Order 18, and as admittedly the second respondent had never served his employer with the statutory notice of his {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1977 P C 489 (2) PLD 1975 Kar. 716
(3) PLD 1975 Ku. 719) {{FOOT NOTE}} ' grievance, it is obvious the view of the Labour Court was correct. As the second respondent had not complied with Pre-condition of the Junior Courts jurisdiction, the application filed by him could only be dismissed."
' In K.D.A. v. Presiding Officer II Sind Labour Court (1) it was observed as under :- "Section 25-A of the I R 0 in pari materia with Standing Order 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, The view taken in the fonter judgment was that the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of Standing Order 18 were mandatory in nature, and where a grievance was not brought to the notice of the employer the Court had no jurisdiction. This also was Division Bench judgment."
' In Shipyard & Engineering Works Limited v. Sind Labour Court II etc. (2) it was observed as under :- "The position is that every worker whose services have been terminated shall be bound to follow the procedure laid down in subsections I to 4 of section 25-A of the I.R.O."
4. The position, however, remains that it was incumbent upon the, respondent No,
2. Himself to give all the particulars and serve the petitioner with notice which were pre-conditions before filing an application under section 25-A of the Ordinance, the relevant portions whereof read as under :- "25-A Redress of individual grievances.-(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop Steward or trade union, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises. (2) Where a worker himself brings his grievance to the notice of the employer, the employer shall, within fifteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the worker. (3)
Where a worker brings his grievance to the notice of his employer through his Shop Steward or Trade Union, the employer shall, within seven days of the grievance being brought to his notice,, communicate his decision in writing to the Shop Steward or, as the case may be, the trade union
(4) If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2), or, as the case may be, subsection (3), or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or Shop Steward may take the matter to his Trade Union or the (Junior Labour Court), or as the case may be, the Trade Union may take the matter to the (Junior Labour Court), and where the matter is taken to the (Junior Labour Court), it shall give (a decision) within (seven) days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were an industrial dispute : Provided, that a worker who desires to so take the matter to the (Junior {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1975 Kar. 716 (2) PLD 1975 Kar, 719 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Labour Court) shall do so within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer or, as the case may be, from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3), as the case may be."
Even the plain reading of this provision would make it clear that the required pre-conditions were to be fulfilled before presentation of the application under section 25-A of the Ordinance which has in fact not been done in the instant case. The petitioner has filed an affidavit in support of his petition and has also produced the copy of the application filed in the Labour Court for draping the proceedings which has all been supported by an affidavit and, in which affidavits it has very clearly been stated that no requirements with regard to the service of the notice etc. Were fulfilled before filing an application under section 25-A of the Ordinance. Neither there is anything available on the record to the contrary as no counter-affidavit seems to have been filed nor the respondent No, 2 has been able to put forth anything to the contrary at the time of arguments though he was present, and was heard in person, as he was unrepresented. What I find further that neither such notice has been produced nor it has been mentioned anywhere to have been served on the petitioners. The petitioner has further contended that he had no knowledge of the proceedings before the Junior Labour Court till he was subsequently informed by the respondent No, 2 through a registered letter as no notice of such proceedings was also served on him before the ex parte order was passed. Accordingly, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that there was no compliance of the requirements of section 25-A of the Ordinance before an application under that section was presented in the Junior Labour Court is not without substance.
5. As regards the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that there was no compliance of the requirements of section 13 (b) of the Ordinance before the complaint under section 36-E of the Ordinance was filed against the petitioner, it would be convenient for reference to reproduce section 13 (b) of the Ordinance .Which reads as under:- "Section 13. Power and function of Registrar-The following shall be the powers and functions of the Registrar:- a) ...............
(b) to lodge, or authorise any person to lodge, complaints with the Labour Court or Commission for action, including prosecution, against trade unions, employers, workers or other persons for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practice or violation of any provision of this Ordinance or for expending the funds of a trade union in contravention of the provisions of its constitution."
' A plain reading of this section 13 (b) would make it abundantly clear that in case of violation of any of the provisions of this Ordinance the Registrar shall lodge or authorise any person to lodge complaint with the Labour Court or Commission for action including prosecution against trade union, employers, workers or other persons for any alleged offence or any unfair labour practice or violation of any provisions of the Ordinance. Since it is alleged that the petitioner did not comply with the directions of the Junior Labour Court re-instating the respondent No, 2, which in fact as the record discloses was done by the petitioner, the prosecution if any had not to be filed by the respondent No, 2 himself as section 13 (b) provides that either it had to be done by the registrar or had to be authorised by him. In the instant case it has not been done s and respondent No, 2 has not controverted the allegations in that respect the complaint itself shows that it was filed by the respondent No,
2. Does not show that it was even authorised by the Registrar. Non-corn pliancy of the requirements of section 13 (b) of the Ordinance, therefore appears on the face of the record.
Reliance in that respect has placed on the unreported decision in C.P. No, 258/75, wherein it was clearly held that the complaint filed against the employer in such situation when it was neither presented by the Registrar nor was authorised by him was legally incompetent. It would, therefore, on the face of it appear that there has been no compliance of the requirements of section 13 (6) of the Ordinance before the complaint under section 36-E of the Ordinance was presented before the Senior Labour Court. It was, therefore, legally incompetent and was entertained without lawful authority. This contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is, therefore, also not without force.
6. The impugned orders passed by the Labour Courts, therefore, were not in the exercise of lawful authority and are of no legal effect. The results, is that they are quashed and the petition is allowed.
However, there will be no order as to costs.