' MAHMOOD AHMAD BHATTI, J. --- Ghulam Farid, the petitioner filed this writ petition to assail the orders dated 29.11.2012 and 07.07.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Chobara, District Layyah and District Judge Layyah, respectively whereby an application moved by the petitioner to be made a party to the suit for pre-emption instituted by Mohammad lqbal, respondent No. 4 was dismissed and a revision petition preferred thereagainst was dismissed as well.
2. The facts, in brief, are that Mohammad lqbal, respondent No. 4 herein instituted a suit for pre- emption to pre-empt a sale mutation No. 371 attested on 21.01.2011 in favour of Wajid Hussain, who purchased the land measuring 24 Kanals from Mohammad Bakhsh, respondent No. 3 herein situated in Tehsil Chobara, District Layyah. This suit was instituted on 17.06.2011. When the aforesaid suit was under way, the present petitioner instituted a suit for specific performance against Mohammad Bakhsh, respondent No. 3 herein regarding the very same land, alleging that he had entered into an agreement to sell' dated 21.03.2010 with Mohammad Bakhsh for a consideration of Rs. 600000/-. This suit was brought on 02.06.2012. On 19.09.2012, the petitioner herein made an application for impleadment in the suit for pre-emption titled "Mohammad lqbal v. Wajid Hussain".
The pre-emptor resisted this application, praying that the same was to be dismissed. As stated above, the said application was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Chobara vide order dated 29.11.2012, holding that the petitioner is neither a necessary nor a proper party.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned District Judge, Layyah, but he could not be persuaded to interfere with the order passed by the Trial Court. As a result, he dismissed the revision petition vide order dated 07.07.2014. Hence, this writ petition.
4. In support of this petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that if the petitioner was not made a party to the suit for pre-emption titled "Mohammad lqbal v. Wajid Hussain", the rights of the petitioner could not be secured and even if he succeeded in obtaining a decree in the suit instituted by him for specific performance, he would have to grope in the dark and the possibility could not be ruled that such a decree might in effect be contradictory to that of the decree to be passed in the suit for pre-emption. According to him, if the things are put in perspective, the petitioner is a necessary party deserving to be impleaded in the suit for pre- emption.
5. I have duly considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but am unable to agree with the same. To begin with, Mohammad lqbal instituted the suit for pre-emption against Wajid Hussain at a time when the petitioner had not instituted the suit for specific performance. It could never have been in his contemplation that the petitioner would be instituting a suit against Muhammad Bakhsh, the owner and vendor of the suit land. It is well-established law that in a pre-emption suit there are only two parties: one the pre-emptor and the other, the vendee. Even the vendor is not regarded as a necessary or a proper party. To state the obvious, preemption is a right of substitution and in the event of success, the pre-emptor would be getting what was conferred upon the vendee. Without attributing any male fides to the petitioner, If he was allowed to be made a party to the suit for pre-emption, it would throw a spanner in the works and things might come to such a pass that the pre-emption suit might be made contingent on the outcome of the suit for specific performance instituted by the petitioner. Should this happen, this would muddy the waters and might result in the multiplicity the proceedings. In the circumstances, it can safely be held that the petitioner is neither a necessary nor a proper party and he cannot be allowed to join in the suit for pre-emption instituted by Mohammad lqbal. Both the orders in this writ petition were passed in accordance with law. They do not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional defect, calling for interference in the writ jurisdiction.
6. For what has been stated above, this writ petition being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed in limine.