Jamshed Elahi Butt son of Fazal Elahi and Kashif Jamshed Butt son of Jamshed Elahi (hereinafter referred as 'respondents') were tried by the learned Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-II, Rawalpindi/ Islamabad Capital Territory in case FIR No,15 dated 22-1-2007 under section 365-A, P.P.C. Registered with Police Station Mandra, District Rawalpindi at the instance of Fazal Qadir, appellant/complainant of the case who allegedly along with his brother Muhammad Khan were abducted by the respondents for ransom on 27-1-2006. During the course of investigation conducted by Bahadar Khan, S.I./I.O. (P.W.6) the respondents were found involved in the case.
Hence, the trial.
2. The learned trial Court on conclusion of the trial vide judgment dated 6-9-2008 acquitted the respondents of the charges against them, extending them the benefit of doubt. Hence, this appeal against acquittal under section 25 of the-Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
3. Main thrust of arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned trial Court in utter disregard of sufficient incriminating material on record has passed the impugned judgment and so it is a clear case of mis-reading and non-reading of the evidence. Further, contends that without any cogent reason the P.Ws. Were not trusted despite involving no major discrepancy coupled with recoveries and proof of ransom money paid to the respondents.
4. Arguments heard and record perused.
5. We have noted that the learned trial Court very properly took notice of the material discrepancies regarding the prosecution story as to abduction and payment of ransom.
Admittedly the FIR was lodged by the appellant/complainant after about one year of the occurrence i,e, on 22-1-2007 without giving any plausible explanation. None of the P.Ws. Admitted to have paid ransom money on the demand of the respondents. Even P.W.6 Bahadar Khan, S.I. Who conducted the investigation admitted in cross-examination that according to his investigation the story of the FIR was found concocted one. Moreover, neither place of alleged confinement of both the victims was pointed out nor it has come on record that the said house was guarded by the accused at the time of raid. Further, it also does not appeal to reason to a person of ordinary prudence that how respondents could take the high risk of disclosure of particulars of the place, where the said abductees were allegedly detained by them, to the P.Ws. As also giving them sufficient time to contact outside for requisitioning ransom money and come back to the same place to pay them. In this regard, we do agree with the findings of the learned trial court recorded in para-14 of the judgment that --- "There is a statement of Manager of the Bank where amount was withdrawn by Muhammad Khan P. W. 2 on 19-1-2006. It means that said amount was withdrawn and paid as ransom. The Rapat Ex.PA shows that according to the complainant he and Muhammad Khan were abducted on 13-1- 2006 and Muhammad Khan was released after 7 days and date is mentioned as 19-1-2006. If 7 (seven) days are calculated then the date becomes 20-1-2006. Even otherwise, when Muhammad Khan was released on 19-1-2006 at Dargai, it was not possible for him to reach Sukhu in the working hours of the bank and withdrew that amount."
6. This all shows that the P.Ws. Have not stated all that was true at the trial. So, their, veracity and integrity is not above board.
7. The argument that even statements of both the abductees P.W.1 Fazal Qadir, complainant/appellant and P.W.2 Muhammad Khan were sufficient for recording the conviction of the respondents has no force as the abductees themselves have been contradicted by the other P.Ws. On material points involved in the case, as rightly observed by the learned trial Court.
8. Coming to the recovery, the same do not advance the case of the prosecution in any manner whatsoever. Even otherwise if the recovery is at all proved against the respondents the same would not be sufficient to connect them with the allegation of abduction for ransom as the evidence of recovery used for corroboration of the main allegation, which the prosecution has miserably failed to prove and what to say of other.
9. We have also taken note of the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that unless it can be shown that the judgment of the lower court is perverse or that it is completely illegal and no other conclusion can be drawn except the guilt of the accused or there has been misreading of evidence resulting in miscarriage of justice, the acquittal order cannot be interfered with whereby an accused earns double presumption of innocence as held in Muhammad Mansha Kausar v.
Muhammad Ashgar and others (2003 SCMR 477). In this case the prosecution has not been able to bring on record adequate incriminating evidence to the extent of the respondents that may connect them with the crime.
10. In view of the above, we believe that the learned trial Court after applying its judicious mind acquitted the accused-respondents keeping in view the manner in which the alleged occurrence had been narrated by the prosecution. Therefore, we have not felt it necessary to have re- appraisal of the evidence in defence brought by the respondents in support of their version recorded under section 342, Cr. P. C .
11. Furthermore, once a judgment of acquittal is passed by a competent court of jurisdiction after proper and correct appraisal of evidence as held in Imran Hussain v. Amar Arshad and 2 others (1997 SCMR 438) the same cannot be interfered with merely on the ground that on re-analysis of the evidence another view could be taken.
12. Therefore, as a result of what has been discussed above we find no merit in the appeal in hand, which is accordingly dismissed in limine.