1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, ACTG. C. J. The respondent herein purchased a house built on Khasra No. 691, situate in Pishin Bazar, Quetta, from Abdul Alt on 16th of May 1977, which was in possession of the petitioner as a tenant. He, thereupon, served a notice on him under section 13-A of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on 22nd of August, 1977 informing him of the purchase of the house by him and for the payment of the rent due; and as the petitioner defaulted in the payment of rent, he filed an application for his ejectment on 28th of August, 1977, on the grounds of default in the payment of rent without - specifying the period and for his personal bona fide use. In 1979, while this application was pending, the respondent filed another application for its amendment to incorporate the period of default as from 17th August, 1977 to 17th of March, 1979. The Rent Controller allowed his prayer. But in the amended application, a different period was mentioned, that is, from 16th of May 1977 to 17 of March, 1979. The Rent Controller, however, dismissed the ejectment application on 3rd of July, 1979, on the ground that the respondent had failed to amend the application as ordered and added that in doing so his object was' to harass the tenant.
2. The respondent filed an application for he review of the order on 4th of July; 1979, and the Rent Controller, thereupon, recalled his order on 30th of December, 1979 and proceeded to decide the application. On 8th of March, 1980, he passed an order under section 13(6) of the Ordinance whereby he directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 3,150 on or before 15th of April, 1980, but as there was a default in the payment of the entire amount on or before the crucial ate, his defence was struck off by order dated 3rd of July, 1980. The appeal in the High Court failed as it was held that the Rent Controller had the power to recall his order under section 20 of the General Clauses Act and that further on the basis of the decision in Syed Nafis Ahmed Zaidi v. S. M. Hussain (PLD 1964 Lah.th 536), it was augmented that the powers exercised by the Rent Controller under the Ordinance were not exhaustive and like a Court he possessed inherent powers to recall his order in the ends of justice.
3. In seeking leave to appeal, it was again vehemently stressed that unless the power to review an order was enacted in the statute, it could not be exercised as an inherent power by the Rent Controller on the same principle as exercised by the civil-Court as he was not a Court; and that further section 20 of the General Clauses Act did not empower, him to do so. This submission grounded, as it is, does not arise for consideration, as in our view the ejectment was sought on grounds of default and personal bona fide use. Even assuming for argument sake that the Rent Controller was not satisfied as to the correctness of the ground of default because of the variation in the period for which the rent was due, still he was duty bound to give his finding on the second ground, namely, personal bona fide use. Section 13(2) imposes an obligation on the Rent Controller to objective) satisfy himself as to the merits of the grounds pleaded for ejectment and to give his finding thereon and the failure to do so would not amount to the disposal of the application on merits. This being so, the order dated 30th of December, 1980, was a nullity in law and the ejectment application should be deemed to have been pending for decision. The review application was, accordingly, an exercise in futility.
4. Therefore, this petition has no substance and is dismissed. However, we would direct that the amount of rent deposited should be settled by the Rent Controller in terms of section 13(8) of the Ordinance. The-petitioner undertakes to voluntarily surrender the possession of the house within two months on payment of current rent and we permit him to do so subject to this undertaking.