' The appellant is aggrieved of an order dated 15-1-2005 passed by a learned Judge in Chambers of this Court. Through the impugned order, a constitutional petition filed by the appellant against orders passed by the Provincial Quality Control Board ("PQCB") was dismissed.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of the constitutional petition were that the Drug Inspector, Mandi Baha-ud-Din reported that on 23-4-2012, he took a drug sample of Sanidine 500 mg Capsules, Batch No,91E from the premises of Arshad Clinic/Store, Gali M.B. High School, Mandi Baha- ud-Din, On analysis, the said drug was declared spurious by the Government Analyst, Drug Testing Laboratory, Punjab. Arshad Pervaiz son of Muhammad Ramzan Baig, proprietor of Arshad Clinic/Store took the stance that he had purchased the said capsules from Shaukat Ali son of Ghulam Rasool resident of Chak No,2 Janubi, Tehsil and District Mandi Baha-ud-Din. The said person stated that he had supplied the said medicine to Arshad Pervaiz after purchasing the same from Aamir Medical Store, 21-A, Muslim Masjid, Lohari Gate, Lahore, which is owned and run by the appellant.
3: On receipt of the information, show-cause notice dated 21-5-2013 was issued by PQCB to all persons allegedly involved in the matter including the appellant. The appellant, filed a reply to the show cause notice and was called for personal hearing. On 2-7-2013, the board heard the parties including the learned counsel for the appellant, examined the report of the Government Analyst, Drug Inspector and other material placed before it and came to the conclusion that a spurious drug was being sold, which was a heinous and cognizable offence under the Drug Act 1976 ("Act").
It, therefore, decided to grant permission for registration of FIR against Arshad Pervaiz, Shaukat Ali, Anwar Saeed Butt (appellant) and Imran Saeed Butt. FIR No, 334 of 2014 dated 1908(sic)-10-2013 was accordingly registered with Police Station City Mandi Baha-ud-Din,
4. Subsequently, pursuant to another hearing in which the appellant was represented through counsel, PQCB was informed that an FIR had already been lodged against the, accused persons and as per reports of the police and Drug Inspector, Arshad Pervaiz son of Muhammad Ramzan had been found guilty of the offences. However, the other accused persons who were nominated in the FIR had been declared as Proclaimed Offenders. The concerned Drug Inspector, therefore, requested PQCB to grant permission to prosecute all, the accused persons in terms of section 11 of the Act.
5. After hearing all parties, scrutiny of the report of Government Analyst, report of the Drug Inspector, statement of the Drug Inspector and the stance taken by/on behalf of the accused persons, the Board came to the conclusion that the accused persons were involved in manufacturing/Selling/Stocking for sale of spurious drugs and were trying to shift responsibility on each others shoulders. Therefore, the Board vide order dated 8-8-2014 granted permission for prosecution against the accused persons including the appellant for offence of manufacturing/selling/stocking of spurious drugs.
6. The appellant was aggrieved of the said orders and approached this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction through W.P. No,808.Of 2015, which was dismissed.
' Hence this appeal,
7. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that respondent No,3 while passing the impugned order had failed to examine the record and apply its judicious mind. He maintains that respondent No,3 was bound to examine the record itself instead of referring the matter to some other agency i,e, police for registration of FIR. He maintains that there was no incriminating material available before PQCB furnishing any reason or justification either to direct registration of FIR against the appellant or sanctioning the prosecution. He further submits that it was a statutory obligation of respondent No,3 itself to come to a definite conclusion about the guilt of the petitioner before passing any order against the petitioner which obligation has not been discharged by the said respondent. He maintains that the learned Single Bench did not appreciate the afore-noted facts in their true perspective.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone through record.
9. The only question requiring determination in this matter is whether respondent No,3 adequately discharged its obligation under section 11 of the Drug Act, 1976. On hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and examination of the record, our response to the above question is in the affirmative for the following reasons:-- i. Section 11 5(b) of the Drug Act 1976, which is relevant for the purpose of this appeal provides as follows:- " 11.Provincial Quality Control Board. - (1)....
(2)
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(3)
(4)
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(a) . . .
(b) to scrutinize the reports of Provincial Inspectors in respect of contraventions of this Act and reports of the Government Analysts in respect of drugs sent to them by Provincial Inspectors for test and analysis and issue instructions to the Inspectors as to the action to be taken on such reports: ' Provided that the Provincial Quality Control Board may specify the class of cases in which a Provincial Inspector may make a complaint to the Drug Court, or take any other action, without the specific instructions of the Board; ' Perusal of the said section shows that PQCB is required to scrutinize reports of Provincial Inspectors, Government Analyst in respect of drugs sent for testing and analysis and issue instructions as to actions to be taken on such reports. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the appellant that the drug sent for analysis was found to be spurious by the Government Analyst. The Drug Inspector had reported his findings relating to involvement of various persons including the appellant in the sale of spurious drugs. On receipt of his report, the PQCB had issued a show cause notice to the accused persons, granted them personal hearing, examined all material including report of the Government Analyst for testing and analysis and thereafter passed an order for lodging an FIR vide order dated 2-7-2013. ii.The record also indicates that on receipt of request for grant of permission to initiate prosecution against the accused persons, the petitioner and other accused persons were granted another hearing during which the accused persons, their counsel and the Drug Inspector were heard and the entire record examined. On the basis of the said hearing, scrutiny of the record and due application of mind, the PQCB came to the conclusion that the accused persons were, involved in manufacturing/selling/stocking for sale of spurious drugs and were trying to shift responsibility on each others shoulders. On the basis of such conclusion, the Board proceeded to grant permission for prosecution of the accused persons intruding the appellant for offence of manufacturing/selling/stocking of spurious drugs before the Court of competent jurisdiction. We have, therefore, not found any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that PQCB did not fulfil its statutory obligation under Section 11 of the Drug Act, 1976. iii. Perusal of the proceedings taken by PQCB indicate that they have not only fulfilled the requirements of law by issuing show cause notices, receiving replies of the same and granting the accused persons personal hearings but have also examined and scrutinized documents, reports and statements made before it or produced before it to arrive at their conclusions. In view of the fact that their conclusions were based upon the scope of enquiry/scrutiny provided by Section 11 of the Drug Act, 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder, they directed that FIR be lodged and subsequently granted permission for prosecution to the Drug Inspector in order to fix responsibility, which may involve a number of parties starting, from the manufacturer and encompassing the entire supply chain. The said exercise needs to be undertaken by an investigating agency, which has the requisite powers, expertise and resources to undertake investigations, collect evidence and build the case for prosecution in accordance with law, by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which will decide the question of guilt or innocence of the petitioner and other accused persons on the basis of evidence produced before it, in accordance with law. Iv. As far as the rights of the appellant are concerned, he would get ample opportunity to defend his case before the trial Court in accordance with law and all defences available to him, if taken before the trial Court, would undergo the process of judicial scrutiny as would the case set up by the prosecution, once the trial commences. v. There is no denial of the fact that the samples collected by the Drug. Inspector were found to be spurious, what remains to be determined is, who is involved and responsible for manufacturing, stocking, selling and distributing such drugs. This kind of investigation can neither be undertaken by PQCB nor are they required in terms of section .11 to do so. The scope of section 11 is limited to scrutiny of record brought before PQCB from different sources and if as a result of such scrutiny, the Board comes to the conclusion that any act in contravention of Drug Act 1976 has been committed, it can proceed further and pass the requisite orders. Such orders having been passed after fulfilling all parameters and requirement of section 1.1, required no interference by this Court, which was correctly declined by the learned Single Bench. vi. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon a judgment of this Court reported as Waheed Akbar and 2 others v. Government of Punjab, Health Department through Secretary Health; Civil Secretariat, Lahore and 3 others (2002 YLR 1612) in support of his contention. We have scanned through the said judgment and find that the same is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and is clearly distinguishable. In the said judgment, the petitioner was condemned unheard and the order of PQCB did not disclose any reason. It is not the case of the appellant before us that he was not heard, the order was passed behind his back or that the order is devoid of reasons. As such the judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant is of no help to him.
10. For reasons recorded above, we find that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Chambers is well-reasoned, based upon the correct interpretation of the principals of law on the subject and does not require any interference. Consequently this appeal fails. It is accordingly dismissed.