Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to this constitution petition are that on an application of respondent Salam Din landlord on the grounds of default, damage, subletting and personal requirement, the learned Rent Controller vide order dated 15-9-1980 directed eviction of the petitioner from the shop in dispute. The appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, vide order dated 2-9-1981. Hence, this constitution petition. .
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before me that the impugned orders of eviction are illegal as the same have been passed misconstruing the provisions of section 13(3) (ii)(b) of the Urban Reni Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The precise submission is that not only good faith of the applicant/landlord is to be established but the Rent Controller is also to be satisfied of the bona fides of the landlord in seeking eviction from the rented premises. Elaborating, it is argued that the mala fides of the landlord was not gone into by both the Courts below as they failed to take notice of preliminary objection No. 4 taken in the written statement of the petitioner. The plea of the mala fides is based on the assertion that earlier landlord obtained an ejectment order in collusion with the father of the petitioner by filing an ejectment application against the father though the petitioner was the tenant and not the father and on an application filed by the petitioner under Order XXI, rules 99 and 100, C. P. C. It was held that the petitioner cannot be ejected in pursuant to the ejectment decree passed against the father. The appeal against the said order was dismissed on the . Point of limitation as well as on account of non-compliance of the provisions of Order XLI, rule 1, C. P. C. As certified copy of the impugned order was not filed alongwith the appeal. Civil Revision No. 70 of 1979 filed against the order dismissing the appeal was also dismissed in l1mine. In these circum--stances, it is argued that the mala fides of the landlord/appellant are apparent as having failed to obtain possession in pursuant to the said decree obtained in collusion with the father, the present ejectment petition was repeated. This plea has no substance as it was conceded that the earlier ejectment order was not based on the concession made by the father and that the same was passed after contest. If that is so, then it cannot be argued that there was collusion between the father of the petitioner and Salam Din respondent/landlord. On the other hand, it becomes apparent that the respondent/landlord is trying to obtain the possession of the shop since filing' of the earlier application but the ejectment order obtained was rendered infructuous as the petitioner was successful in showing that he is in occupation of the shop in question independently from his father. The ejectment order in the present litigation has been passed on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord. The bona fides of the requirement in the absence of the collusion cannot be termed mala fide or lacking in good faith.
3. Next it is argued that the very evidence produced by the respondent/ landlord was not relied upon in respect of the other issues relating to default, damage, and subletting and as such the same cannot relied upon for purpose of the issue framed on the question of need. Din Muhammad and Muhammad Shafi witnesses of the petitioner asserted that the other shop presently in occupation of the petitioner was owned by the respondent/landlord. The respondent/landlord, however, when questioned denied the suggestion that the shop in his occupation was owned by him. On the contrary, his stand was that the shop in his occupation was rented one and that he wanted to occupy his own shop after eviction of the petitioner. The question raised essentially pertains to appreciation of evidence and the learned Courts below having concurrently found in favour of the respondent landlord and there being no misreading on the point, no case is made out for interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The learned Courts below have also observed that the law provides adequate safeguard as in case the landlord does not occupy the premises himself after getting it vacated on the ground of personal use the tenant is to be put back in possession. The learned Courts below have, therefore, neither misconstrued the provision contained in section 13(3) (ii) (b) of the Ordinance nor the appreciation of evidence can be considered to be perverse or arbitrary.
4. In view of above discussion, this petition has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed in limine.