Syed Afsar Shah, J.-Through the instant writ petition, under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Amanullah Khan, the petitioner has made a prayer that:-- "on acceptance of this constitutional petition the impugned action of cancellation of contract vide letter Bearing No, 617/DO (R) D C P dated 31.10.2014 may graciously be declared as void ab-initio without jurisdiction and without any lawful authority and the respondents be directed to rescind/recall the said impugned order from the same date and time and the petitioner be allowed to complete his period of contract till the 30th June, 2015 in the interest of justice".
2. The facts leading to the filing of the instant writ petition as spelt out from the petition are that the Government of KPK (Respondent No, 1) invited bids for the contract of 2% property tax on immovable property fall within the local limits of District Council, Peshawar through publication appeared in daily "Express and "Aaj" through open auction to be conducted on 23rd, 24th and 25th June, 2014. In pursuance of the above publication, the petitioner deposited the required call deposit, whereafter, participated in open auction which was conducted under the supervision of competent authorities. Being highest bidder in the open auction, the petitioner was declared successful which was approved by the competent authority vide letter Bearing No, Aoii/LAC/9- 1/2014 dated 24.7.2014, whereafter, the respondents/department vide its letter dated 4.8.2014 informed all the concerned about the approval of the contract in favour of the petitioner. Later on, an agreement for the year, 2014-15 regarding 2% property tax was executed between the petitioner and respondents on 25.8.2014 and as a consequence thereof the petitioner started collection of the property tax in the district. The petitioner was depositing the monthly installments regularly and without any fail in. National Bank of Pakistan in favour of Chief Coordination Officer of District Council, Peshawar. In the meanwhile on 31.10.2014 a serious issue pertaining to the payment of property tax on DHA Housing Scheme arose whereby the petitioner was asked time and again to enter with them into private negotiation. Since an amount of Rs,60,90,0913/- was to be paid by the DHA in the head of the property tax and the respondents wanted to grab that amount privately in connivance with the petitioner to which he did not agree, therefore, it was in that background that the contract was cancelled by the respondents vide notification impugned herein.
' When put on notice by the Court, Respondents No 3, 4 and 6 filed their comments wherein they controverted the allegations of the petitioner mainly on the ground that in view of clause 12 of the agreement he (petitioner) ought to have adhered to arbitration.
3. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the cancellation of the contract by the respondents is without any lawful authority and that under the principle of legitimate expectancy and promise/deed executed by the Provincial Government, the same could not be rescinded. He further added that the action taken by the respondent/department is immoral, unwarranted and against the norms of justice. He went on to say that the petitioner has been condemned unheard as no notice has been given to him. Developing his arguments learned counsel for the petitioner maintained that the cancellation of the contract through one stroke of pen by the respondents speak malice and on their part which cannot be cured by any bureaucratic approach rather through judicial review by this Court . The impugned action of cancellation of the contract is without application of mind, having no justification rather for financial gain and to some extent the result of political motivation, learned counsel for the petitioner lastly added. In support of his arguments learned counsel for the petitioner made reference to case laws titled "Messers Airport Support Services Vs. The Airport Manager, Quaid- eAzam International Airport, Karachi and others, 1998 SCM R-2268 and Messers Ramna Pipe and General Mills (Put) Ltd. Vs. Messers. SNGPL (NO and others (2004 SCM R 1274).
4. As against that learned counsel for the respondents vehemently urged that in view of the involvement of disputed questions of fact this Court has got no jurisdiction to sit on the matter while exercising constitutional jurisdictioh. He maintained that contractual rights and obligation are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Lastly, he added that in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement since the petitioner has got alternate efficacious remedy, therefore, on this score too, the constitutional petition is not maintainable. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on case laws "Muhammad Younus. Khan and 12 others Vs. Government of N. W.F.P. Through Secretary, Forest. And Agriculture, Peshawar and others" (1993 SCM R 618), and Messrs Track Triangle Aviation Services (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive Vs. Civil Aviation Authority through Director-General and another (2002 SCM R 1061).
' We have considered submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case with their valuable assistance.
5. Admittedly and as stated earlier the respondent/District Council invited bids for the contract of 2% property tax in leading newspapers. The auction proceedings were conducted under the supervision of competent authorities. The petitioner participated in the auction proceedings and being highest bidder he was declared successful, whereafter, the same was awarded to him for the year, 2014-15 with a lease consideration of Rs, twelve crore and fifty lac subject to observance of all codal formalities. Thereafter the petitioner started the collection of the property tax followed by depositing of monthly installments by him regularly and without any fail in National Bank of Pakistan.
' In the meanwhile notification Bearing No, SOH/Housing/1- 16/DHA/2014-15, dated 25.6.2014 whereby D.H.A. Housing Scheme was notified in Peshawar was considered by the government. Here it is pertinent to note that on the day of auction i,e, 25.6.2014, the said notification was promulgated by the government. In view of the said notification, inquiry was conducted whereafter in light of the inquiry report the contract was cancelled by the Secretary, Local Council Board, Peshawar (Respondent No, 3) vide impugned notification.
6. It is the case of the petitioner that the notification referred to above is the result of malice. That he has been condemned unheard. That despite the fact that he was paying the monthly installments regularly and without any fail the answering respondents had cancelled the contract which is against the all norms of justice. Perusal of the record appended with the petition would show that the notification pertaining to Defence Housing Scheme has been issued on 25.6.2014, on the day on which the auction was conducted. Again on one hand, there is inquiry report with adding assertion by the answering respondents that the petitioner was asked time and again to settle the issue but he did not turn up.
' On the other hand, there are allegations of the petitioner that the contract has been cancelled by the answering respondents m alafidely, purely for financial gain and that he has been condemned unheard.
' In the given position, the question arises that whether contractual disputes are open to a' judicial review, and the answer in the attending circumstances of the case, we are afraid is in the negative in that routine contractual disputes between private parties and public functionaries are not open to scrutiny under the constitutional jurisdiction. We are also aware of the fact that breaches of such contract which do not entail inquiry into or examination of minute or controversial questions of fact if committed by the government, semi government or local authorities or like controversies if involving derelictions of obligations, flowing from a statute, rules or instructions can adequately be addressed to for relief under the jurisdiction. Simple is that this Court while exercising constitutional jurisdiction can sit on the matter if the illegality impugned could be established without elaborate inquiry.
' While going through the record of the case, one could reach to an irresistible conclusion that the controversy raised by the petitioner in his petition has seriously been controverted by the answering . Respondents in their continents by placing on record plethora of I documents and hence at this stage, the authenticity of the said documents/documentary evidence without recording' evidence canno I be subjected to scrutiny. Moreover, establishment of DMA Housing Scheme vide notification referred to earlier was issued on the day of auction but the same was considered after approval of the contract and for Which the answering respondents have, no doubt, given reasons but its implementation often the approval of contract is also the question which' could not be resolved without entering into the process of inquiry. Needless to say that if the D.H.A. Housing Scheme is not considered there will be huge financial loss to the government exchequer.
By now it is more than settle that in constitutional jurisdiction, Court does not go into a questions involving minute details nor can it decide facts of which no foundation is laid, unless it is shown that such controversy is devoid of supporting record or perverse. The superior Courts should not involve themselves into procedure for investigations of disputed questions of fact, which necessitate taking of evidence. This can . More appropriately be done in the ordinary civil D intended primarily for providing an expeditious remedy in a case where the illegality of the impugned action of an executive or other authority can be established without any elaborate enquiry into complicated or disputed facts. Controversial questions of fact,' adjudication on which is possible only after obtaining all types of evidence in power and possession of parties can be determined only by Courts having plenary jurisdiction in matter and on such ground constitutional petition is incompetent as in the instant case where the 6 controversy between the parties cannot be resolved without entering into the process of inquiry.
' Besides the case laws referred to by learned counsel for the respondents which is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are also fortified by "Ghulam Nabi's case (PLD 2001 SC 415) where it was held by their lordships that:-- "It hardly needs any elaboration that the superior Courts should not involve themselves into evidence. This can more appropriately be done in the ordinary Civil Procedure for litigation by a suit. This extraordinary jurisdiction is intended primarily, for providing an expeditious remedy in a case where the illegality of the impugned action of an executive or other authority can be established without any elaborate enquiry into complicate or disputed facts."
' The above view has been reiterated by the apex Court in a case titled "Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Lahore Cantt. Through Secretary Vs. Dr.Nusrat Ullah Chaudhry'and others, (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 1068), where it was observed by their lordship's that disputed questions pertaining to contractual liability cannot be adjudicated by High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction, as disputed question of facts particularly referring to a contractual obligation requires recording of evidence, which is the job of a civil Court.
' Again it was re-enforced in Shamim Khan's case (PLD 2005 SC 792), where the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that: "Controversial question of facts requiring adjudication on the basis of evidence could not be undertaken by the High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction where the material facts were admitted by the respondent. High Court could interfere."
' The view was again followed by the apex Court in Muhammad Sadiq vs. Ilahi Bukhsh (2006 SCM R 12) where the august Supreme Court ruled as under: "High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction is not suppose, to dilate upon the controversial questions of facts and interfere in the concurrent findings on such question in the writ jurisdiction but it is settled law that if findings of facts are based on misreading or non-reading of evidence or not supported by any evidence, the High Court without any hesitation can interfere in the matter in its constitutional jurisdiction".
' And finally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the above principle in Watan Party's case (PLD 2012 SC 292), In view of the 'ratio decidendi' in the above judgments of the apex Court, it is clear that as a general principle contractual obligations and controversies, which are based on contentious disputed facts, should not be entertained and adjudicated in constitutional jurisdiction.
' However, the aforementioned general principle has exceptions, which may be formulated as under:--
(i) The illegality impugned can be established without elaborate inquiry;
(ii) The illegality challenged is apparent from the admitted facts or documents available on the record;
(iii) The illegality attacked in the petition is based on misreading or non-reading of evidence for no evidence at all.
' So far as the case under consideration is concerned, as discussed, earlier, it does not fall within the ambit of above exceptions. The precedents cited by learned counsel for the petitioner will not come in the way of the present case because here the controversy between the parties is of such nature which could not be resolved without recording evidence.
' Coming to the last limb of arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents regarding referring the dispute to arbitrator it will be more appropriate to refer to clause 12 of the agreement whereby in case of any dispute arising between the parties, the same shall be referred to Secretary, Local Council Board under the Arbitration Act, 1940 whose decision thereon shall be final and conclusive and not open to challenge. In the given circumstances the petitioner ought to have adhered to the above paragraph of the agreement.
7. In view of the above and again while deriving wisdom from the case laws referred to earlier, the petition being not maintainable stands dismissed.