' ARSHAD MAHMOOD TABASSUM, J. --- Through the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, read with Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., the petitioners seek quashment of FIR No,337, dated 12.11.2014, registered under section 153-A, PPC at Police Station Saddar, Chakwal.
2. Priefly, the facts, relevant and necessary for the disposal of the instant petition, are the petitioners belong to Shia sect of Muslims while the complainant/respondent No,2 is a Sunni by faith. On written application of respondent No,2, the above said FIR, was registered against the petitioners and others on the allegation that on 12.11.2014, in violation of a written agreement , the petitioners after Majlis, went to the house of M/S Riaz Hussain and Muhammad Gull for "Niaz" and thereafter came out and reached the Chowk in front of Imam Bar Gah and started "Matamdari"; that in view of the agreement between both the sects, they could visit the said houses of M/S Riaz Hussain and Muhammad Gull for "Niaz" but could not perform the above act and that thereby they committed violation of the agreement due to which the feelings of the people of the other sect were injured.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the offence under Section 153-A, P.P.C, is a non-cognizable offence and no F.I.R. Could be registered without sanction of the Provincial Government, as such the FIR has been registered in violation of the provisions of section 196 Cr.P.C; that no such occurrence took place as alleged in the FIR and that the respondent got no authority whatsoever to lodge the said FIR.
4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No,2 has argued that the challan has since been submitted in the Court, hence the petitioners have got an alternate remedy which is equally efficacious by approaching the learned trial Court for redressal of their grievance. Hence, the petition is not maintainable.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have myself perused the documents annexed with the petition.
6. There is no denial of the fact that offence under ,Section 153-A, PPC, is a non-cognizable offence and in view of Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the Court cannot take cognizance of the said offence, unless a complaint is made by order of, or under authority from the Provincial Government concerned, or some officer empowered in this behalf by the said Government. For the sake of convenience the said provision of law is reproduced herein below:- "Prosecution for offences against the State. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI or IXA of the Pakistan-Penal Code (except section 127), or punishable under section 108A, or section 153A, or section 294A, or section 295A or section 505 of the same Code, unless upon complaint made by order of, or under authority from, the Central Government, or the Provincial Government concerned, or some officer empowered in this behalf by either of the two Governments."
' It has been ruled in the case of "Muhammad Ishaq and others v. The State" (1988 P Cr.L J 992) at page 993 as under:- "After careful consideration of the arguments put forth by the applicant's counsel and having considered the decisions referred to by counsel and other aspects of the case I am clear in my mind that the police was not competent to investigate the case or put up challan as proper procedure for lodging of report under the law had not been followed and the submission of the challan was without sanction of law and illegal. The learned Magistrate who had initially taken the cognizance and sent up the case for trial to the Sessions Court also acted illegally, as such it was abuse of process of the Court. Since the provisions clearly prohibit the registration of case without authority from the Central Government or the Provincial Government or some officer empowered in this behalf. All to me are, therefore, illegal."
' Similarly, in another case titled "Dr. Abdul Jabbar Khattak and another v. The State" (1990 P Cr. L J 1708) at page 1712, it was ruled as under:- "In view of the above factual as well as legal position, I am of the considered view that investigation carried on by the police, submitting of challan before the Court and taking of cognizance by the Court in the present case were illegal and without jurisdiction. I, therefore, allow this quashment application and quash the proceedings pending against the applicants under sections 120-B, 121 and 124, P.P.C. In Case No, 563 of 1988 (State v Abdul Jabbar Khattak and others) before the learned Ilnd Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi Central."
' Likewise in a case titled "Bashir Ahmed v The State" (2000 P Cr. L J 902) at page 904, this Court observed as under:- "The learned Judge, Special Court-II, Anti-Terrorism, Bahawalpur, took cognizance of the case, recorded the prosecution evidence, conviction and sentence of the appellant without adverting to the aspect of the absence of the requisite sanction/order as required by section 196, Cr.P.C. For an offence under section 295- A, P.P.C. The entire proceedings by the learned trial Court being nullity in the eye of law liable to be quashed."
' In another case titled "Makhdoom Javed Hashmi v. The State" (2010 PCr. L J 1809) at pages 1820 & 1821, this Court observed as under:- ' Thus non-compliance of section 196, Cr.P.C. Vitiates the entire proceedings. In the absence of the order by the Government as required by section 196, Cr.P.C. Learned trial court has no jurisdiction to hold a judicial inquiry and trial. Reliance in this behalf is placed upon the judgment reported as Muhammad Khan v. Government of West Pakistan (PLO 1960 W.P. Lahore 434), Bashir Alunad v. The State (2000 PCr.I.J 902), Faml-i-Raziq v. Riaz Ahmad (PLD 1978 Lab 1082), Gokulchand Dwarkadas v.
The King (PLI) 1948 PC 11), Dost Muhammad v. The State (1976 PCr.LJ 184) and Salman Taseer vs. Judge Special Court (1993 SCM R 71). Besides, there is also violation of mandatory provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure inter alia in the registration of the case, investigation, recording of statement under section 164, Cr.P.C. And non-compliance of section 196, Cr.P.C. The rules of procedure are meant to ensure the right to liberty of the accused and due dispensation of justice, it is the fundamental principle of law that penal laws must be interpreted strictly and not so as to deprive a subject of this legal right. It is also settled principle of law that if a particular thing is required to be done in a particular manner then it should be done in that manner or it should not be done or at all.
' In view of the above case law the very registration of the case against the petitioners and their co- accused persons is violative of the provisions of Section 196, Cr.P.C. Hence, the FIR cannot sustain.
7. As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that in presence of alternate remedy, this petition is not maintainable and that the petitioners should approach the, learned trial Court for redressal of their grievance, it is observed that though the availability of an alternate remedy bars the filing of a constitutional jurisdiction but this case has its own peculiarity, when this Court has come to the conclusion that the very registration of the case is illegal and without lawful authority, the taking of cognizance by the learned trial Court in the matter is also without any jurisdiction. It has been ruled by the Apex Court in a case titled "Miraj Khan v. GuI Ahmed and 3 others" (2000 SCM R 122) that if on the basis of facts admitted and patent on record no offence can be made out then it would amount to abuse of process of law to allow the prosecution to continue with trial. The relevant portion whereof reads as under:-
4. There is no absolute bar on the power of the High Court to quash an F.I.R. And it is not always necessary to direct the aggrieved person to first exhaust the remedy available to him under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. It is coordinal principle of law that every criminal case should be adjudged on its own facts. The facts of one case differ from the other and, therefore, no rule of universal application can be laid in a certain case so as'to be made applicaLle to other cases. Even in the case reported in PLD 1997 SC 275, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner this principle has been recognized that the High Couri in exceptional cases can exercise jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.0 without waiting for trial Court to pass orders under section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., if the facts of the case so warrant. The main consideration to be kept in view would be whether the continuance of the proceedings before the trial forum would be futile exercise, wastage of time and abuse of process of Court or not. If on the basis of facts admitted and patent on record no offence can he made out /a then it would amount to abuse of process of law to allow the prosecution to continue with the trial.
8. In the light of the above discussion, this Court has arrived at an irresistible conclusion that the impugned FIR has been registered without any lawful authority and the proceedings on the basis of said FIR are a nullity in the eye of taw. Therefore, while allowing this petition, the impugned FIR is hereby quashed. F.I.R. Quashed.