' SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).-The appellant. Ali Muhammad Aziz, while employed as S.D.O.
Kbarian Cantt, under the Director General, Pakistan Telephones and Telegraph Department, filed a writ Petition on 19th May, 1974, in the Lahore High Court, praying that Raja Tridiv Roy and Mr. Nurul Amin, two political figures from East Pakistan, could not hold seats in the National Assembly.
Though this petition was subsequently withdrawn by the appellant, yet he was served with a charge-sheet that he had indulged in political activities contrary to the provisions of rule 24 of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and as such committed an act of misconduct within the meaning of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules; 1973. After completion of the proceedings against the appellant, an order of compulsory retirement was made on 1st January, 1975. From this order, an unsuccessful departmental, appeal was preferred, and Mali), he appealed before this Tribunal, the appeal bearing No, 156 (R)175. The Tribunal, by majority opinion, accepted the appeal and set aside the order of compulsory retirement, mainly on the ground that the appellant had not been given reasonable opportunity of being heard.
2. As a result of the Tribunal's order, the appellant was re-instated into service by order dated 8th September, 1976, but fresh charge-sheet dated 8th Feburary, 1977, was served on him on 18th September, 1977. In this charge-sheet, the same allegations were repeated. The charge-sheet specifically mentions that the act of the appellant in filing Writ Petition was an act of indulging in political activities in contravention of rule 24 of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964, which amounted to misconduct. One Mr. F. D. Qureshi, a Divisional Engineer, Telephones, was appointed Inquiry Officer.
3. On receipt of the fresh charge-sheet, the appellant asked for certain clarifications, but no reply thereto was given. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry on 11th February, 1978, and 19th February, 1978, and submitted the report on 28th February, 1978, to the Authorised Officer. The Authorised Officer gave personal hearing to the appellant, and finally by fresh order dated 19th May, 1979, the appellant was again compulsorily retired from service as a punishment.
4. The appellant challenged the order of retirement departmentally, but having not been given any redress, has again appealed to the Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
5. We have heard the appellant, who appeared in person, as also the learned Counsel for State. It appears that the Inquiry Officer did not give a specific finding about the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. However, the fact that the appellant filed a Writ Petition in the Lahore High Court, as observed earlier, was neither denied by the appellant, nor the Inquiry Officer held otherwise. The Authority, while indicating the .Punishment of compulsory retirement, brought in certain extraneous circumstances relating to the conduct of the appellant which are not relevant to the original charge. However, at the time of the arguments, the learned State counsel conceded that these extraneous circumstances to which the Authority has referred, are not relevant to the charge, and therefore, cannot be taken into account. The Inquiry. Officer has not given any finding, as already observed, whether the appellant was guilty of misconduct or not, but it was agreed at the bar by the appellant well as the learned State counsel that the Authority could take suit action on the facts established during the proceedings before the lug Officer, even if there was no specific finding of the charge being prove or not.
6. The only question which calls for determination in the appeal is whether the appellant by filing a writ petition challenging the participation of Mr. Nurul Amin and Raja Triadic Roy in the National Assembly contravened the provisions of rule 24 of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and whether his act amounted to misconduct.
7. The appellant who argued his own case, has urged that, under the Constitution, it is the basic obligation of every citizen, wherever he may be, to protect it and that his act of filing the writ petition in the High Court was intended to discharge that obligation, because he was bona fide of the opinion that Mr. Nurul Amin and Raja Tridiv Roy could not act as Members of the National Assembly, being not the citizens of that part of Pakistan for which the Constitution was framed and Bengla Desh which was the Province of domicile of the two politicians, had not been recognised by the State of Pakistan. In our opinion, the stand taken by the appellant is quite devoid of force. When a person enters the Government service, his entire time is at the disposal of the Government, and he cannot be permitted to indulge in such acts, which directly or indirectly amount to political activities. To say that the appellant was discharging his obligation under the Constitution was itself a political activity not connected with the functions of the appellant himself. The act of filing the writ petition was intended to obtain a decision contrary to what the Government in power for the time being, considered to be justified. It cannot be denied that Mr. Nurul Amin and Raja Tridiv Roy were recognised as Members of the National Assembly for political reasons, inasmuch as at the relevant time, the Government in power was passing through difficult circumstances as a result of Indian aggression on the Eastern Wing of Pakistan and the consequences thereof. There were controversial political views on the issue whether Bengla Desh should or could not be recognised.
The Government had to face those issues. The act of the appellant in filing the writ petition in the High Court was intended obviously to project one of those views though not on a plat- form, but by approaching the highest judicial form of the Province. This act obviously amounted to political activity and in our opinion the Authority had rightly found the appellant to be guilty of the charge.
In any case, a Government servant who is subject to the command of the' Government, is expected to act in a manner in which the Government desires. He cannot be permitted to indulge in such activities which put the Government in an embarassing position. Any act on the part of a Government servant which creates a reasonable doubt on his faithfulness, would be against good order and shall amount to misconduct. The Government servant by his behaviour is not expected to act in a way derogatory to the prestige of the Government. The Government servant is expected to develop some sort of detachment in life and avoid involvement in political activities, even in his private life. We do not mean to say that a Government servant should live in an ivory tower or in retreat from the world, or he should lead a life of cloistered hermits. Nevertheless, an act on the part of a Government servant, which places the Government in an embarassing position, or which gives an occasion for the criticism of the Government, should be avoided, irrespective of the fact that the act is not otherwise illegal. Flu appellant's insistence that he was per forming his constitutional obligation is of no help to him, because t Government was actually placed in an embarassing position in defending the writ petition. Filed by the appellant.
8. For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the view that the appellant did commit an act of misconduct. He has already been dealt with leniently, and we confirm the penalty as well. The appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.