' ABDUS SATTAR ASGHAR, J.---This civil revision under section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is directed against the judgment dated 24-12-2014 passed by learned District Judge Mandi Baha-ud- Din.
2. Brief facts leading to this civil revision are that Muhammad Yousaf respondent lodged a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 16-1-2010 against the petitioner. The suit was resisted by the petitioner through written statement while contending that the impugned agreement to sell is fictitious, forged, void and ineffective as against his rights. Consequently learned trial Court framed issues as arising out of divergent pleadings of the parties and invited respondent's evidence in order to discharge the burden of proof. In the course of evidence Muhammad Yousaf respondent appeared in the witness box as PW-1 on 3-9-2014. During cross- examination respondent stated that he was ready to take Oath on Holy Qur'an and further stated that if the petitioner takes up-the key of the disputed Havaili on Holy Qur'an he (the respondent) will withdraw his suit. The petitioner accepted the offer and thereafter learned trial Court stopped recording further statement of the respondent and kept the case pending for administration of oath. After an interval at 11-30 a.m. Proceedings were again taken up by the learned trial Court and recorded that petitioner has taken up the key from the Holy Qur'an and thus dismissed the respondent's suit as withdrawn.
3. Above noted proceedings and order dated 3-9-2014 passed by learned trial Court were assailed by the respondent through appeal before learned District Judge Mandi Baha-ud-Din on the ground that on 3-9-2014 during the lengthy cross-examination he could not manage his emotions on account of repeated interference and hooting by the petitioner and that due to heat of discussion and spontaneous emotions being overwhelmed he made an offer to the petitioner to take the key of. The disputed Havaili on. Holy Qur'an who went out to take ablution and in the meanwhile learned trial Court took his signatures and thumb impressions on the order sheet and after administration of the Oath his suit was dismissed; that in the given circumstances learned trial Court was obliged not to take the proceedings of Oath rather to adjourn the case as a note of caution in the light of the guidelines provided by the Superior Courts in order to protect valuable rights of the petitioner; that impugned proceedings and order dated 3-9-2014 passed by the learned trial Court being against law and facts are liable to set aside.
4. The learned first Appellate Court after providing opportunity of hearing to both the parties, scanning the evidence and scrutinizing the record of learned trial Court as well as after going through the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble apex Court in case of Muhammad All v. Major Muhammad Aslam and others (PLD 1990 SC 841) passed the impugned judgment dated 24-12- 2014 in the following manner:-- "10. The facts of the referred case and the facts of the appeal in hand are identical in nature. In the case in hand also the appellant during lengthy cross-examination in a spur of moment, during a heated state of mind, had made an offer which was accepted by the other party and the learned trial Court had also acted too swiftly, which was against the aforementioned dictum laid down by the superior courts.
11. On the other hand, the respondent side had referred 1993 CLC 1552 [Quetta] case titled Malik Khan Muhammad alias Khanay v. Moulvi Luqman and 3 others and 2001 M LD 128 [Lahore] case titled Rafi Kashif v. Imtiaz Ahmad and 2 others. As far as the above said referred cases are concerned, it is observed that in both of the cases proper applications were made by the other party and it was accepted by the opponent party and then the matter was decided on oath.
Whereas in the case in hand all the proceedings had been conducted during the lengthy cross- examination of the appellant, during a heated state of mind of the appellant, hence I am more inclined to follow the dictum laid down in Khushi Mohammad's case supra.
12. Pursuant to my above discussion the appeal filed by the appellant is accepted. The proceedings conducted by the learned trial Court on 3-9-2014 for the recording of proceedings on Holy Qur'an and order whereby the suit of the appellant had been dismissed are hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the learned trial court, where it should be placed before the learned successor Judge of trial Court on 13-1-2015 for further proceedings in accordance with law. There is no order as to the costs. Record of the learned court be sent back immediately. File of this court be consigned to the record room after its due completion and compilation."
5. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that since the respondent had made a conscious offer at his own accord without any duress or coercion requiring the petitioner to take the key of the disputed Havaili on the Holy Qur'an which was accepted by him therefore respondent cannot be allowed to resile from it; that the learned trial Court after proper administration of Oath had d rightly dismissed the respondent's suit; that the learned first Appellate Court erred in law and facts while accepting the appeal and remanding the case through the impugned order.
6. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. The moot point in this case is as to whether a party who has made an offer to decide the matter on Oath on Holy Qur'an can resile from such an offer. In this regard it will be expedient to take guidance from the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad All v. Major Muhammad Aslam and others (PLD 1990 SC 841). Relevant extract of the dictum reads below:- Basically, therefore, the principle still is that there is no section in the Oaths Act, 1873, dealing with the question whether a party who has made an offer to be bound by the statement on oath, or special oath, by the opposite party or Witness, can resile from such an offer and the matter being one left to be decided on general principles, the question whether the party who has made an offer can resile from it, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
11. In cases such as the present, where it is not possible to lay down guiding principles as to what facts or circumstances in a given case would induce a judge to permit a party to resile from either the offer or the acceptance, it is necessary for the Court to guard itself and the parties against snap decisions taken by the parties in this connection. More often that not, during examination of a party or a witness, or during a heated discussion or argument, a party in the excitement of the moment may be led to make a snap decision in this respect. He may in the heat of passion make such an offer, or accept such a one, which otherwise in a state of cool deliberation he would not do. The Court should be careful to see that such offers and acceptances are not recorded with the same snap speed with which they are made, for such offers and acceptances would not be founded in piety and grace and would not be made at the highest level of truth. For no sooner a person makes an offer to another to make a statement On the Holy Qur'an or his Holy book, whichever it may be, with regard to any matter or fact, the effect of which will be to bind him in a particular manner, for good or for worse, he does so on the assumption that the person who will accept it is conscious of his trust and whilst making the statement on the Holy Book shall place himself figuratively before his Maker and his Holy Prophet and state the truth, on pain of divine wrath. The Court should, therefore, be somewhat circumspect in this matter and refrain from permitting parties to enter into such agreements, which otherwise do, not appear to have been made by them in some reasonable frame of mind, or which appear to be the result of indecent haste, or which otherwise, from the apparent conduct of any of the parties, appear to be such as would make a mockery of the oath. The need for recording separate statements of the parties in respect of the offer and acceptance made in such cases deserves to be over-emphasised, for such a procedure would give parties some short time to think over the matter and extricate themselves from hasty decisions, before appending their signatures to- their statements. We do not wish to go down on the record as suggesting that this procedure must invariably be observed, for there is no such legal compulsion, nor do we want to suggest that certain safeguards suggested here should be treated as rules of prudence to be observed in such cases, because sections '9 to 11 of the Oaths Act do not admit of such intrusions, but we would say then all this may be treated as a note of caution, for a Court is as much bound to ensure the solemnity of these proceedings, as the parties are bound to respect them."
8. In the light of the above quoted observations of the Hon'ble apex Court scrutiny of proceedings recorded by the learned trial Court in this case clearly manifests that during lengthy cross- examination respondent had made a spontaneous offer accepted by the petitioner and the learned trial Court also acted swiftly without adhering to the safeguards suggested by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as rule of prudence to ensure safe administration of justice. In the peculiar circumstances of this case the learned trial Court was obliged to give reasonable time to the parties to think over the matter in order to extricate themselves from hasty decisions before appending their signatures on their statements. In the instant case record transpires that no separate statements regarding offer by the respondent or acceptance by the petitioner were recorded by A the learned trial Court rather their signatures were obtained on the margins of interim orders sheets. Impugned proceedings before the learned trial Court therefore lack due care, caution and solemnity. The learned trial Court thus failed to exorcise its jurisdiction in accordance with law to ensure safe administration of justice. In view of the above learned first Appellate Court carefully scrutinizing the proceedings of the learned trial Court in the light of the guideline provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Ali (supra) has rightly set aside the proceedings and order of the learned trial Court. I do not find any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned judgment passed by learned Appellate Court.
Petitioner therefore has no case to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court for interference in the impugned judgment.
9. For the above reasons this revision petition having no merit is dismissed in limine.