' M. SOHAIL IQBAL BHATTI, J. --- Through this appeal, the appellants have challenged the judgment and decree dated 23.11.2009 passed by learned Judge Banking court No, 1, Faisalabad.
2. The facts of the case are that the respondent Dank/plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs, 1,75,65,955.05 along with costs and cost of funds. The appellants in Durance to the notices issued under Section 9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 filed application for leave to appear and defend the suit/written statement. The appellants/defendants raised numerous preliminary objections in their application for leave to appear and defend the suit/written statement. The learned Judge Banking Court dismissed the application for leave to appear and defend the suit filed by the appellants/defendants and passed a decree amounting to Rs, 1,67,96,046.51 along with costs of the suit and cost of funds from the date of default till the final realization of the decretal amount, hence this appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the learned Judge Banking Court while passing the impugned judgment and decree committed material irregularity while ignoring the objection that the suit has not been competently filed as the suit has not been filed by the branch manager but by the attorneys of the bank who had not been duly authorized by the resolution of board of directors of the bank. It has been further that in fact it was the respondent/plaintiff bank which failed to fulfill its obligation towards the bank, the appellants had applied for a finance facility of Rs, 30 (Million) but as verbally agreed, only a BTF (Balance Transfer Facility) was provided to the appellants. It has been further argued that the sanction letter is, dated 27.01.2006 whereas the agreement for financing which was annexed with the plaint is dated 27.01.2007 and this was a serious and bona fide dispute which could only have been resolved after grant of leave to defend the suit and adducing of evidence. The learned counsel has further argued that the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff bank was not supported by a proper statement of account and the respondent/plaintiff bank had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of law by only providing one page break-up of the summary of loan account, which cannot be termed as a statement of account reflecting the proper credit and debit entries. The learned counsel further argued that serious and bona fide disputes were raised by the appellants which were brushed aside by the learned Judge Banking Court No, 1, Faisalabad.
4. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent bank has vehemently supported the judgment and decree passed by learned Judge Banking Court No, 1, Faisalabad. It has been argued that the defendants/appellants have not denied the availing of finance facility, execution of charge documents. It has been further argued that no substantial question of law or fact has been raised by the appellants/defendant, which would have entitled the appellants for the grant of leave to defend the suit.
5. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the record.
6. It is established from the record that the appellants were initially availing a home loan from Standard Chartered Bank; and thereafter approached the respondent bank through application dated 16.12.2008 for grant of balance transfer facility (BTF). The application filed by the appellants was allowed through sanction letter purportedly dated 27.01.2006. According to the terms and conditions laid down in the sanction letter, an amount of Rs, 1,68,40,000/-was advanced which was to be repaid in 156 monthly installments. It is correct that the date mentioned on the sanction letter is 27.01.2006 but apparently it seems to be a typographical error as the application has been filed by the appellant/Abaid-ur-Rehman on 16.12.2006 and in pursuance to this application, a balance transfer facility amounting to Rs, 1,68,40,000/- was sanctioned in favour of the appellants. The agreement for financing executed by the appellants is dated 27.01.2007 and the date of embossing of stamp on the said agreement for financing is 28.12.2006. Meaning thereby that the date mentioned on the sanction letter as 27.01.2006 is a typographical error which also gathers credence from this fact that the date of generation of this document mentioned at the bottom is 27.01.2007.
' The appellants have also executed two registered mortgage deeds on 27.02.2007 and 02.03.2007 respectively to secure the advanced amount of Rs, 1,68,40,000/-.
7. We have observed that there is a document acknowledgement receipt executed by the appellant/Abaid-ur-Rehman Sheikh which fully corroborates the case of the respondent bank that the appellant had only requested for a balance transfer facility as initially the properties, which have been mortgaged with the respondent bank were mortgage( with Union Bank Limited.
8. As far the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the suit has not been competently filed We are of the view that a plaint could be presented by Financial Institution before Banking Court duly signed and verified on oath either by the branch manager or such other officer of the bank who held power-of-attorney or was authorized otherwise.
' In the present case, we have observed that the plain has been accompanied with the power-of- attorney of both the officials who had signed the plaint, thus the requirement of Section 9(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery o Finances) Ordinance, 2001 has been fully complied with Reliance in this regards is placed on Muhammad Nawa; Chaudhry and another v. Citibank N.A. (2002 CLD 334, [Lahore], Haji Saghir Ahmed v. United Bank Limited (2004 CLD 1334) [Lahore] and Allied Bank Limited v. Muslin Cotton Mills Private Limited and 3 others (2011 CLD 393 [Karachi].
9. As far the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaint was not accompanied with proper statement of account, we are of the view that this not the case of an ordinary running finance or cash finance facility where the statement of account should reflect ever) credit and debit entry. In the present case, the statement o account which has been attached with the paint duly reflect the principal amount advanced to the appellants; the amount of installment paid according to the schedule the sanction letter and the date of default. This factum ha: also been duly reflected in the para 7 and 8 of the plaint thus the plaint duly complied with the provisions of Sectior 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.
10. At this stage, we would like to refer to preliminary objection No, 6 and para 21 of application for leave to defend the suit; which are diametrically in contradiction to each other. In preliminary objection No, 6, the appellants have denied the execution of the documents in favour of the respondent bank but in para 21, the appellants have admitted to the availing of finance facility and have referred to an agreement executed by the appellants and have also admitted the fact regarding payments of installment. In the detail of repayments, the appellants have mentioned that the deposits were made w,e,f, 01.01.2006 till 13.07.2007 but this fact also does not appeal to prudence as the appellants applied to the respondent bank for grant of balance transfer facility on 16.12.2006; if the application for grant of balance transfer facility was made on 16.12.2006; then the payment could not have been made w,e,f, 01.01.2006, moreover, there is no document/deposit receipt annexed with the application for leave to defend the suit to substantiate the payment made from 01.01.2006 to 01.12.2006.
11. The expression "substantial question of law or fact" as employed in Section 10(8) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 does not mean that denial of availing of finance facility or execution of documents would be the one which require adducing of evidence.
Concept of grant of leave to defend requires that the defendant should come up with a positive defence of a particular fact which has to be supported by certain documentary evidence to convince the Court that there was sufficient ground for granting leave to defend. We are of the considered opinion that Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is a special statute and the Banking Court is not obliged to grant leave to defend the suit in a mechanical manner. The term "substantial" means of real worth and importance as opposed to imaginary or illusory. For grant of leave by the Banking Court, the defendant has to raise a serious question which needs to be important, grave and entails consequence giving cause of concern and must be worthy of consideration.
12. We are of the considered view that the appellants in their application for leave to appear and defend the suit failed to raise any substantial question of law or fact, in respect of which evidence was required to be recorded.
13. For what has been discussed above, we are not inclined to interfere with the well reasoned judgment and decree dated 23.11.2009 passed by learned Judge Banking Court No, 1, Faisalabad; resultantly this appeal stands dismissed.