' ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, J.---By this common order I intend to dispose of both these IInd Civil Appeals Nos.1 and 2 of 2008 as the same arise out of one and same judgment.
2. These second appeals under section 100 C.P.C. Are directed against the judgments and decrees dated 17-1-2007, passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Sukkur in First Appeals Nos.
99 and 100 of 2004, upholding the judgments and decrees dated 7-8-2004 and 11-8-2004, respectively, passed by the learned 2nd Senior Civil Judge Sukkur, whereby the F.C. Suit Nos.17 and 18 of 2000 filed by the respondents/plaintiffs were decreed.
3. The impugned judgments and decrees were passed on 17-1-2007, while the present second appeals were filed on 24-1-2008, therefore, the same are time barred by 1 year and 6 days. The appellants, acknowledging that the second appeals are time barred, have filed the applications (C.M.As. Nos. 15 and 17 of 2008) under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay, without specifying the period of delay, on the ground that the delay was caused due to late sanction of court-fee amount for filing parent second appeals.
4. I have heard Mr.David Lawrance, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr.Abdul Naeem, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents and examined the available record.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the second appeals could not be filed within prescribed period of 90 days as the amount of court-fee was sanctioned by the concerned officials of the appellant after expiry of appeal period. He has also contended that the decisions of the cases on merit have always been encouraged instead of non-suiting the litigants for technical reasons including on limitation. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed his reliance on the cases of (i) Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary Government of Punjab and others v. Syed Muhammad Rafique Shah 2013 SCM R 1468 and (ii)
Managing Director Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. Karachi v. Ghulam Abbas and others PLD 2003 SC 724.
6. As against above, the learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously argued that the appellants applied for the copies of judgment and decree after the expiry of limitation; therefore, they could not be entitled to deduct period spent in obtaining copies of judgments/decrees in computing period of limitation, as such, the present second appeals are time barred by more than one year. He has also contended that the appellant being a Department of Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant and the appellants have failed to satisfy the Court for delay of each day. He has placed his reliance on the cases of (i) Chief Personal Officer, Pakistan Railways, Head Quarter Lahore v. Anjum Farooq and 6 others 1997 SCM R 860 (ii) Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Messrs Azhar Brothers Limited 1990 SCM R 1059 (iii) Government of Punjab, through Secretary (Services), Services General Administration and Information Department, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Saleem PLD 1995 SC 396 (iv) Federation of Pakistan and 5 others v.
Jamaluddin and others 1996 SCM R 727 (v) Lahore High Court v. Nazar Muhammad Fatina and others 1998 SCM R 2376 (vi) Collector Land Acquisition Chashma Right Bank Canal Project, WAPDA v.
Ghulam Sadiq and others 2002 SCM R 677.
7.
Admittedly, the impugned judgments and decrees, were passed on 17-1-2007. The appellants applied for certified copies of the impugned judgments and decrees in First Appeal No,99/2004 on 3-5-2007 while in First Appeal No,100/2004 on 27-4-2007; meaning thereby the 90 days' time prescribed for filing of second appeal under Article 156 of the Limitation Act, 1908 had already expired before applying for certified copies of judgments and decrees, which were made ready on 4-5-2007 and the appellants supplied the stamps on 8-5-2007 and on the same day the certified copies were delivered to appellants, while, the appellants filed the instant Second Appeals on 24-1- 2008, which are time barred by 1 year and 6 days. It further appears from the examination of the available record that the court-fee stamps were obtained by the appellants on 11-5-2007; therefore, even from the date of obtaining court-fee stamps, the instant second appeals are time barred by 8 months and 22 days, for that the appellants have failed to, show sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
8. It Is well settled principle of law that the persons seeking condonation of delay must, explain delay of each and every day to the satisfaction of the Court and should also establish that the delay had been caused due to reasons beyond his control. When the delay in filing the appeal is seemingly sign to mere negligence and carelessness of the appellant who failed to pursue his case with due diligence, he is not entitled to any indulgence by the Court. In the case of Muhammad Hussain v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner reported as 1975 SCM R 304, it has been observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that in civil matters a valuable right accrues to the other side by laps of time and it is necessary that each day's delay should be necessarily explained. Similar principle was laid down in the case of Muhammad Saeed v. Shaukat Ali reported as 1982 SCM R 285 calling upon to appellant to explain each day's delay. In the case of Mst.
Rukhsana Ahmed v. Tariq Attaullah reported as 1980 SCM R 36 even one day's delay was not condoned, holding that even if the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the ejectment order is computed from date of application for grant of copy to date of its delivery, the first appeal filed by the petitioner was barred by one day.
9. There is no cavil to the proposition which was settled decades ago and still holds the field "that Government and / or any Department of Federal or Provincial Governments are to be treated alike an ordinary litigant while considering the question as to whether sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay in an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908". I am fortified in this regard from the cases of Collector Land Acquisition Chashma Right Bank Canal Project WAPDA v. Ghulam Sadiq and others reported as 2002 SCM R 677, Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Messrs Azhar Brothers Ltd. Reported as 1990 SCM R 1059, Government of Punjab, through Secretary (Services), Services General Administration and Information Department, Lahore and others v. Muhammad Saleem reported as PLD 1995 SC 396, Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 5 others v.
Jamaluddin and others reported as 1996 SCM R 727, Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad through Collector of Custom, Sialkot Dry Port, Samberial, District Sialkot and others v. Messrs Raja Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Through General Manager and 3 others reported as 1998 SCM R 307, Lahore High Court, Lahore through Registrar v Nazar Muhammad Fatiana and others reported as 1998 SCM R 2376, and Chairman, District Evacuee Trust, Jhelum v. Abdul Khaliq reported as PLD 2002 SC 436.
In the case of Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad v. Messrs Raja Industrial (Pvt.) Ltd. And 3 others reported as 1998 SCM R 307 while dismissing the Civil Petition, being, time barred by 217 days, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down that so far as the limitation is concerned the Government cannot be treated differently from an ordinary litigant and if in spite of enormous resources and facilities, the Government continues to delay the filing of cases in time detrimental to its own interest , the opposite party cannot be penalized for its negligence. I would like to signify here the case of Chairman Secretary, Pakistan Railways, Ministry of Railways, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Sharif Javaid Warsi reported as PLD 2003 SC 6, wherein the honourable Supreme Court, while dismissing the petition barred by 21 days, and taking serious note of the conduct of Government officials, has observed that it is well-settled that no preferential treatment is to be offered to Government Department qua the civil litigant, and directed that the officers of Government Department who were responsible for causing delay in instituting proceedings before different Courts should be penalized because on account of their such conduct government sustained considerable loss which ultimately had to be borne by the public and lethargic tactics of the delinquent officers could not be tolerated merely either on account of their ignorance of law or for any extraneous consideration. Similarly in the case of Food Department, Gujranwala through its Deputy Director and others v. Ghulam Farid Awan reported as 2010 SCM R 1899 the honourable Supreme Court while rejecting Petition for leave to appeal filed by Government agency, barred by 39 days, wherein plea was taken that delay was caused due to seeking of permissions from different officers, has observed that:- "Number of cases filed by the Government agencies are time barred and it is possible that such petitions are filed either to oblige the litigants or to conceal the illegality, inaction and negligence of the officers/authorities concerned. The burden of decision is thus shifted on the Courts system.
Such maneuver can neither be appreciated nor approved. A stock explanation of administrative delays is normally pleaded in the condonation applications; such explanation does not constitute a sufficient cause or a reasonable ground to be attached any weight or credibility. In fact it is constitute an admission of the guilty negligent of the concerned and thus compounds the ever existing, manage mental inefficiency and lack of decision making in the Government offices. Those seeking condonation of delay are under legal duty to explain each day's delay and to show their vigilance to avoid such delays which fatally obviates a valuable remedy".
10. Having gone through very cautiously the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the appellants, I am of the opinion that the said case-law, being varied on legal premises, is of no help to him. In the case of Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary Government of Punjab and others v. Syed Muhammad Rafique Shah reported as 2013 SCM R 1468 the delay in filing petition for leave to appeal was condoned by the honourable Supreme Court as the matter was of public importance and would affect a number of government employees. While, in the case of Managing Director Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. Karachi v. Ghulam Abbas and others reported as PLD 2003 SC 724 the judgments passed by the Federal Service Tribunal in different cases separately, relating to the cases of Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. Were assailed in the Civil Appeals, Civil Petitions and Civil Review Petitions and the honourable Supreme Court held that interference in the order of the Services Tribunal, condoning the delay in filing of appeals before it would not advance the cause of justice. The present second appeal is neither one of public importance nor any order of subordinate Court/Tribunal condoning the delay in filing of appeal, is subject matter of these second appeals. As such, the factual as well as legal footings of the present appeals are quite
11. In the light of what has been discussed above, I am of the view that the second appeals are time barred by 1 year and 6 days for that they have failed to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Government and/or any Department of Federal or Provincial Governments cannot be treated differently from an ordinary litigant and if in spite of enormous resources and facilities, the Government continues to delay the filing of cases in time detrimental to its own interest, the opposite party cannot be penalized for its negligence. Hence, the applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 are hereby dismissed. Consequently, the second appeals are also dismissed being time barred but with no order as to costs.