' MUNIB AKHTAR, J.---On 18-9-2013, we had asked learned counsel for the petitioner to assist us with regard to the maintainability of the petition. As recorded in the order of that date, we had noted that the petitioner is, as per annexure 'A' of the petition registered as a welfare organization. This registration is with the Social Welfare Wing of the Community Development Department of the local government for Karachi. However, the memorandum and articles of association of the petitioner had not been placed on file and we wished to satisfy ourselves as regards its legal capacity to file the present petition and seek relief in terms of the prayer clause. We may note that the petitioner claims to be aggrieved by the allegedly illegal construction being carried on by the respondent No,1 on the property identified in para 1 of the petition. The grievance is that the concerned official respondent, the Sindh Building Control Authority ("SBCA"), has failed to take appropriate action to bring to an end the allegedly illegal construction. On 1-10-2013, learned counsel for the petitioner had placed before us the memorandum and articles of association of the petitioner (which are contained in one composite document, herein after referred to as the "constitutive document") and we had the benefit of submissions by learned counsel, as well as learned counsel for SBCA on the point of maintainability.
2. From the constitutive document, it appears that the petitioner is an unincorporated body which is registered as a welfare organization in terms already noted. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was engaged in various types of welfare activities. He contended that the scope of its operations included bringing to the attention of the Court or ,other competent authority any illegal construction activity being carried out on any property at Karachi. Learned counsel submitted that in the present petition, the question of maintainability had not been raised previously and the Court had given various directions to SBCA through various orders some of which were referred to.
Learned counsel further submitted that the plague of illegal construction afflicting the city was well-known and that it was well within the scope of activities of a welfare organization to take notice of the same and try and obtain suitable redress from the relevant forums including the judicial forum by moving the present petition. Learned counsel contended that the present petition was in the nature of public interest litigation and the rules relating to standing were liberally construed and applied in suchlike cases. In support of his submissions learned counsel relied on Ghulam Habib Jadoon v. Karachi Watch and Care Society and others 2004 SCM R 911, Ardeshir Cowasjee and others v. Karachi Building Control Authority and others 1999 SCM R 2883, Fazal Din v.
Lahore Improvement Trust and another PLD 1969 SC 223, and two Division Bench judgments of this Court reported as National Bank of Pakistan v. Government of Pakistan and another 1990 CLC 43 and Abdul Waheed Butt v. Mrs. Asma and others 1989 CLC 1936.
3. We have heard learned counsel as above and considered the case-law being relied upon. While there is no doubt that the High Court will liberally construe the rules of standing in respect of public interest litigation, and there is nothing in the record that would indicate that the present petition does not fall in this category, this does not mean that the Court is to altogether abandon and ignore all such rules. In the present case, the petitioner is an association. A perusal of the constitutive document shows that it has at least seven different categories of membership. As is to be expected, the various clauses of the constitutive document contain elaborate provisions with regard to how membership is to be acquired or lost (as the case may be), how the affairs of the organization are to be run and managed as well as all the myriad other details which are invariably to be found in suchlike documents, i,e,, constitutions of bodies when a group of persons wish to band together and launch upon a enterprise. It is irrelevant whether such enterprise is based on the profit motive or is driven by a selfless devotion to the public welfare. In our view, in all such cases it is essential to keep in mind the purposes and objects for which the persons have chosen to band together. The reason for this is simple. While an individual may, while acting on his own, undertake, discontinue or abandon altogether any lawful act or activity, such unfettered freedom of action is not available when that individual joins others in a group or association. This is so because in any such association,* what holds the group together is the commonality of interest, which is reflected in the aims and objects of the organization. Any individual member of the association is entitled to say (and therefore to demand) that the organization remain within the four corners of its stated aims and objects. That,' after all, is why the association came into being in the first place, and why he chose to become its member. This is an established, fundamental and substantive principle of law, applying to all organizations whether incorporated or otherwise. The principle is given effect to through the doctrine of ultra vires. This doctrine, at its most general, limits the scope of activities of any organization to its declared aims and objectives or matters reasonably incidental or ancillary thereto. Anything beyond this is outside the powers of the organization, i,e,, ultra vires. This, in our view is the principle that applies in the present case, suitably modified in the context of public interest litigation with regard to relaxation of the rules relating to standing.
4. When the case-law cited by learned counsel is considered, it is apparent that apart from one case, all the rest essentially involved individuals and not any organization, society or association.
Thus, while the principles enunciated in those decisions are well established they do not, with respect, advance the petitioner's, case. It is not those principles that are in doubt, nor can they be called in question here. Rather, the cases do not apply because the question of maintainability that arises in the present case is of a different nature. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider those decisions in any detail.
5. The one decision that does require detailed examination and which was understandably strongly relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is Ghulam Habib Jadoon v. Karachi Watch and Care Society and others 2004 SCM R 911. In this case the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal against an order of this Court dated 12-12-2001 in Constitutional Petition No,D-1805 of 2001, whereby the petition was allowed in -terms of that order. Taking advantage of the fact that the decision that had been appealed against came from this Court, we summoned the record and examined the aforementioned order. A perusal of the order showed that the issue of maintainability, by way of standing of the first respondent before the Supreme Court (which was the petitioner in the High Court), was not raised in this Court. It was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court and learned counsel in the present matter relied upon the following observations in the leave refusing order:- "2. The respondent No, 1, Karachi Watch and Care Society, is a non-governmental organization (N.G.O'.) and is registered under Societies Act XXI of 1986. It is looking after the problems of Karachi City relating to water, power and other easememary rights besides paying attention to the environmental hazards. It filed a petition before High Court against the petitioner for raising construction in violation of provisions of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979, hereinafter referred to as, "the Ordinance", stating therein that in spite of its repeated complaints the respondent No,-2 failed to take action against the petitioner under the provisions of the Ordinance.
3. Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, learned Advocate-on-Record for the petitioner contends that the respondent No, 1 had no locus standi to file the petition and action, if any, against the petitioner could be taken only by the respondent No,2. This case has the characteristics of public interest litigation and the respondent No, 1, in fact, is probono publico, as such, had locus standi to file the petition and High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Reliance is placed on the case reported as. Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and others 1985 SCMR 362."
6. We have carefully considered the foregoing observations and the submissions made on the basis of the same, but in the end must conclude, with respect, that these observations do not assist the petitioner. The reason is that even though the aims and objects of the society -before the Supreme Court, as reproduced in the foregoing extract, do not appear to deal expressly with the issue of illegal construction, such an issue can readily' be regarded as reasonably incidental to the stated objects. This is, so because illegal construction can, and does, have an impact on the available water and power resources and facilities and easementary rights, and can create environmental hazards. When the fact that the petition was filed as public interest litigation is also taken into account, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court did not take kindly to the objection with regard to standing. However, the aims and objects of the present petitioner, as contained in Article 4, of the constitutive document, are cast in significantly different form. These are as shows (typographical errors in original):
(1) To establish Charitable Dispensary.
(2) To establish Free Coaching Centre to the Poor Students.
(3) To establish Ladies Industrial Home.
(4) To provide Financial Assistance to the needy Peoples.
(5) To provide Books, Uniform to the deserving Children.
(6) To provide employment to the deserving peoples.
(7) To help poor, widow and orphans.
(8) To create peaceful atmosphere in Karachi.
(9) To help Disabled Persons.
7. We have carefully considered the aforesaid avowed and stated aims and objects of the petitioner. Quite obviously, these do not expressly include the issue of unlawful or illegal construction activities. In our view, the stated aims and objects do not include, and cannot be regarded as including, the aforesaid issue as reasonably incidental or ancillary thereto, and this is so even when the fact that this petition is public interest litigation is taken into account. Therefore, in our respectful view, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the observations of the.
Supreme Court in the cited decision do not apply to the present petitioner. It necessarily follows that the grievance of illegal construction raised by the petitioner and the relief sought by it in relation thereto is beyond its legal capacity and hence ultra vires. The petition is therefore not maintainable.
8. Before parting with this matter, we may again highlight the principal point. Made earlier, since it may otherwise cause some confusion. It could be argued that the issue raised in the present petition (assuming for the moment, without prejudice to the case of any of the respondents, that the allegations stated in the petition are correct) is a burning issue for the city of Karachi, and that therefore the Court should not turn away from such issue for what might be considered by some as a technical reason. It may also be argued that had such a grievance been brought by any of the individual members of the petitioner then, most probably, the Court would have entertained the petition. So, why it could be asked, perhaps in some perplexity has the Court concluded that the present petition is not maintainable? In our view, with respect, these objections would not have merit. What an individual can do,' in his own capacity and for his own purposes, is not necessarily what he can do ',when he bands together with others. At its most general level, what creates an organization or association is the commonality of interest that brings different persons, perhaps from diverse and divergent backgrounds, together on one common, platform. Absent that platform, it could be that the group may not have banded together at all. Furthermore, if the group comes together under the umbrella of the stated goals and objectives and it is felt that the association should now pursue some other objective, whether in tandem with or to the exclusion of existing goals, it is a simple thing (especially in the case of an unincorporated association) to.
Modify the aims and objectives to reflect this change. However, until and unless the objects are so changed, they provide (along with anything reasonably incidental or ancillary thereto) the framework within which the organization or society must act, if it is to act at all. It is not open to any member or members of the society or indeed even for all the members for the time being, to, in effect, toss aside the stated goals and objects and go off after what, in law, would be regarded as an extraneous goal, no matter how noble and desirable that objective may This, in our view, is a fundamental principle of the law relating to organizations, and is part of the substantive law applicable to them. With respect, we find ourselves unable to accept learned counsel's invitation to cast it aside, no matter how worthy the result sought to be achieved through the present petition may appear to be.
9. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this petition is not maintainable, and therefore dismiss it as such.