' ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, J.---This second appeal under section 100, C.P.C. Is directed against the judgment and decree dated 442-2008 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge Sukkur in First Appeal No 35 of 2006, upholding the judgment and decree dated 20-6-2006 passed by the learned 2nd Senior Civil Judge Sukkur, whereby the F.C. Suit No, 99 of 2005 filed by the appellant/plaintiff was dismissed.
2. The impugned judgment and decree was passed on 4-12-2008, while the present second appeal was filed on 274-2009, therefore, the same is barred by time The appellant acknowledging that the second appeal is barred by time has filed the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act (C.M.A No 166 of 2009) for condonation of delay of 52 days, on the ground that the appellant was sick, therefore, the delay in filing parent second appeal be condoned.
3. I have heard Mr. Mian Mumtaz Rabbani Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Abdul Ghaffar Memon, the learned State counsel and examined the available record.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the appellant was suffering from Dard Urqun-Nisa (Sciatica); therefore, he was under treatment of a Hakeem, who has issued such certificate, and since the appellant was unable to move from 5th February 2009 to 20th April 2009, he could not file the second appeal in time thus, the delay in filing of second appeal is liable to be condoned.
5. On the other hand, the learned State counsel has opposed the application for condonation of delay. He has contended that the medical certificate issued by Hakeem is apparently managed one and the appellant has failed to satisfy the Court for delay of each day, as the second appeal is time barred by 52 days.
6. Admittedly, the impugned judgment and decree was passed on 4-12-2008 And the instant second Appeal was filed on 27-4-2009, which is time barred by 52 days. It appears from the perusal of certificate issued by Hakeem M. Shafi Khan that the appellant was under his treatment for 43 days, from 5th February, 2009 to 20th March, 2009. The reading of the certificate does not disclose that the appellant who was allegedly suffering from sciatica was bedridden and that he was unable to move or even communicate the instructions to his advocate to prefer the second appeal. Even the period of 43 days consumed in treatment of appellant is condoned the second appeal is time barred by nine days.
7. It is well settled principle of law that the persons seeking condonation of delay must explain delay of each and every day to the satisfaction of the Court and should also establish that the delay had been caused due to reasons beyond his control. When the delay in filing the appeal is seemingly sign to mere negligence and carelessness of the appellant who failed to pursue his case with due diligence, he is not entitled to any indulgence by the Court. In the case of Muhammad B Hussain v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner reported as 1975 SCM R 304, it has been observed by the honourable Supreme Court that in civil matters a valuable right accrues to the other side by lapse of time and it is necessary that each day's delay should be necessarily explained. Similar principle was laid down in the case of Muhammad Saeed v. Shaukat Ali reported as 1982 SCM R 285 calling upon to appellant to explain each day's delay. In the case of Mst. Rukhsana Ahmed v. Tariq Attaullah reported as 1980 SCM R 36, even one day's delay was not condoned, holding that even if the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the ejectment order is computed from date of application for grant of copy to date of its delivery, the first appeal filed by the petitioner was barred by one day.
8. In the light of what has been discussed above the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed. Consequently, the second appeal is also dismissed being time bared.