' SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, J.---By means of this appeal under section 33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to be as "the Act") the appellant had called in question the vires of order dated 13-6-2011 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur.
2. Succinct facts, forming factual canvass of the instant appeal, are that the respondent filed petition/complaint under section 25 of the Act before the learned Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur, with the averments that his son, namely, Duraiz Murtaza applied for admission in M.B.B.S in the appellant's college and he was offered admission by virtue of communication dated 27-9-2009. Consequent thereto the respondent's son deposited requisite dues amounting to Rs,7,90,000/- and in token thereof the appellant issued receipt dated 28-3- 2009. Later on, as son of the respondent was also selected for admission in Sir Agha Khan Medical University, he decided to join the said institution and requested the appellant for return of dues deposited by him and a cheque amounting to Rs,2,40,000/- was issued in the name of the respondent towards part refund of the dues. As the entire amount deposited by son of the respondent was not paid back, the respondent served legal notice on the appellant on 6-5-2010.
As grievance of the respondent was not redressed despite issuance of legal notice, the respondent instituted petition/complaint under section 25 of the Act before the Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur which was contested by the present appellant. The learned Presiding Officer after scanning the evidence of both sides and hearing arguments of respective learned counsel for the parties, held the respondent entitled to recover Rs,5.49,000/-. As remaining amount and Rs,1,00,000/- as cost from the appellant; hence the instant appeal.
3. The arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant can be summed up in the words that the respondent was not authorized to institute the petition/complaint; that the respondent does not, fall within the definition of an aggrieved person as contemplated under section 2(c) of the Act; that the District Consumer Court at Bahawalpur had no jurisdiction in presence of Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, as not only cause of action arose at Islamabad but the appellant also has its place of business there; that by virtue of the letter, referred above, it was informed to student in unequivocal terms that certain dues deposited by him were non- refundable; that as no services were provided by the appellant therefore the provisions of the Act were not attracted; that the claim filed by the respondent was hopelessly time barred; that seat allocated to son of the respondent is vacant till to-date which would remain so till 2014 viz. Completion of the course; that contractual obligations cannot be enforced through Consumer Court. In addition to his oral submissions, learned counsel has referred to the case reported as Hammad Arshad v. NFD Institute of Engineering and Technological Training Khanewal Road, Multan (2006 M LD 967).
4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent, while defending the impugned order, submits that as the appellant offered admission to son of the respondent at Bahawalpur therefore the jurisdiction was rightly exercised by the Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur; that according to section 27 of the Act the respondent was well within his rights to institute the petition/complaint at Bahawalpur; that as the cheque was issued in the name of the respondent, he is an aggrieved person; that educational institutions, which otherwise are considered as source of imparting education, have become business hub now-a-days; that the appellant-college authorities use to get signed terms and conditions of their own choice in order to avoid any future liability; that the complaint filed by the respondent was within stipulated time as envisaged under section 28(4) of the Act; that when the private educational institutions are being run on commercial basis the jurisdiction of the Consumer Court is fully attracted. In addition to his oral submissions, learned counsel has referred to judgment dated 30-4-2012, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in Writ Petition No,415 of 2011 titled Muhammad Usman Syed v. COMSATS Institute of Information Technology Etc.
5. I have given ardent hearing to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and have also perused the documents annexed with this petition and those forming record of the lower Court in addition to the case-law cited at the bar.
6. Firstly taking up the point regarding jurisdiction of Consumer Court at Bahawalpur, I am of the view that to determine the scope and purpose of a particular enactment, conjunctive reading of the legislation as a whole with its preamble, main title, followed by a short title, plays a pivotal role.
In this regard, my view stands fortified from the verdicts of the apex court of country reported as Sabz Ali Khan v. Bismillah Khan and another (1997 SCM R 1781), The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v.
Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan Works Division and 2 others (PLD 1972 SC 279). To determine the extent and scope of the Act, 1 deem it appropriate to have a glance over section 1 of the Act which for convenience of reference is reproduced herein below:- "1. Short title, extent and commencement.--
(1) This Act may be called the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005.
(2) It shall extend to the whole of the Province of the Punjab.
(3) It shall come into force at once."
A bare perusal of afore-quoted provision from the Act makes it clear that the territorial limits of the Act are confined to the province of Punjab.
7. Further, it is golden principle of interpretation of statutes that while interpreting provisions of an Act, it is presumed that while enacting the legislation, the legislator was well aware about the existing enactments on the subject at the relevant time. It is admitted fact that the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act was promulgated in the year 1995. While determining purpose and extent of the said Act, the legislator introduced section 1 which for facility of reference is reproduced herein below:--
1. "Short title, extent and commencement.--
(1) This Act may be called the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995.
(2) It extends to the Islamabad Capital Territory.
(3) It shall come into force at once."
When both the afore-referred enactments are put in juxtaposition to each other, it surfaces on the scene that they both have independent territorial limits viz. The provisions of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 are attracted to the matters where the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of Islamabad Capital Territory where the provisions of the Act (The Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005) are confined to matters falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the province of Punjab. It is also important to mention over here that while determining the territorial limits of a statute, its scope/extent cannot unnecessarily be stretched to the area falling within the domain of another enactment as the same would amount to overlap the territorial limits of each other.
8. Another off-shoot which has direct nexus with the issue, under discussion, is the place of cause of action. To determine the venue of cause of action the place of transaction between the parties and its allied matters play a pivotal role, In the matter in hand, admittedly, son of the respondent applied for admission to the appellant-college having its sole office at Islamabad; the dues were deposited in the account of the appellant maintained there; the amount was partly refunded to the respondent by virtue of Cheque No,1261309 dated 19-10-2009 drawn at Emirates Global Islamic Bank, Shifa Hospital Sub Branch, Islamabad and the appellant has also its sole education complex there. In this scenario, the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of Islamabad Capital Territory.
9. Section 27 of the Act determines the jurisdiction of the consumer court to entertain a complaint/petition. According to the said provision of law, an aggrieved person can file complaint/petition before the consumer court in whose jurisdiction the defendants or one of them voluntarily resides, or carries, on business or personally works for gain or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The discussion made in the preceding paragraph makes it indubitably clear that not only cause of action arose at Islamabad but the appellant has also its place of business there, thus the jurisdiction of the District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur was not attracted
10. According to section 26(1) of the Act the Government has been bestowed with the power to establish one or more consumer courts and determine their area of jurisdiction. In exercise of the said power, Government of the Punjab has issued Notification (bearing No,E&A(ID)7-15/2001, dated 2-2-2007, earmarking the territorial limits of the Consumer Courts working under the Act. According to the said Notification, the District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matters arising within the territorial limits of Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar and Rahim Yar Khan Districts. This being the position, learned Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur assumed the jurisdiction which was not vested in him.
10. While dealing with the issue, under discussion, the august Supreme Court in the case of Sabz Ali Khan (supra) has inter alia held as under:-- "A statute may not therefore, be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made... "
' Likewise, this court in the case reported as Hashim Ali v. The State (PLD 1963 (W.P) Lahore 82) has laid law to the following effect:- "*It may be safely asserted that unless the language of a statute indicates otherwise it is to be presumed that it does not apply to matters regarding which a provision already exists
12. The discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs is sufficient to hold that the Consumer Court, Bahawalpur was not competent to entertain the petition/complaint filed by the respondent.
13. Now coming to the point as to whether the respondent falls within the definition of an aggrieved person or not, a perusal of section 2(c) of the Act is of vital importance, which for convenience of reference is reproduced herein below: "2(c) "Consumer" means a person or entity who-
(i) buys or obtains on lease any product for a consideration and includes any user of a such product but does not include a person who obtains any product for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires any services for a consideration and includes any beneficiary of such services"
' Admittedly, neither the respondent applied for admission in the college, nor he was offered the same nor receipt regarding deposit of dues was issued to him as is evident from the documents available at pages Nos.15 and 16 of the petition/complaint. So far as contention of the respondent regarding issuance of cheque in ins name is concerned, 1 am of the view that in case of refund of amount to the students, who do not have their own bank accounts, cheque is issued in the name of their guardian. Thus, this fact is not sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur.
14. Now coming to the case-law cited by learned counsel for the respondent, I am of the opinion that the same is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case inasmuch as in the said case the Islamabad High Court while exercising its jurisdiction vested under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, ordered for refund of certain dues received by COMSATS University but the preposition involved in this position is entirely different.
15. For what has been discussed above, I have no doubt in my mind to hold that the learned Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition/complaint filed by a person who was not aggrieved with any act of the appellant-college.
Thus, the order passed by him being coram-non-judice is not sustainable and the merits of the case in such situation are totally irrelevant. Consequently, the instant appeal is accepted and the impugned order dated 13-6-2011 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur is set aside. As a result, the complaint/petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.